New York Court Temporarily Enjoins UCC Foreclosure Sale
September 21, 2020 —
Steven E. Ostrow, Timothy E. Davis, Steven E. Coury & Kristen E. Andreoli - White and WilliamsNew York courts have become a battleground for challenges to foreclosure sales under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Another trial court of the New York State Supreme Court (New York County) issued a preliminary injunction in Shelbourne BRF LLC v. SR 677 Bway LLC, halting a mezzanine lender’s August 19, 2020 UCC foreclosure sale. The decision confirms that the impact of the pandemic on the value of commercial real estate, and upon traditional steps taken to conduct a foreclosure auction, are both key factors that courts will continue to consider in determining whether a UCC foreclosure sale scheduled during the pandemic can be conducted in a commercially reasonable manner as required by the UCC.
THE CASE
In Shelbourne, the mezzanine borrowers owned the membership or equity interests in the companies (collectively, the “Property Owner”) that held title to a 12-story office building in Albany, New York. As security for the $3.35 million mezzanine loan, the mezzanine borrowers pledged their equity interests to the mezzanine lender. In May 2020, the mezzanine lender declared a default under the mezzanine loan as a result of the Property Owner’s default under the $28.5 million senior loan secured by a mortgage against the office building. The mezzanine lender then scheduled a public UCC foreclosure sale of the equity interests in the Property Owner for August 19, 2020. If the sale had been held, the equity interests in the Property Owner (and right to control the Property Owner and office building) would have been transferred to the successful bidder, either the mezzanine lender or a third party purchaser.
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams attorneys
Steven E. Ostrow,
Timothy E. Davis,
Steven E. Coury and
Kristen E. Andreoli
Mr. Ostrow may be contacted at ostrows@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Davis may be contacted at davist@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Coury may be contacted at courys@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Andreoli may be contacted at andreolik@whiteandwilliams.com
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Federal Court Dismisses Coverage Action in Favor of Pending State Proceeding
October 12, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the coverage action that was parallel to a case pending in state court involving the same parties and same issues pending. Navigators Ins, Co. v. Chriso's Tree Trimming, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129711 (E.D. Calif. July 22, 2020).
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) entered into a tree, brush and wood removal contract with Mount F Enterprises, Inc. Mountain F subsequently entered into a subcontractor agreement with Chriso Tree Trimming, Inc. for work to be performed for PG&E. In August 2017, Chriso attempted to remove a tree, but the tree accidentally fell in the wrong direction and knocked down nearby powerlines. The powerlines came into contact with surrounding brush and started the "Railroad Fire." The fire was eventually contained on September 15, 2017, after 12, 407 acres were burned and 7 structures and 7 homes were destroyed.
Five subrogation lawsuits were filed in state court against Chriso and Mountain F by various insurance companies that paid for the damage caused by the Railroad Fire. A policy limits demand to settle all claims against Chriso and Mountain F was made. Navigators insured Chriso for $9 million through a Commercial Excess Liability Policy, payable once all other insurance was exhausted. The policy included a "Professional Services Endorsement" (PSE Exclusion) that excluded coverage of "professional services." "Professional services" was defined through a list of 12 non-exclusive professions and services that generally referred to activities involving specialized knowledge or skill that was predominantly mental or intellectual in nature rather than physical or manual.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
The Year 2010 In Review: Design And Construction Defects Litigation
February 25, 2011 —
Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen LauderdaleThis article is the first in a series summarizing construction law developments for 2010
1. Centex Homes v. Financial Pacific Life Insurance Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1995 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
After settling numerous homeowners’ construction defect claims — and more than ten years after the homes were substantially completed — a home developer brought suit against one of the concrete fabrication subcontractors for the development seeking indemnity for amounts paid to the homeowners, as well as for damages for breach of the subcontractor’s duties to procure specific insurance and to defend the developer against the homeowners’ claims. The subcontractor brought a motion for summary adjudication on the ground the developer’s claims were barred by the ten year statute of repose contained in Code of Civil Procedure Section 337.15.
The District Court agreed the developer’s claim for indemnity was barred by Section 337.15. And it held that because the damages recoverable for breach of the subcontractor’s duty to purchase insurance are identical to the damages recoverable through the developer’s indemnity claim, the breach of duty to procure insurance claim also was time-barred. The District Court, however, allowed the claim for breach of the duty to defend to proceed. The categories of losses associated with such a claim (attorneys’ fees and other defense costs) are distinct from the damages recoverable through claims governed by Section 337.15 (latent deficiency in the design and construction of the homes and injury to property arising out of the latent deficiencies).
2. UDC — Universal Development v. CH2M Hill, 181 Cal. App. 4th 10 (6th Dist. Jan. 2010)
Indemnification clauses in construction agreements often state that one party to the agreement — the “indemnitor” — will defend and indemnify the other party from particular types of claims. Of course, having a contract right to a defense is not the same as actually receiving a defense. Any indemnitor attempting to avoid paying for defense costs can simply deny the tender of defense with the hope that when the underlying claim is resolved the defense obligations will be forgotten. In the past, when parties entitled to a defense — the “indemnitees” — had long memories and pressed to recover defense costs, indemnitors attempted to justify denying the tender by claiming their defense obligations coincided with their indemnity obligations and neither arose until a final determination was made that the underlying claim was one for which indemnity was owed.
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Reprinted courtesy of Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen Lauderdale, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP. Ms. Matson can be contacted at cmatson@sheppardmullin.com, Mr. Hamersmith can be contacted at hhamersmith@sheppardmullin.com, and Ms. Lauderdale can be contacted at hlauderdale@sheppardmullin.com.
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Pennsylvania Superior Court Fires up a Case-By-Case Analysis for Landlord-Tenant, Implied Co-Insured Questions
February 03, 2020 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Joella v. Cole, 2019 PA Super. 313, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently considered whether a tenant, alleged by the landlord’s property insurance carrier to have carelessly caused a fire, was an implied co-insured on the landlord’s policy. The court found that the tenant was an implied co-insured because the lease stated that the landlord would procure insurance for the building, which created a reasonable expectation that the tenant would be a co-insured under the policy. Since the tenant was an implied co-insured on the policy, the insurance carrier could not maintain a subrogation action against the tenant. This case confirms that Pennsylvania follows a case-by-case approach when determining whether a tenant was an implied co-insured on a landlord’s insurance policy.
The Joella case stems from a fire at an apartment building in Northampton County, Pennsylvania. The landlord’s property insurance carrier paid the landlord $180,000 to repair the damages resulting from the fire. In March 2018, the insurer brought a subrogation action against Annie Cole, a tenant in the building, alleging that Ms. Cole’s negligent use of an extension cord caused the fire. Ms. Cole raised the affirmative defense that she was an implied co-insured on the landlord’s insurance policy. The subrogating insurer filed a partial motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Ms. Cole’s defense. In response, Ms. Cole filed a cross motion for partial judgment, arguing that because the lease specified that the landlord would maintain fire insurance for the building, there was a reasonable expectation that she would be a co-insured on that policy. The trial court found in favor of Ms. Cole, holding that the landlord’s insurer could not maintain a subrogation action against her because she was an implied co-insured of the landlord’s insurance policy under the terms of the lease. The landlord’s insurer filed an appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Electronic Signatures On Contracts: Are They Truly Compliant?
April 10, 2023 —
Rebecca S. Glos - ConsensusDocsElectronic Signatures On Contracts: Are They Truly Compliant
As companies move to work-from-home situations in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the issue of whether electronic signatures are legally recognized becomes more relevant. For many platforms, an electronic signature merely requires logging in, clicking a button, or typing your name. This process, which replaces the mighty pen and quill, is so effortless that oftentimes an electronic signature may feel like it does not carry the same weight as a handwritten signature. Thus, the question that we should be asking ourselves is whether the law recognizes this type of signature as being valid? Additionally, if electronic signatures are, indeed, valid, are there exceptions on whether they can be used?
Difference Between “Electronic” And “Digital” Signatures
Before delving into this issue, an understanding of some related terms may be helpful. In basic terms, an electronic signature (or “e-signature”) is any signature created or captured through a computer or other electronic device. Electronic signatures can include touch-sensitive screens where you use your finger or a stylus to sign your name as you would on a paper document. Electronic signatures can also include forms where you merely type in your name and perhaps other identifying information, then check a box stating that you intend to sign the document. They cover the full range of technologies and solutions to create signatures electronically such as:
- Clicking “I Agree” on a website;
- Signing with your finger on a mobile device;
- Typing your name or PIN into an online form; or
- Using e-signature software
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Rebecca S. Glos, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar, & Fitzgerald, LLP (ConsensusDocs)Ms. Glos may be contacted at
rglos@watttieder.com
Where Breach of Contract and Tortious Interference Collide
January 11, 2022 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsClaims for breach of contract are numerous in the construction law world. Without these claims we construction attorneys would have a hard time keeping the doors open. A 2021 case examined a different sort of claim that could arise (though, “spoiler alert” did not in this case) during the course of a construction project. That type of claim is one for tortious interference with business expectancy.
In Clark Nexsen, Inc. et. al v. Rebkee, the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia gave a great explanation of the law of this type of claim in analyzing the following basic facts:
In 2018, Clark Nexsen, Inc. (“Clark”) and MEB General Contractors, Inc. (“MEB”) responded to Henrico County’s (“Henrico”) Request for Proposals (“RFP”) for the design and construction of a sport and convocation center (the “Project”). Henrico initially shortlisted Clark and MEB as a “design-build” team for the Project, but later restarted the search, issuing a second RFP. Clark and MEB submitted a second “design-build” proposal, but Henrico selected Rebkee Co. (“Rebkee”) for certain development aspects of the Project. MEB also submitted proposals to Rebkee, and Rebkee selected MEB as the design-builder for the Project. MEB, at Rebkee’s request, solicited proposals from three design firms and ultimately selected Clark as its design partner. From December 2019 to May 2020, Clark and MEB served as the design-build team to assist Rebkee in developing the Project. In connection therewith, Clark developed proprietary designs, technical drawings, and, with MEB, several cost estimates. In February 2020, MEB submitted a $294,334.50 Pay Application to Rebkee for engineering, design, and Project development work. Rebkee never paid MEB. Henrico paid MEB $50,000.00 as partial payment for MEB’s and Clark’s work. MEB then learned that Rebkee was using Clark’s drawings to solicit design and construction proposals from other companies. On July 23, 2020, Rebkee told MEB that Henrico directed it to cancel the design-build arrangement with MEB and Clark and pursue a different planning method. MEB and Clark sued and Rebkee for, among other claims, tortious interference with a business expectancy. Rebkee moved to dismiss the tortious interference claim.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
San Diego: Compromise Reached in Fee Increases for Affordable Housing
October 01, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFA San Diego City Council committee has forwarded a revised plan to increase affordable housing in the city, which reduces the linkage fees increases, reported the U-T San Diego. The first proposal would have increased linkage fees by five times, while this new plan doubles current fees.
The Times of San Diego reported that “[t]he fee had been halved in 1996 as an economic stimulus and was supposed to be reviewed annually, but wasn't.” However, Andrea Tevlin, the city of San Diego’s Independent Budget Analyst, estimated that “costs on developers would have jumped 400 percent to more than 700 percent, depending on the type of project.”
The new proposal also contains exemptions for “developers of manufacturing facilities, warehouses and nonprofit hospitals from paying any fees at all,” according to U-T San Diego. “Developers of research and science-related projects would still have to pay fees, but they would be exempt from the proposed increase.”
However, not everyone is satisfied by the compromise. “While the November 2013 proposal went too far, this new proposal doesn’t go far enough,” Tevlin told U-T San Diego. The vote had been deadlocked, 2-2, but will be forwarded to the main council because Republican Lori Zapf, committee chair, could break the tie.
The new plan “created jointly by the San Diego Housing Commission and a group of business leaders called the Jobs Coalition, would increase the linkage fees’ annual yield from $2.2 million to an estimated $3.7 million and allow construction of 37 affordable housing units per year instead of 22,” U-T San Diego reported.
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CGL Insurer’s Duty to Defend Insured During Pre-Suit 558 Process: Maybe?
December 20, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn earlier postings, I discussed the issue of whether Florida Statutes Chapter 558′s pre-suit construction defects process triggers a CGL insurer’s duty to defend. The issue was whether Florida’s 558 pre-suit notice of a construction defect and repair process met the definition of “suit” within a standard CGL policy.
A standard CGL policy defines the term “suit” as:
“Suit” means a civil proceeding in which damages because of “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” to which this insurance applies are alleged. “Suit” includes:
a. An arbitration proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured must submit or does submit with our consent; or
b. Any other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured submits with our consent.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
