A Brief Discussion – Liquidating Agreements
June 27, 2022 —
Gerard J. Onorata - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.During a construction project, it is not uncommon for disputes to arise between a general contractor and a subcontractor. Frequently, these disputes involve claims for extra work and delay damages that can be attributed to the owner of the project due to deficient design or unforeseen conditions. When these occasions arise, the parties can often resolve these claims without the need for litigation or arbitration by entering into a “liquidating agreement.”
What is a Liquidating Agreement?
Because there is no direct contractual relationship between a subcontractor and an owner, there does not exist a legal basis for a subcontractor to assert a breach of contract claim against a project owner. In legal parlance, this is known as “lack of contractual privity.” A liquidating agreement bridges this contractual gap and allows a subcontractor to pass its claim against the owner through the general contractor. Essentially, with a liquidating agreement, the general contractor acts as a conduit for passing through the subcontractor’s claim.
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Gerard J. Onorata, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Mr. Onorata may be contacted at
gonorata@pecklaw.com
Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Kentucky Supreme Court Creates New “Goldilocks Zone” to Limit Opinions of Biomechanical Experts
July 24, 2023 —
Aimee E. Muller - Lewis BrisboisLexington, Ky. (June 26, 2023) – In a recent decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court placed stricter limitations on the opinions that biomechanical engineers may offer at trials in Kentucky courts. Specifically, the published opinion issued in Renot v. Securea, Supreme Ins. Co., 2023 Ky. LEXIS 163, recognizes a new space for the testimony of biomechanics experts – “The Goldilocks Zone.”
Where is the Goldilocks Zone?
The Goldilocks Zone is a perfect place in which the proffered testimony is neither too specific such that it wanders into the realm of medical causation, nor too general such that it fails to help a lay jury. Specifically, a biomechanical engineer’s expert testimony must be limited to the forces generated by the subject collision, the generally anticipated responses of a hypothetical person’s body to those forces, and the range of typical injuries resulting from such forces. Moreover, following Renot, a biomechanical engineer’s proffered opinions no longer may enter into the realm of diagnosing a specific medical condition associated with a traumatic injury. Instead, the question of whether a trauma actually caused or exacerbated a plaintiff’s injuries falls solely within the purview of a medical doctor.
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Aimee E. Muller, Lewis BrisboisMs. Muller may be contacted at
Aimee.Muller@lewisbrisbois.com
What Lies Beneath
April 10, 2023 —
Grace Austin - Construction ExecutiveIndustry experts call it the “Wild Wild West,” and it certainly could be considered a new frontier: private utility locating. While public utility locating is familiar territory, private utility locating is decidedly newer—and already changing rapidly. Public or private, utility location is imperative to safe and cost-effective construction. Hidden utilities can lead to damage, driving up costs and causing unexpected project delays. They can also be dangerous to both workers and the public, causing injuries and even deaths.
The Common Ground Alliance’s 2021 DIRT Report—which compiles information from CGA’s Damage Information Reporting Tool program—found that natural gas and telecommunications were the leading utilities damaged. DIRT received more than 230,000 reports on damages and near-misses in 2021. Clearly, the industry can do better.
CALL BEFORE YOU DIG
Utility location mapping in the United States began in earnest in the mid-20th century, according to GPRS, a private utility-mapping company that was founded in 2001. As postwar development shifted into high gear, the utility industries realized that power, water, gas, phone and other utilities were now being installed in the ground—and there needed to be a better system to prevent service disruptions and accidents.
Reprinted courtesy of
Grace Austin, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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You Need to be a Contractor for Workers’ Compensation Immunity to Apply
November 16, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIf you are a contractor, you are aware of workers’ compensation immunity when it comes to injuries on the site; and, if not, you should be. It is this workers’ compensation immunity (where workers compensation is the exclusive form of liability for an injured employee) which is why a contractor should generally always want to ensure its subcontractors have workers’ compensation insurance. Workers’ compensation immunity would protect a contractor that is being sued by a subcontractor’s employees that are injured on the job. For more information on workers’ compensation immunity, please check out this
article and this
article.
In this regard, Florida Statute s. 440.10(1)(b) provides:
In case a contractor sublets any part or parts of his or her contract work to a subcontractor or subcontractors, all of the employees of such contractor and subcontractor or subcontractors engaged on such contract work shall be deemed to be employed in one and the same business or establishment, and the contractor shall be liable for, and shall secure, the payment of compensation to all such employees, except to employees of a subcontractor who has secured such payment.
(If the subcontractor does not have workers’ compensation insurance, the contractor is deemed the statutory employer and its workers’ compensation insurance would apply. Otherwise, the subcontractor’s workers compensation insurance would apply.)
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Texas Condo Construction Defect Code Amended
September 17, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to David H. Fisk of Kane Russell Coleman & Logan PC, “Before filing a lawsuit or initiating an arbitration proceeding pertaining to a construction defect, a condominium association in Texas with eight or more units must now comply with the newly added Section 82.119 to Chapter 82 of the Texas Property Code.”
Fisk reported that the new section “requires affected associations to have a licensed professional engineer inspect the units and common elements in question and prepare a written report that (1) identifies the specific units or common elements, (2) describes the present physical condition of the units or common elements, and (3) describes any modifications, maintenance, or repairs to the units or common elements performed by the unit owners or the association.”
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Courthouse Reporter Series: Nebraska Court of Appeals Vacates Arbitration Award for Misconduct
November 18, 2024 —
Brendan J. Witry - The Dispute ResolverVacating an arbitration award is often seen as an uphill battle. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “courts may only vacate an arbitrator’s decision ‘only in very unusual circumstances.’” Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 568 (2013). The Federal Arbitration Act provides limited grounds to seek the vacatur of an arbitration award. In Lund-Ross Constructors v. Duke of Omaga, LLC, ___ N.W.3d ___, 33 Neb.App.73, the Nebraska Court of Appeals found that an arbitrator’s conduct warranted the partial vacatur of the award, which granted relief to a subcontractor who filed a counterclaim after the arbitration hearing had closed.
Lund-Ross contracted with Duke of Omaha to build an apartment complex in Omaha. Lund-Ross, in turn, sub-contracted with A Raymond Plumbing. Following completion of the building, Owner withheld payment from Lund-Ross, who in turn, withheld payment from Raymond. Both Lund-Ross and Raymond filed mechanics liens and initiated suits; Raymond’s suit ultimately was dismissed for want of prosecution. Lund-Ross proceeded to arbitration with Owner, naming Raymond as a respondent. Raymond did not participate in the arbitration as a claimant at the time of the hearing.
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Brendan J. Witry, Laurie & Brennan LLPMr. Witry may be contacted at
bwitry@lauriebrennan.com
Federal Court Rejects Insurer's Argument that Wisconsin Has Adopted the Manifestation Trigger for Property Policy
April 03, 2013 —
Tred Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court disagreed with the insurer's strident claim that Wisconsin followed the manifestation trigger for deciding coverage under a homeowner's policy. Strauss v. Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 2, 2013).
Several years after their house was constructed, the insureds discovered water damage. Chubb denied the claim. The insureds sued. Chubb moved for summary judgment and argued that the loss first manifested many years after its policy expired. Further, Chubb argued that Wisconsin followed the manifestation trigger for first-party property insurance, meaning that only the insurance policy in effect when the loss manifested was required to respond.
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
