Insurer Unable to Declare its Coverage Excess In Construction Defect Case
January 06, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a summary judgment in the case of American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Several other insurance companies were party to this case. In the earlier case, the US District Court of Appeals for Arizona had granted a summary judgment to Ohio Casualty Group and National Fire & Marine Insurance Company. At the heart of it, is a dispute over construction defect coverage.
The general contractor for Astragal Luxury Villas, GFTDC, contracted with American Family to provide it with a commercial liability policy. Coverage was issued to various subcontractors by Ohio Casualty and National Fire. These policies included blanket additional insured endorsements that provided coverage to GFTDC. The subcontractor policies had provisions making their coverage excess over other policies available to GFTDC.
The need for insurance was triggered when the Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association filed a construction defect claim in the Arizona Superior Court. CFTDC filed a third-party claim against several subcontractors. The case was settled with American Family paying the settlement, after which it filed seeking reimbursement from the subcontractor’s insurers. The court instead granted summary judgment in favor of Ohio Casualty and National Fire.
American Family appealed to the Ninth Circuit for a review of the summary judgment, arguing that the “other insurance” clauses were “mutually repugnant and unenforceable.” The Ninth Circuit cited a case from the Arizona Court of Appeals that held that “where two policies cover the same occurrence and both contain ‘other insurance’ clauses, the excess insurance provisions are mutually repugnant and must be disregarded. Each insurer is then liable for a pro rate share of the settlement or judgment.”
The court noted that unlike other “other insurance” cases, the American Family policy “states that it provides primary CGL coverage for CFTDC and is rendered excess only if there is ‘any other primary insurance’ available to GFTDC as an additional insured.” They note that “the American Family policy purports to convert from primary to excess coverage only if CFTDC has access to other primary insurance as an additional insured.”
In comparison, the court noted that “the ‘other insurance’ language in Ohio Casualty’s additional insured endorsement cannot reasonably be read to contradict, or otherwise be inconsistent with, the ‘other primary insurance’ provision in the American Family policy.” They find other reasons why National Fire’s coverage did not supersede American Family’s. In this case, the policy is “written explicitly to apply in excess.”
Finally, the Astragal settlement did not exhaust American Family’s coverage, so they were obligated to pay out the full amount. The court upheld the summary dismissal of American Family’s claims.
Read the court’s decision…
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“Made in America Week” Highlights Requirements, Opportunities for Contractors and Suppliers
August 14, 2023 —
Sarah Barney & Amy Hoang - The Construction SeytOn July 21, 2023, President Biden designated July 23-29, 2023, as “Made in America Week.” This proclamation builds on the Biden Administration’s efforts to bolster domestic manufacturing through evolving policies attached to government funds that require contractors and suppliers to feature varying amounts of U.S.-made content in their products and services. To commemorate this week, here is a refresher on “Made in America” and what it means for government contractors and suppliers.
What does “Made in America” mean?
Under Executive Order 14005, the Administration defined “Made in America” laws as “all statutes, regulations, rules, and Executive Orders relating to Federal financial assistance awards or Federal procurement, including those that refer to “Buy America” or “Buy American,” that require, or provide a preference for, the purchase or acquisition of goods, products, or materials produced in the United States, including iron, steel, and manufactured goods offered in the United States.” Generally speaking, “Made in America” or “Buy American” requirements refer to:
- The Buy American Act (BAA) of 1933, establishing domestic sourcing preferences for unmanufactured and manufactured articles, materials, and supplies procured by the federal government for public use, including those used on federal construction contracts;
Reprinted courtesy of
Sarah Barney, Seyfarth and
Amy Hoang, Seyfarth
Ms. Barney may be contacted at sbarney@seyfarth.com
Ms. Hoang may be contacted at ahoang@seyfarth.com
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CGL Insurer’s Duty to Defend Insured During Pre-Suit 558 Process: Maybe?
December 20, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn earlier postings, I discussed the issue of whether Florida Statutes Chapter 558′s pre-suit construction defects process triggers a CGL insurer’s duty to defend. The issue was whether Florida’s 558 pre-suit notice of a construction defect and repair process met the definition of “suit” within a standard CGL policy.
A standard CGL policy defines the term “suit” as:
“Suit” means a civil proceeding in which damages because of “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” to which this insurance applies are alleged. “Suit” includes:
a. An arbitration proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured must submit or does submit with our consent; or
b. Any other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured submits with our consent.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Partners Nicole Whyte and Karen Baytosh are Selected for Inclusion in Best Lawyers 2021 and Nicole Nuzzo is Selected for Inclusion in Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch
September 28, 2020 —
Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, LLPBremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, LLP is proud to announce that Partners Nicole Whyte and Karen Baytosh have been chosen for inclusion in Best Lawyers 2021 Edition!
CEO/Founding Partner Nicole Whyte has been selected for the 2nd time by her peers for inclusion in the 27th Edition of The Best Lawyers in America, for her work in Family Law. Reno Partner Karen Baytosh is also being recognized by her peers for her work in Commercial Litigation. This is an outstanding recognition as only the top 5% of talent in the United States are chosen for inclusion in this publication.
BWB&O is also excited to share Partner Nicole Nuzzo has been selected by her peers for her inclusion in the edition of Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch, for her work in Family Law. The “Ones to Watch” award gives recognition to attorneys who are earlier in their careers for outstanding professional excellence in private practice in the United States.
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Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, LLP
Contractor Walks Off Job. What are the Owner’s Damages?
September 25, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesWhat are your damages as the result of a breach of the construction contract? This is an important question, right? It is probably the most important part of your case. If you didn’t have damages, you wouldn’t be in a dispute. So, I repeat, what are your damages as the result of a breach of the construction contract? The below case explains dealing with a contractor that elected to walk off the job mid-construction.
In Forbes v. Prime General Contractors, Inc., 43 Fla.L.Weekly D20194a (Fla. 2d DCA 2018), owners hired a contractor to perform a residential renovation job for $276,000. The owners were to pay the contractor in five draw payments (common for residential jobs) where the third draw payment was due upon the contractor’s completion of the dry-in (as defined in the contract). After the contractor received the first two draw payments totaling $138,000 plus an additional $6,000 for updated architectural plans, the contractor claimed the job doubled in price and demanded that the owners pay the contractor the third draw payment immediately (before it was due) plus an additional $31,450. The contractor refused to continue unless the owners agreed to its terms, and then walked off the job when the owners would not agree to these terms (nor should the owners agree to those terms). At the time the contractor walked off the job, the owners’ home was not habitable due to the construction.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Significant Ruling in PFAS Litigation Could Impact Insurance Coverage
October 10, 2022 —
Sara C. Tilitz & Lynndon K. Groff - White and Williams LLPPer- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances, commonly known as PFAS, have served as a key component in numerous industrial and consumer products for decades. These “forever chemicals,” which have been associated with environmental contamination and adverse health outcomes, have garnered steadily-growing attention from regulatory authorities, the plaintiffs’ bar, and, by extension, the insurance industry.
The current “case to watch” regarding PFAS is the multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Judge Gergel presiding. The MDL is comprised of well over 2,000 cases brought by both individual plaintiffs and state and local governments arising out of the manufacturing and/or use of aqueous film forming foam, also known as AFFF. The use of AFFF, which was historically employed in firefighting operations, including those undertaken by the United States military, allegedly causes the release of two types of PFAS into the environment – PFOS and PFOA.
On September 16, 2022, Judge Gergel denied a motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendant 3M Company and other AFFF defendant manufacturers on the government contractor immunity defense. Although not an insurance coverage decision, the ruling is significant in the context of PFAS litigation and could have insurance coverage implications.
Reprinted courtesy of
Sara C. Tilitz, White and Williams LLP and
Lynndon K. Groff, White and Williams LLP
Ms. Tilitz may be contacted at tilitzs@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Groff may be contacted at groffl@whiteandwilliams.com
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Breaking The Ice: A Policyholder's Guide to Insurance Coverage for Texas Winter Storm Uri Claims
August 30, 2021 —
Kelly A. Johnson - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.The devastating extreme cold weather event in Texas often referred to as Winter Storm Uri, which lasted from February 14 to February 18, 2021, caused significant damages to homes and businesses in the region. Temperatures during the winter storm were the coldest on record since 1883, with some areas reaching as low as negative 6 degrees.4 Millions of Texans were impacted and many lives were lost.
Insurance analysts predict that Uri will lead to the largest number of insurance claims in the state, totaling $20 billion in claimed losses.5 In fact, Uri is set to surpass Hurricane Harvey as the most devastating natural disaster in Texas, which resulted in $19 billion in insured losses. Further, Uri will be the largest insured loss from a United States winter storm in the industry’s history.6
The catastrophic Uri losses range from damage to property caused by the bursting of frozen pipes, collapsed roofs, weakened structures, loss of power, lack of public utility services, and the expenses incurred in the disruption of normal business operations. In addition, some commercial businesses were unable to operate due to bad weather conditions on the roads, while others were forced to halt operations due to power outages.
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Kelly A. Johnson, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Johnson may be contacted at
KJohnson@sdvlaw.com
