Yet ANOTHER Reminder to Always Respond
July 11, 2021 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsYou would think I wouldn’t have to discuss the absolute need to respond to any served pleadings, particularly after some of the prior examples of what can happen if you fail to respond. Of course, I wouldn’t be starting a post like this if those that were sued contacted an experienced attorney in a timely fashion and followed this advice.
Yet another example of the disastrous results that can occur simply from failing to file responsive pleadings occurred last year in the Eastern District of Virginia federal court in Alexandria, VA. In Pro-Telligent, LLC v. Amex Int’l, Inc. the Court considered a claim for breach of contract (among other causes of action) by Pro-Telligent against Amex. The operative facts are that Pro-Telligent was a subcontractor to Amex that claimed it was unpaid in the amount of $279,660.27, its Complaint was served on January 7, 2021, and Amex did not respond within the required 21-day window. The Court then held a hearing on February 28, 2020, regarding the validity of the Clerk of Court’s entry of default per the rules of court.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Court Holds That One-Year SOL Applies to Disgorgement Claims Under B&P Section 7031
November 23, 2020 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogWe’ve talked before about Business and Professions Code section 7031 which courts have referred to as “harsh[ ],” “unjust[ ]” and even “draconian.” Under Section 7031, a contractor performing work requiring a contractor’s license, but who doesn’t: (1) is prohibited from suing to recover payment for work performed; and (2) is required to disgorge all money paid by the project owner for work performed. This is true even if the project owner knew that the contractor was unlicensed, the contractor was only unlicensed during part of the time it performed work requiring a license, and even if the work performed by the contractor was free of defects. In short, it’s the nuclear bomb of remedies against a contractor.
However, until now, no court has addressed when a project owner is permitted to raise a Business and Professions Code section 7031 claim against a contractor. In the next case, Eisenberg Village of the Los Angeles Jewish Home for the Aging v. Suffolk Construction Company, Inc., Case No B297247 (August 26, 2020), the 2nd District Court Appeal finally answers this question.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
DC Wins Largest-Ever Civil Penalty in US Housing Discrimination Suit
November 15, 2022 —
Kriston Capps - BloombergThree real estate companies operating in Washington, DC, will pay record-breaking penalties in a suit brought by the city for illegally discriminating against tenants who use Section 8 vouchers and other forms of housing assistance.
The attorney general for the District of Columbia, Karl Racine, announced on Thursday a settlement for $10 million. While fair housing cases involving lenders have resulted in larger compensation payouts, $10 million is the largest civil penalty ever levied in a housing discrimination case.
In 2020, the city sued several entities — DARO Management Services, DARO Realty and New York-based parent company Infinity Real Estate, as well as several executives — over housing practices in the District. DARO Management operates and rents some 1,200 residential units in more than a dozen apartment buildings spread across Wards 1, 2 and 3, which include DC’s more affluent areas. (DARO Realty owns the properties, DARO Management operates them, and Infinity owns both affiliates.)
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Kriston Capps, Bloomberg
Background Owner of Property Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Construction Defects
November 07, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFIn Truppi v. Pasco Engineering, John Quattro sued Property Management Contractors, Inc. over construction defects in William Truppi’s home. All parties are named in the suit. The California Court of Appeals ruled that Property Management Contractors, Inc. (PMCI) could not compel Mr. Quattro to arbitration.
The background of the case involves two houses built in Encinitas, California by PCMI: one for Mr. Truppi at 560 Neptune, and one for Mr. Quattro at 566 Neptune. Both contracts contained an arbitration provision. Mr. Quattro signed the contract for his residence and Mr. Truppi signed the other. Mr. Quattro then sued PCMI and its principal, William Gregory. Mr. Quattro claimed to be the true contracting party for the 560 Neptune residence and a third party beneficiary of the contract Mr. Truppi signed, and stated that PCMI was aware of this.
PCMI in a demurrer stated that Quattro “had only a ‘prospective beneficial interest in the property upon its eventual sale or lease.’” Mr. Quattro amended his complaint to account for the issues raised by PCMI. The court rejected PCMI’s demurrer to the amended complaint.
Finally, PCMI and Gregory asserted that Quattro was “not the real party in interest” and could not sue. PCMI continues to assert that Quattro lacks standing, but their attorney sent Quattro an e-mail stating, “While my client disputes that you are a party, and that you lack standing to assert the claim, to the extent you do so I believe you are obligated to proceed by way of arbitration.”
The court did not cover the issue of Quattro’s standing in the case, only if he could be compelled to arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Quattro could not be compelled to arbitrate the construction defect claim as neither he nor Gregory signed the contract in an individual capacity. Further, the court noted that PCMI and Gregory “denied the existence of an agreement between themselves and Quattro on the 560 contract,” and cannot compel arbitration on a non-existent agreement. And while non-signatories can, in some situations be compelled to arbitrate, the court found that “these cases are inapplicable because here they seek to have the alleged third party beneficiary (Quattro) compelled by a nonsignatory (Gregory).” The arbitration clause in question “expressly limited its application to persons or entities that signed the 560 contract.”
As Mr. Quattro was not a signatory to that agreement, the court found that he could not be held to its arbitration provision.
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Scientists found a way to make Cement Greener
October 01, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to Futurity, scientists say by “paying attention to concrete’s atomic structure…they could make it better and more environmentally friendly.” Cement currently is “the third-largest source of carbon dioxide released to the atmosphere.”
Materials scientist Rouzbeh Shahsavari stated that “[t]he heart of concrete is C-S-H—that’s calcium, silicate, and hydrate (water). There are impurities, but C-S-H is the key binder that holds everything together, so that’s what we focused on.” The team spent a year in research and “looked at defects in about 150 mixtures of C-S-H to see how the molecules lined up and how their regimentation or randomness affected the product’s strength and ductility.”
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UK's Biggest Construction Show Bans 'Promo Girls'
February 28, 2018 —
Debra K. Rubin - ENRThe UK Construction Week megashow, set to attract 35,000 attendees and more than 670 exhibitors October 9-11 in Birmingham, England, released a new "code of conduct" for exhibitors, banning the use of "promo girls" and stressing “equality, diversity and inclusion" in marketing, event organizers announced Feb. 12.
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Debra K. Rubin, Engineering News-RecordMs. Rubin may be contacted at
rubind@enr.com
Privileged Communications With a Testifying Client/Expert
June 10, 2019 —
Shannon M. Warren - The Subrogation StrategistIn
In re City of Dickinson, 568 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. 2019), the Supreme Court of Texas recently assessed whether a client’s emails with its counsel were subject to disclosure after the client was designated as a testifying expert witness. In re City of Dickinson involved a coverage dispute between a policyholder and its insurer. The policyholder moved for summary judgment on the issue of causation, essentially alleging that its insurer did not pay all damages caused by Hurricane Ike. In responding to the motion, the insurer relied upon an affidavit by one of its employees, a claims examiner, that included both factual testimony and expert witness testimony.
The policyholder subsequently filed a motion to compel, seeking the production of emails between the claims examiner and the insurer’s counsel that were generated while the affidavit was being drafted. The emails contained numerous revisions of the affidavit. The insurer objected, asserting that the emails were protected by the attorney-client privilege and were generated in the course of the rendition of legal services.
The trial court granted the motion to compel, ordering production. Ultimately, after a series of appeals, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the documents in dispute were subject to discovery. In resolving this issue, the court examined the rules pertaining to expert disclosures. As noted by the court, the rules authorize the production of all documents provided to a testifying expert witness. Thus, the court was faced with determining if its rules required the disclosure of documents that are also subject to the attorney-client privilege.
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Shannon M. Warren, White and WilliamsMs. Warren may be contacted at
warrens@whiteandwilliams.com
The Colorado Supreme Court holds that loans made to a construction company are not subject to the Mechanic’s Lien Trust Fund Statute
February 21, 2013 —
W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCIn a prior blog post, we summarized the Court of Appeals decision in the case of AC Excavating, Inc. v. Yale, ___ P. 3d. ___, 2010 WL 3432219 (Colo. App. Sept. 2, 2010) which provided an interpretation of the Colorado Mechanic’s Lien Trust Fund Statute, C.R.S. § 38-22-127 (hereafter “the Trust Fund Statute”). A divided Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and held that capital loans infused into a limited liability company which performed construction could be subject to the provisions of the Trust Fund Statute.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that this determination was necessary because the statute was considered applicable to “all funds disbursed on a construction project.” Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that the intent of the provider of funds was not relevant, and that the statute applied “irrespective of the [originator of the funds]’s intended use of the funds.”
This decision was reviewed by the Colorado Supreme Court in an opinion released on February 4, 2013, and it reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. See, Yale v. AC Excavating, Inc., ___ P. 3d. ___, 2013 WL 441895 (Colo. Feb. 4, 2013). The Supreme Court strongly disagreed that loaned or infused capital funds which were obtained by the general contractor entity were “funds disbursed on a construction project,” simply because some of the infused monies were used for operational purposes to pay down specific project obligations.
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W. Berkeley Mann, Jr.mann@hlmrlaw.com