Washington, DC’s COVID-19 Eviction Moratorium Expires
August 23, 2021 —
Zachary Kessler, Amanda G. Halter & Adam Weaver - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThroughout the COVID-19 pandemic, federal and local governments have adopted varying moratoria on evictions, enacted as emergency legislative protections for tenants facing eviction. The federal moratorium on eviction, promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), is set to expire on July 31. While the Supreme Court recently left the moratorium in place, the Court signaled that it would likely be held unconstitutional if extended and challenged again. With the sole federal moratorium expiring, state and local protections may remain in effect; however, many of these local orders are also beginning to expire. Washington, DC’s eviction moratorium, one of the most tenant-friendly pieces of emergency legislation in the country, is one such example, beginning a phaseout process that allows the pace of evictions to slowly begin throughout 2021 before a final legislative sunset in February 2022.
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council of the District of Columbia and Mayor Muriel Bowser enacted a series of public health emergency legislation. Under the Coronavirus Omnibus Emergency Amendment Act of 2020, the Council put a pause on evictions for nonpayment of rent or violations of lease provisions, prohibiting landlords from filing a complaint to evict a tenant who detained “possession of real property without right” or whose “right to possession has ceased.” Under the moratorium, the Council effectively banned residential evictions, unless a court found that a tenant had performed an “illegal act” within the rental unit, that the tenant was causing undue hardship on the health, welfare, and safety of other tenants or neighbors, or that the tenant had abandoned the premises. The moratorium and other tenant-protections were initially set to remain in place indefinitely, expiring 60 days after the end of Mayor Bowser’s declared COVID-19 emergency period.
Reprinted courtesy of
Zachary Kessler, Pillsbury,
Amanda G. Halter, Pillsbury and
Adam Weaver, Pillsbury
Mr. Kessler may be contacted at zachary.kessler@pillsburylaw.com
Ms. Halter may be contacted at amanda.halter@pillsburylaw.com
Mr. Weaver may be contacted at adam.weaver@pillsburylaw.com
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Maybe Supervising Qualifies as Labor After All
May 22, 2023 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRemember back in 2021 when I
“mused” about Dickson v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland et al.? Remember how the Eastern District of Virginia held that mere supervision does not qualify as “labor” under the federal
Miller Act? Well, the 4th Circuit recently weighed in on the appeal of that case and had some interesting things to say about the definition of labor.
As a quick reminder, Plaintiff worked as a project manager on a project to repair and upgrade certain stairs at the Pentagon. Plaintiff subcontracted with prime contractor Forney Enterprises Inc. on this project. On Dec. 20, 2018, the prime contract was terminated. Plaintiff filed the Miller Act suit on Feb. 5, 2020. Dickson alleged that Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, or F&D, must pay him, pursuant to the Miller Act, the amount he is owed for the labor he performed on the project. Now before the district court were cross-motions for summary judgment. In evaluating Plaintiff’s claims, the district court examined the defendant’s claims that (1) Dickson’s work did not qualify as “Labor” under the Miller Act, and (2) that the suit was not timely filed. The Eastern District of Virginia court agreed with both arguments.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
UK Construction Defect Suit Lost over One Word
October 16, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFIn the UK, be careful what you tell your insurer; the Court of Appeal has upheld the legality of basis clauses. As Paul Lewis and Janetta Gibbs of Herbert Smith Freehills LLP explain, “a basis clause is a provision set out in the proposal form or in the insurance contract itself, to the effect that all or any of the answers to the questions in the proposal shall form the basis of the contract of insurance.” The catch, as they point out, is that “should any of those answers — whether material to the risk or not — prove to be untrue, the insurer may repudiate the policy and treat itself as never having been on risk.” There is a move in the UK to abolish the use of basis clauses in business insurance, but currently they are still legal.
This came up in a construction defect case covering latent defects in a public housing project. The contract between the owner, Genesis Housing Association Limited, and the contractor, Time and Tide (Bedford) Ltd, required TT Bedford to indemnify Genesis if it became insolvent. In the contract with the insurer, representatives of Bedford and Genesis referred to the contractor as “TT Construction.”
While the courts concluded that Bedford and Genesis were not guilty of misrepresentation or intent to defraud, they did note that neither party thought the firm’s name was “TT Construction.” Therefore, over the failure to name the builder correctly, the court found that the insurance contract was invalid.
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Illinois Court Assesses Factual Nature of Term “Reside” in Determining Duty to Defend
October 30, 2023 —
James M. Eastham - Traub LiebermanIn State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Guevara, 2023 IL App (1st) 221425-U, P2, the Illinois First District Court of Appeals addressed an insurance carrier’s duty to defend under a homeowners insurance policy. The underlying suit stemmed from an alleged injury suffered at a residence located in Berwyn, Illinois and owned by named insured Luz Melina Guevara, a defendant in the suit. After Guevara tendered the suit, State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Guevara because Guevara did not “reside” at the insured premises.
The policy defined the "insured location" as the "residence premises," and residence premises was defined as "the one, two, three or four-family dwelling, other structures, and grounds or that part of any other building; where you reside and which is shown in the Declarations." In response to the underlying lawsuit, Guevara had filed an answer and affirmative defenses in which Guevara denied the allegation that "At all relevant times, [Guevara] resided in Berwyn, Cook County, Illinois." Guevara admitted that she owned the Berwyn property but denied that she "resided in, maintained and controlled the property". The declaratory judgment complaint alleged (among other things) that, based on admissions by Guevara in her answer, the Berwyn residence was not an "insured location" under the State Farm policy. State Farm moved for summary judgment at the trial court level on this ground and summary judgment was granted in State Farm’s favor. An appeal ensued wherein the parties disagreed as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that, under the language of the policy, State Farm had no duty to defend because the Berwyn property was not an "insured location" because she did not "reside" there.
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James M. Eastham, Traub LiebermanMr. Eastham may be contacted at
jeastham@tlsslaw.com
The Right to Repair Act (Civ.C §895 et seq.) Applies and is the Exclusive Remedy for a Homeowner Alleging Construction Defects
February 07, 2018 —
Craig Wallace – Smith Currie McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court (01.18.18) ____ Cal.4th _____ (2018 WL 456728)
The California Supreme Court confirmed that the Right to Repair Act (CA Civil Code § 895, et seq. and often referred to by its legislative nomenclature as “SB800”) applies broadly to any action by a residential owner seeking recovery of damages for construction defects, regardless of whether such defects caused property damages or only economic losses. This includes the right in the Act of the builder to attempt repairs prior to the owner filing a lawsuit.
Background
Homeowners sued builder for construction defects. Included in their causes of action was a cause of action for violation of the Right To Repair Act. The Act requires that before filing litigation, a homeowner must give the builder notice and engage in a nonadversarial prelitigation process which gives the builder a right to repair the defects. The builder asked the court to stay the homeowners’ action so the prelitigaiton process could be undertaken. Rather than give the builder the repair right, the homeowners dismissed the particular cause of action from their case, leaving only other so-called common law and warranty causes of action. The common law claims sought recovery for property damage caused by the defects. The builder nonetheless asked to the Court to stay the action so it could exercise its right to repair.
The trial court, relying on
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98, denied builder’s request to stay the action. The
Liberty Mutual Court concluded that certain common law construction defect claims fell outside the purview of the Act. Builder appealed. The Court of Appeal disagreed with
Liberty Mutual, so did not follow it, granted the builder’s request for a stay, and directed that the homeowners afford the builder the right to repair the claimed defects as provided under the Act.
The California Supreme Court affirmed, disapproving
Liberty Mutual and the subsequent cases relying on it.
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Craig Wallace, Smith CurrieMr. Wallace may be contacted at
swwallace@smithcurrie.com
No Coverage for Hurricane Sandy Damage
August 02, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe magistrate recommended that summary judgment be entered in favor of the insurer, thereby eliminating coverage for property damage incurred during Hurricane Sandy. Madelaine Chocolate Novelties, Inc. v. Great Northern Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103015 (E.D. N.Y. June 30, 2017).
Madelaine Chocolate owned a facility three blocks form the Atlantic Ocean and one block from the Jamaica Bay section of Long Island Sound. Hurricane Sandy arrived October 29, 2012. Madeline Chocolate's facility sustained significant damage to its inventory, production machinery and premises, as storm surge from both bodies of water hit the property. Operations ceased during the 2012 holiday season and beyond, resulting in millions of dollars in lost income.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Assert a Party’s Noncompliance of Conditions Precedent with Particularity
July 26, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesConstruction contracts oftentimes and should contain conditions precedent to payment. Conditions precedent apply to both progress payments and final payment. The conditions precedent operate such that payment is NOT due until the conditions are satisfied. The satisfaction of the conditions precedent triggers the payor’s obligation to pay.
If a dispute arises due to the payee’s noncompliance with conditions precedent to payment, the noncompliance should be asserted with particularity in the answer and affirmative defenses. For example, if a subcontractor was required to provide lien waivers and releases as a condition precedent to payment, then this should be asserted with particularity as an affirmative defense. If the contractor’s receipt of payment from the owner was a condition precedent to payment to the subcontractor (pay-when-paid), then this should be asserted with particularity as an affirmative defense. Any noncompliance with a condition precedent should be identified as an affirmative defense.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
Dadelstein@gmail.com
“Bound by the Bond”
September 02, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyA New York trial court granted judgment in favor of a performance bond surety on a construction project, based upon the failure of the claiming party to abide by the terms of the bond.
The “AIA Document A312” bond form – described by the court (quoting surety law authority) to be “one of the clearest, most definitive, and widely used type of traditional common law ‘performance bonds’ in private construction” – contains various procedures which must be honored as a “condition precedent to an action to recover” on the bond/against the surety. One of those prerequisites is a “declaration of default” concerning the contractor principal (here, a subcontractor).
The case involved the construction of an 85-story skyscraper in midtown Manhattan, and the performance of the subcontract for the building’s superstructure. The bonded contract was at a value of approximately $25,000,000 and obligated the sub to provide a performance bond “in a form similar to the [A312 bond],” and which was otherwise satisfactory to the obligee/construction manager.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
