Hawaii Federal District Court Denies Title Insurer's Motion for Summary Judgment
February 01, 2022 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiIn a rare title insurance dispute before the federal district court in Hawaii, the court denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment while granting the insured's motion for summary judgment. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. GS Industries, LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240601 (D. Haw. Dec. 16, 2021).
GS Industries, LLC took ownership of a parcel of real property located fronting Waipa Lane in Honolulu. The property used four buildings and a parking area for 50 cars. GS obtained a title insurance policy from First American. The policy insured GS' fee simple interest in the property in the amount of $3,500,000. The policy insured GS "against loss or damage, not exceeding $3,500,000, sustained or incurred by GS by reason of . . . not right of access to and from the land,." The policy did not identify any issues with access to the property and did not define "access."
A portion of Waipa Lane was owned by the City and County of Honolulu. Parcel 86 and Parcel 91 on Waipa Lane were privately owned. (Private Waipa Lane Parcels). Vehicular access to (ingress) and from (egress) the property was via Waipa Lane. Ingress was made via the publicly owned portion of Waipa Lane. Vehicular egress was made via the Private Waipa Lane Parcels. The City of Honolulu maintained the Private Waipa Lane Parcels and considered them to be pubic. None of the owners of Parcels 86 or 91 notified GS of their intent to block the use of Waipa Lane.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Parks and Degradation: The Mess at Yosemite
September 09, 2024 —
Laura Bliss - BloombergA couple of miles past the western entrance to Yosemite National Park, visitors pass from California into a postcard. The road opens to a majestic view of
Half Dome, El Capitan and Cathedral Rocks—celebrity peaks if ever there were—which form the towering walls of Yosemite Valley. On the pine-scented floor of John Muir’s mountain mansion, the Merced River flows gently by the side of the road as signs point toward trailheads and tourist destinations. Not far from
Curry Village, a cluster of tent cabins and eateries at the eastern end of the road, is a section of employee housing known as the Stables. It was there that Erin Rau found herself wrapped in a sleeping bag one broiling afternoon last summer, wondering whether she was about to die.
Rau was a little over a month into a seasonal job selling goods in the village’s general store. Almost as soon as she arrived from Michigan, she recalls, she got the sense this wouldn’t be the carefree, post-college summer gig she’d imagined. In the evenings, she was left alone to manage a bunch of fellow early-twentysomethings making the same sixteenish bucks an hour until the shop closed at 10. At night a family of ringtail possums would crawl down from the rafters to tear into a display of baked goods, a long-standing issue she says her bosses did nothing to resolve, apart from throwing away half-eaten muffins in the morning. Similarly, deer mice kept leaving droppings on the pillows and sheets in the cabin Rau shared with three other women. When one of her roommates complained, she says, management supplied a Ziploc with a couple of mouse traps, a mask, gloves and some hand wipes, leaving the employees to sort out the rest.
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Laura Bliss, Bloomberg
Not Everything is a Pollutant: A Summary of Recent Cases Supporting a Common Sense and Narrow Interpretation of the CGL's Pollution Exclusion
October 26, 2020 —
Philip B. Wilusz & Jeffrey J. Vita - Saxe Doernberger & VitaThose of us who suffered through law school are familiar with the argument that there are fundamental rules applicable to contract interpretation and that a certain contract language interpretation would “swallow the rule.” However, insurance companies have long advocated for an interpretation of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion that would “swallow the coverage” that the insureds thought they were purchasing. Insurers have successfully argued in several states that the pollution exclusion’s definition of “pollutant” should be read literally, and be applied to any “solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.” As anyone with children can attest to, the range of items and substances that can be considered an “irritant” is limitless. The logical extent of the insurer’s interpretation brings to mind the high school student who, for his science fair project, convinced his fellow students to ban “dihydrogen monoxide.”1 Citing evidence such as the fact that everyone who has ever died was found to have consumed “dihydrogen monoxide,” he convinced them of the dangers of . . . water. Similarly, an overly expansive reading of the definition of “pollutant” could lead to the absurd result of even applying it to ubiquitous harmless substances such as water. The pollution exclusion, therefore, has run amok in many states and has allowed insurers to avoid liability for otherwise covered claims.
Fortunately, insureds in many states have successfully argued that the pollution exclusion is subject to a more limited interpretation based on several different theories. For example, some courts have agreed that the pollution exclusion, as initially introduced by the insurance industry, should be limited to instances of traditional environmental pollution. Others have held that the exclusion is ambiguous as to its interpretation. The reasonable expectations of the insureds do not support a broad reading of the defined term “pollutant.” Below, this article addresses a number of recent decisions that have adopted a pro policyholder interpretation of the pollution exclusion. As with most insurance coverage issues, choice of law clearly matters.
Reprinted courtesy of
Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and
Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at pbw@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Vita may be contacted at jjv@sdvlaw.com
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Bought a New Vacation Home? I’m So Sorry
August 13, 2014 —
Ben Steverman – BloombergSummer is a time to relax, kick back and make dumb financial decisions.
That's how financial advisers see it, when their clients get a hankering for a summer house after returning from an idyllic trip. Sales of vacation homes in the U.S. rose 30 percent last year to 717,000, the National Association of Realtors estimates, based on a survey. But owning a second home is often far more expensive and stressful than buyers, or dreamers, imagine.
Start with the dark side to beautiful weather. Sun, salt and wind are cruel to houses. One owner in Virginia Beach was shocked to learn he'd need new windows every six years. That alone wiped out an entire summer of rental income, says David O’Brien, his adviser. Storms take out roofs, docks and sea walls, replaceable only at exorbitant rates. "These properties are for family memories, not capital appreciation," O'Brien says sunnily.
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Ben Steverman, BloombergMr. Steverman may be contacted at
bsteverman@bloomberg.net
“If It Walks Like A Duck . . .” – Expert Testimony Not Always Required In Realtor Malpractice Cases Where Alleged Breach Of Duty Can Be Easily Understood By Lay Persons
April 17, 2019 —
David W. Evans & Renata L. Hoddinott - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Ryan v. Real Estate of the Pacific, Inc., et al. (No. D072724, filed 2/26/19), the Fourth Appellate District reversed a trial court’s granting of summary judgment and finding that expert testimony is not required in a professional negligence action where the claimed acts or omissions are within the understanding of a lay person.
Daniel and Patricia Ryan hired Defendants David Schroedl, David Schroedl & Associates, and Real Estate of the Pacific, Inc., doing business as Pacific Sotheby’s International Realty to list, market, and sell their property. During an open house, the Ryans’ neighbor informed Defendant David Schroedl that he planned significant construction on his own property which would impact the Ryans’ property including, but not limited to, building a large addition that would obstruct the property’s westerly ocean view. Schroedl never disclosed this information to the Ryans or to the subsequent purchasers of the Ryans’ property. The day after escrow closed, the new owners’ interior decorator spoke with that neighbor who again explained his extensive remodeling plans.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Renata L. Hoddinott, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Ms. Hoddinott may be contacted at rhoddinott@hbblaw.com
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Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Impact Your Construction Project?
November 07, 2022 —
Chris Cazenave - ConsensusDocsThe Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a set of statutes governing commercial transactions. Every state has adopted the UCC or some version of it. Understanding when and how the UCC applies to construction contracts is important because it can affect the agreement’s terms.
Article 2 of the UCC applies to the sales of goods, which the UCC defines very broadly to mean “all things (including specialty manufactured goods) which are movable . . . other than money in which the price is to be paid . . . .” UCC § 2-105. For the construction industry, UCC Article 2 governs most, if not all, purchases of materials and equipment installed or incorporated into the project. As a result, contractors and subcontractors should be familiar with the circumstances under which Article 2 may apply and how it may affect the project.
This article provides a brief overview of when Article 2 may affect your construction project and why it matters. The article also generally covers the UCC’s potential effects on the applicable statute of limitations, implied warranties, and when the obligation to make the payment arises.
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Chris Cazenave, Jones Walker LLP (ConsensusDocs)Mr. Cazenave may be contacted at
ccazenave@joneswalker.com
Prison Time and Restitution for Construction Fraud
February 14, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFFederal prosecutors have obtained prison sentences and fines for the two leaders of a construction kickback scheme. Others are awaiting sentencing. The Chicago Sun-Times reports that John Paderta the former president of Krahl Construction has been sentenced to five years in prison and must pay $10 million in restitution. His executive vice president, Doug Harner will be spending five years in prison and has been ordered to pay $9.6 million in restitution.
Paderta and Harner overbilled two clients on renovation projects, giving kickbacks to employees at the client companies. Two employees of these client companies have pled guilty. A further five employees of the three companies have admitted that they were involved in the fraud. They are yet to be sentenced.
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North Carolina Federal Court Holds “Hazardous Materials” Exclusion Does Not Bar Duty to Defend Under CGL Policy for Bodily Injury Claims Arising Out of Direct Exposure to PFAs
December 07, 2020 —
Paul A. Briganti - White and Williams LLPOn October 19, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina held that a “hazardous materials” exclusion contained in a CGL policy did not preclude a duty to defend the insured against claims alleging bodily injury resulting from direct exposure to perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), which are man-made chemicals within the group of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAs).[1]
In Colony Insurance Company v. Buckeye Fire Equipment Company, the insured was named a defendant in hundreds of underlying suits relating to its manufacture of fire equipment containing aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF), a fire suppressant.[2] The underlying plaintiffs alleged that: (a) the AFFF contained PFOS and PFOA; (b) PFOA and PFOS are highly carcinogenic; and (c) exposure to AFFF contained in the defendants’ products caused bodily injury or property damage. Around a third of the underlying complaints alleged harm from both direct exposure to the foam and exposure through the environment. Representative language from those complaints was: “[d]uring [underlying plaintiff’s] employment as a firefighter and firefighter instructor, he was significantly exposed to elevated levels of PFOS and PFOA in their concentrated form as a result of regular contact with [d]efendant’s AFFF products and through PFOS and PFOA having contaminated the FireCollege well system.”
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Paul A. Briganti, White and Williams LLPMr. Briganti may be contacted at
brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com
