Sometimes a Reminder is in Order. . .
February 18, 2020 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRecently, I was talking with my friend Matt Hundley about a recent case he had in the Charlottesville, VA Circuit Court. It was a relatively straightforward (or so he and I would have thought) breach of contract matter involving a fixed price contract between his (and an associate of his Laura Hooe) client James River Stucco and the Montecello Overlook Owners’ Association. I believe that you will see the reason for the title of the post once you hear the facts and read the opinion.
In James River Stucco, Inc. v. Monticello Overlook Owners’ Ass’n, the Court considered Janes River Stucco’s Motion for Summary Judgment countering two arguments made by the Association. The first Association argument was that the word “employ” in the contract meant that James River Stucco was required to use its own forces (as opposed to subcontractors) to perform the work. The second argument was that James River overcharged for the work. This second argument was made without any allegation of fraud or that the work was not 100% performed.
Needless to say, the Court rejected both arguments. The Court rejected the first argument stating:
In its plain meaning, “employ” means to hire, use, utilize, or make arrangements for. A plain reading of the contractual provisions cited–“shall employ” and references to “employees”–and relied on by Defendant does not require that the persons performing the labor, arranged by Plaintiff, be actual employees of the company or on the company’s payroll. It did not matter how the plaintiff accomplished the work so long as it was done correctly. The purpose of those provisions was to allocate to Plaintiff responsibility for supplying a sufficient workforce to get the work done, not to impose HR duties or require the company to use only “in house” workers. So I find that use of contracted work does not constitute a breach of the contract or these contractual provisions.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
The Difference Between Routine Document Destruction and Spoliation
October 18, 2021 —
Steven A. Neeley - Construction ExecutiveIn today’s world, there is a tendency to believe that everything must be preserved forever. The common belief is that documents, emails, text messages, etc. cannot be deleted because doing so may be viewed as spoliation (i.e., intentionally destroying relevant evidence). A party guilty of spoliation can be sanctioned, which can include an adverse inference that the lost information would have helped the other side. But that does not mean that contractors have to preserve every conceivable piece of information or data under all circumstances. There are key differences between routine document destruction (when done before receiving notice of potential claims or litigation) and spoliation.
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals decision in Appeal of Sungjee Constr. Co., Ltd., ASBCA Nos. 62002 and 62170 (Mar. 23, 2021) provides a good reminder. There, Sungjee challenged its default termination under a construction contract at Osan Air Base in South Korea. Sungjee argued that the government denied it access to the site for 352 days (out of a 450-day performance period) by refusing to issue passes that were needed to access the base. The government argued that it had issued the passes, but it could not produce them to Sungjee in discovery because they had been destroyed as part of a routine document destruction policy. The base security force issued hard copy passes and entered the information in a biometric system. The government was able to produce the biometric system data but not the hard copy passes because they were destroyed each year.
Sungjee argued the government was guilty of spoliation and moved for sanctions. It asked the Board to draw an adverse inference that the passes would have shown that the government had not issued proper passes on a timely basis, which delayed Sungjee’s performance. The Board denied Sungjee’s motion for several reasons.
Reprinted courtesy of
Steven A. Neeley, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Mr. Neeley may be contacted at
steve.neeley@huschblackwell.com
Water Drainage Case Lacks Standing
March 28, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals has ruled in the case La Tierra de Simmons Familia Ltd. V. Main Event Entertainment, LP. The trial court had found for Main Event. On appeal, the court threw out some of the grounds on which the trial court had reached its decision.
The case involved two commercial lots in northwest Austin, Texas. The uphill tract (Phase III of the Anderson Arbor development) diverts its runoff onto the lower tract (the “Ballard tract”). The owners of the Ballard tract claim that “the drainage system was designed or constructed in a manner that has damaged and continues to damage the Ballard tract.”
Both tracts have undergone changes of ownership since the construction of the drainage system in 2004. At the time the drainage system was constructed, the parcel was owned by Sears Roebuck and Co. Sears later sold the property. Main Event Entertainment is the current tenant. Likewise, the Ballard tract was previously owned by the Ballard Estate which sold the property to La Tierra on an “as is” basis in 2007.
After La Tierra bought the Ballard tract, La Tierra’s engineer “witnessed and videotaped what he described as ‘flooding’ on the Ballard tract caused by storm water discharge from the Anderson Arbor drainage system during a rainfall event.” La Tierra determined that an adequate drainage system would cost about $204,000. Development plans were put on hold.
La Tierra sued Main Event and various other parties associated with the uphill tract, seeking “actual damages for (1) decrease and loss in rental income due to delay in obtaining the development permit, (2) interest on carrying costs during that time period, (3) the cost to build a water conveyance system on the Ballard tract, (4) engineering fees incurred to redesign the water conveyance system, (5) unspecified out-of-pocket real estate expenses, and (6) property devaluation occasioned by the need to construct an expensive water conveyance system.” The trial court never reached these claims, ruling instead that La Tierra lacked standing, that its claims were barred under the statute of limitations, and that there was no evidence of damage.
La Tierra appealed, arguing that “(1) the summary-judgment evidence does not conclusively establish that property damage claims accrued or were discovered prior to September 11, 2007, which is within the limitations period and was after La Tierra purchased the property; (2) even if the property was damaged before La Tierra acquired ownership of the Ballard tract, standing exists based on the assignments of interest from the Ballard Estate heirs, and the discovery rule tolls limitations until the injury was discovered on September 11, 2007; (3) limitations does not bar La Tierra's request for injunctive relief; (4) La Tierra's water code claim against Main Event and M.E.E.P. is viable based on their control over the drainage system, which makes them necessary and indispensable parties for injunctive relief; (5) La Tierra presented more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a fact issue on damages, causation, and other essential elements of its causes of action; and (6) the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the defendants' objections to La Tierra's summary-judgment evidence.”
The appeals court concluded that La Tierra’s second claim was irrelevant to standing, as La Tierra “obtained assignments from the Ballard Estate heirs ? nearly one year after the lawsuit was initially filed.” Nor did the court accept their first point. The water system had been operating unaltered since January, 2004, with monthly maintenance and inspection to maintain its designed operation. Further, a feasibility report La Tierra received stated that “over sixteen acres drain into those ponds, and thus onto this site.” The court noted that “the underlying facts giving rise to a cause of action were known before La Tierra acquired ownership of the Ballard tract.”
The court concluded that the drainage issue is a permanent injury, but that it “accrued before La Tierra acquired an ownership interest in the property.” As La Tierra has standing, the appeals court ruled that it was improper for the trial court to rule on the issues. The appeals court dismissed the questions of whether the case was barred under the statute of limitation and also the question of whether or not La Tierra had damages.
As the issue of standing would not allow La Tierra to bring the suit, the appeals court found for the defendants, dismissing the case for this single reason, and otherwise affirming the ruling of the lower court.
Read the court’s decision…
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AB5, Dynamex, the ABC Standard, and their Effects on the Construction Industry
December 09, 2019 —
Donald A. Velez - Smith CurrieLast year, we reported that the California Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903 (“Dynamex”) adopted a new, pro-employment standard (the “ABC Standard”), which presumes a worker is an employee versus an independent contractor under California wage orders and regulations.
Assembly Bill 5 (“AB5”) has now been passed by the California Legislature and signed by Governor Newsom. Bill AB5 codifies the ABC Standard and brings increased costs, administrative duties, and legal risks for hiring parties on multiple fronts, including, but not limited to:
- Payroll taxes;
- Meals, breaks and overtime policies and enforcement and premium pay;
- Benefits;
- Leave and PTO policies, requirements and enforcement;
- Wage order violations;
- Labor Code violations and Private Attorney General Actions (“PAGA”) claims;
- Unemployment insurance; and
- Workers’ compensation coverage, claims, and premiums.
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Donald A. Velez, Smith CurrieMr. Velez may be contacted at
davelez@smithcurrie.com
“It Just Didn’t Add Up!”
November 05, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyOverturning arbitration awards in court is difficult. One of the few bases for a challenge to an award (under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(4), as well as most state arbitration laws) is where the arbitrator is alleged to have “exceeded [his/her] powers” afforded the arbitrator by whatever rules and agreements are in place for the arbitration. Obviously, this places a burden on the arbitrator to “color within the lines” when serving as arbitrator and issuing rulings in the case.
“After extensive discovery and a 10-day hearing, the Tribunal rendered a 142-page” award, whereupon the parties both sought to have the arbitrators correct what the parties agreed was an error in the award – increasing the award by $47,710. One of the parties, however, went further, urging that the arbitrators “erroneously included damages for claims related to production revenue” that occurred before a certain date. According to the court, that party was urging that “the Tribunal erred by factoring into its award damages related to Claims 2 and 3, which the Tribunal never substantially addressed.”
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Pulled from the Swamp: EPA Wetland Determination Now Judicially Reviewable
September 15, 2016 —
CDJ STAFFLandowners and developers bogged in an EPA wetland determination were recently thrown a life line when the United States Supreme Court determined The Army Corps of Engineer’s (Corps) “jurisdictional determinations” (JD) regarding wetland designations are reviewable by the court. United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. Inc.
Under the Clean Water Act (CWA) landowners and developers who do not have the proper permits can face severe criminal and civil penalties for releasing any pollutant into “the waters of the United States.” Anybody stuck wading through the permitting process will tell you it is difficult, time consuming, expensive, and may eventually prohibit the intended use of the property. Furthermore, there is yet to be a consensus on the definition or scope of the term “waters of the US”. Consequently, a landowners or developers may never be certain whether a permit is necessary before conducting any activity that may discharge a pollutant into a “water of the United States”.
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Sean Minahan, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Minahan may be contacted at
sminahan@ldmlaw.com
You Don’t Have To Be a Consumer to Assert a FDUTPA Claim
February 22, 2018 —
David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA few years ago, the Fourth District Court of Florida rendered an opinion in
Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Palm Beach County, Inc., 169 So.3d 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) regarding
Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (referred as to “FDUTPA”) (Florida Statute s. 501.201et seq.).
This case held that a party can assert a FDUTPA claim even though the party is NOT a consumer. The party still has to prove there was an injury to consumers in filing such claim, but again, the party can bring the claim even though it is NOT a consumer. Caribbean Cruise Line, 169 So.3d at 169 (“[W]hile the claimant would have to prove that there was an injury or detriment to consumers in order to satisfy all of the elements of a FDUTPA claim, the claimant does not have to be a consumer to bring the claim.”).
See also Cemex Construction Materials Florida, LLC v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 2018 WL 905752, *15 (M.D.Fla 2018) (relying on
Caribbean Cruise Line to find that even though the plaintiff does not need to be a consumer, the plaintiff still must prove an injury to consumers to satisfy elements of a FDUTPA claim).
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Anti-Concurrent Causation Clause Eliminates Loss from Hurricane
September 06, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court found the insured was not covered for losses caused by Hurricane Laura due to the implementation of the policy's anti-concurrent causation clause. Aegis Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lejeune, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106804 (W. D. La. June 7, 2021).
At the time of the hurricane, the insureds' home was covered by a manufactured home insurance policy issued by Aegis. The policy excluded coverage for damage "caused by, contributed to or aggravated by" flooding. The policy's anti-concurrent causation clause read, "We do not pay for loss to the types of property covered under this policy caused by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss." The policy's exceptions followed.
After the storm, the insureds submitted their claim. Aegis filed suit for declaratory judgment. Aegis relied upon reports that the manufactured home and barn owned by the insureds were damaged by winds, then displaced and destroyed by storm surge associated with the hurricane. The home first sustained damage from the storm's high winds before it was displaced from its concrete piers by a 12 to 16 foot storm surge.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
