Genuine Dispute Summary Judgment Reversed for Abuse of Discretion and Trial of Fact Questions About Expert Opinions
July 27, 2020 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Fadeeff v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (No. A155691, filed 5/22/20 ord. pub. 6/8/20), a California appeals court held that triable issues of fact and the trial court’s failure to address a request for a continuance precluded summary judgment for an insurer under the genuine dispute doctrine.
In Fadeeff, the policyholders made a claim to State Farm for smoke damage to their home from the 2015 Valley Fire in Hidden Valley Lake, California. With State Farm’s approval, the insureds retained the restoration company, ServPro, to assist with smoke and soot mitigation. State Farm documented smoke and soot on the interior walls, ceilings and carpeting, and on all exterior elevations, including on the deck and handrail. State Farm made a series of payments on the claim totaling about $50,000.
The insureds then hired a public adjuster and submitted supplemental claims for further dwelling repairs and additional contents replacement, totaling approximately $75,000. State Farm responded by using its own independent adjuster to investigate, who was neither licensed as an adjuster, nor as a contractor. State Farm also retained forensic consultants for the structure and the HVAC system, but neither the independent adjuster nor the consultants were aware that State Farm had an internal operation guide for the use of third-party experts in handling first party claims, which guidelines were therefore not followed. In addition, the consultants made allegedly superficial inspections, with one attributing smoke and soot damage to other sources of combustion, including the insureds’ exterior propane barbecue, an internal wood fireplace and wood stove and candles that had been burned in the living room. None of the consultants asked the insureds when they had last used any of the sources of combustion.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Stormy Skies Ahead? Important News Regarding a Hard Construction Insurance Market
August 13, 2019 —
Jason M. Adams - Gibbs GidenWord out of the construction insurance brokerage community is that the construction insurance industry has entered a hard market, seemingly overnight. Property (i.e. builder’s risk), liability and wrap-up markets are all reacting unfavorably, resulting in higher premiums and decreased availability of coverage options.
The prospect of a hard market has been looming for some time given massive weather driven property losses and historically low rates (among other factors). It appears the time is upon us.
Key takeaways for construction professionals are:
- Expect insurance premiums to go up, potentially significantly, at renewal time and/or when seeking a new project specific program (e.g., an OCIP, CCIP, etc.).
- Expect that the available coverage will get worse. Carriers may be unable to offer once standard coverage enhancements and/or may add new exclusions.
- If quotes have been offered consider locking them in now, before the underwriters are forced to increase the rates/restrict coverage, or pull the quotes entirely.
- With respect to wrap-ups and other project specific programs, consider requesting extensions now if the project is expected to go beyond the current policy term.
- As always, the risk management team (lawyer, broker, risk manager) should work together to carefully review contracts and coverage. This will become even more important if the carriers start to introduce new exclusions as a result of the hard market.
Hard markets come and go. The tough times are when true construction insurance professionals separate themselves from the pack and become the key to weathering the storm.
Jason M. Adams, Esq. is Senior Counsel at Gibbs Giden representing construction professionals (owners/developers, contractors, architects, etc.) in the areas of Construction Law, Insurance Law and Risk Management, Common Interest Community Law (HOA) and Business/Civil Litigation. Adams is also a licensed property and casualty insurance broker and certified Construction Risk & Insurance Specialist (CRIS). Gibbs Giden is nationally and locally recognized by U. S. News and Best Lawyers as among the “Best Law Firms” in both Construction Law and Construction Litigation. Chambers USA Directory of Leading Lawyers has consistently recognized Gibbs Giden as among California’s elite construction law firms. Mr. Adams can be reached at jadams@gibbsgiden.com. Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
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Wisconsin “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.”
April 04, 2011 —
CDCoverage.comIn American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 2004), the insured general contractor was hired by the owner to design and build a warehouse on the owner s property. The general contractor hired a soil engineer to do a soil analysis and make site preparation recommendations. The soil engineer determined that the soil conditions were poor and recommended a compression process which the general contractor followed. After the warehouse was completed and the owner took possession, excessive soil settlement caused the foundation to sink which in turn caused structural damage to the warehouse. The warehouse had to be torn down.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
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Terms of Your Teaming Agreement Matter
July 30, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsThese days in construction, and other pursuits, teaming agreements have become a great method for large and small contractors to work together to take advantage of various contract and job requirements from minority participation to veteran ownership. With the proliferation of these agreements, parties must be careful in how they draft the terms of these agreements. Without proper drafting, the parties risk unenforceability of the teaming agreement in the evewnt of a dispute.
One potential pitfall in drafting is an “agreement to agree” or an agreement to negotiate a separate contract in the future. This type of pitfall was illustrated in the case of InDyne Inc. v. Beacon Occupational Health & Safety Services Inc. out of the Eastern District of Virginia. In this case, InDyne and Beacon entered into a teaming agreement that provided that InDyne as Prime would seek to use Beacon, the Sub, in the event that InDyne was awarded a contract using Beacon’s numbers. The teaming agreement further provided:
The agreement shall remain in effect until the first of the following shall occur: … (g) inability of the Prime and the Sub, after negotiating in good faith, to reach agreement on the terms of a subcontract offered by the Prime, in accordance with this agreement.
InDyne was subsequently awarded a contract with the Air Force and shortly thereafter sent a subcontract to Beacon and requested Beacon’s “best and final” pricing. Beacon protested by letter stating that it was only required to act consistently with its original bid pricing. Beacon then returned the subcontract with the original bid pricing and accepting all but a termination for convenience provision. Shortly thereafter, InDyne informed Beacon that InDyne had awarded the subcontract to one of Beacon’s competitors. Beacon of course sued and argued that the teaming agreement required that InDyne award the subcontract to Beacon.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
A Good Examination of Fraud, Contract and Negligence Per Se
February 28, 2018 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law Musings I have spoken on several occasions here at Construction Law Musings about the interplay (or lack thereof)
between fraud and contract as it relates to construction in Virginia. The general rule is that fraud and contract claims don’t mix and
a fraud claim in the face of a contractual one is likely to be dismissed. However,
there are exceptions to this rule as there are to just about every legal rule (we
construction lawyers would be out of a job without them).
A good examination of the interplay between fraud and contract was set out by the Eastern District of Virginia federal court in
Zuberi et al v. Hirezi et al. In that case the Zuberis purchased a home from the Hirezis and later filed suit alleging that the Hirezis concealed serious structural defects that made the house uninhabitable and unsellable. Among the many claims by the Zuberis were those fro fraud, fraudulent inducement, constructive fraud, negligence
per se, violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, and civil conspiracy. In short, they were out for blood.
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Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
"Damage to Your Product" Exclusion Bars Coverage
February 02, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of coverage for the insured based upon the exclusion for "damage to your product." S.E. Arnold & Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2016 Ark. App. LEXIS 625 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2016).
The homeowners paid the insured, S.E. Arnold & Company, over $78,000 to supply and install wood flooring in their residence. The homeowners eventually sued Arnold, alleging that the products and services as provided by Arnold had breached its contract, Arnold was negligent, and it violated applicable rules, regulations, and laws. Specifically, the homeowners alleged that the flooring as sold and installed had splinters, cupping occurred across the width of the individual pieces of flooring, and installation was in contradiction to industry standards and applicable building codes.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Indemnity Clauses—What do they mean, and what should you be looking for?
May 07, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorIt seems that every construction contract now-a-days, contains an indemnity clause. Contractors should be reviewing these indemnity clauses very carefully to understand the potential scope of an indemnity obligation and your opportunity to negotiate changes.
What is an indemnity Clause?
An indemnity clause transfers risk from one party to another. When a contractor signs an indemnity agreement, it is agreeing to pay for damages for which another party could be liable.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
