Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Is Privity of Contract with the Owner a Requirement of a Valid Mechanic’s Lien? Not for GC’s
January 04, 2021 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsAs any reader of this construction law blog knows, mechanic’s liens make up much of the discussion here at Construction Law Musings. A recent case out of Fairfax County, Virginia examined the question of whether contractual privity between the general contractor and owner of the property at issue is necessary. As a reminder, in most situations, for a contract claim to be made, the claimant has to have a direct contract (privity) with the entity it sues. Further, for a subcontractor to have a valid mechanic’s lien it would have to have privity with the general contractor or with the Owner.
The Fairfax case, The Barber of Seville, Inc. v. Bironco, Inc., examined the question of whether contractual privity is necessary between the general contractor and the Owner. In Bironco, the claimant, Bironco, performed certain improvements for a barbershop pursuant to a contract executed by the two owners of the Plaintiff. We wouldn’t have the case here at Musings if Bironco had been paid in full. Bironco then recorded a lien against the leasehold interest of The Barber of Seville, Inc., the entity holding the lease. The Plaintiff filed an action seeking to have the lien declared invalid because Brionco had privity of contract with the individuals that executed the contract, but not directly with the corporate entity.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Look Out! Texas Building Shedding Marble Panels
November 13, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe streets around the Omni Building in Lubbock, Texas have been barricaded for an indefinite period, since the marble panels have been falling off the building. The panels weight about 300 pounds each.
The building’s owners attempted to remedy the problem by replacing the marble with stucco, but that too came loose in the wind and fell to the ground. The city issued a stop work order preventing the installation of any more stucco. The city “told them that all needed to come down, both the old and the new,” according to Steve O’Neil, the city’s chief building official.
The city has filed a lawsuit to compel the owners to fix the building. Glen Robertson, Lubbock’s mayor, sees another possible solution, “or demolish it because, as it stands right now, it is truly a health and safety hazard to our citizens.
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Chicago Makes First Major Update to City's Building Code in 70 Years
August 06, 2019 —
Engineering News-RecordThe City Council recently voted to adopt a major update to the Chicago Building Code, its first in 70 years, that will better align it with the International Code Council’s International Building Code. Mayor Rahm Emanuel (D) said the new code will spur and enhance building projects by adding more flexibility and options for construction materials.
Engineering News-Record
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Safe Commercial Asbestos-Removal Practices
April 18, 2023 —
Emily Newton - Construction ExecutiveContractors must proceed with caution to safely remove asbestos and protect employees and commercial buildings. Only contractors licensed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in abatement should dispose of it, because the best asbestos-removal practices require high degrees of care and safety.
Asbestos is a stealthy material, quickly becoming airborne and contaminating other areas of the building and humans. No matter a contractor's tenure in the field, it's vital to remember the top practices in the industry as people learn more about elusive, toxic asbestos-containing materials (ACMs).
Wait for Technician and Inspector Feedback
It’s important to find out if a jobsite contains asbestos. Proceed with caution if the structure was built before the 1990s. The removal process shouldn't start immediately if a business suspects asbestos and reaches out to a company. Inspectors scope the situation and grab samples for lab testing to determine how abaters should handle the case. They will need to know every potential hiding place for the asbestos, analyzing everything from caulking to wiring for asbestos coatings and other variants of the substance. This may take time, but commercial contractors must wait until they receive this information before proceeding.
Reprinted courtesy of
Emily Newton, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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California Insurance Commissioner Lacks Authority to Regulate Formula for Estimating Replacement Cost Value
April 15, 2015 —
Valerie A. Moore and Christopher Kendrick – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Assn. of Cal. Insurance Companies v. Jones ( No. B248622, filed 4/8/15), a California appeals court held that California’s Insurance Commissioner Dave Jones lacked the authority to promulgate California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2695.183, which set out specific requirements for estimating replacement cost as part of any application or renewal for homeowners insurance.
The regulation was promulgated in 2010 in response to complaints from homeowners who lost their homes in the wildfires in Southern California in 2003, 2007, and 2008, and who discovered that they did not have enough insurance to cover the full cost of repairing or rebuilding their homes because the insurers’ estimates of replacement value were too low when they purchased the insurance.
Reprinted courtesy of
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
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The Anatomy of a Construction Dispute Stage 2- Increase the Heat
January 21, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsLast week we discussed the groundwork and circumstances of a construction claim. This week’s post will discuss the next steps, hopefully short of full blown arbitration or litigation that you, as a construction company, can pursue presuming your claim has been properly preserved.
If your contract requires certain steps such as informal resolution attempts or other items, these are the first things that must be done while still preserving your rights to pursue all remedies available. Instituting such contractually required resolution steps can and should be the first “notch” on the dial of increased pressure on the Owner, General Contractor or possibly Subcontractor against whom you have a claim.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Recent Environmental Cases: Something in the Water, in the Air and in the Woods
July 22, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelState of Texas, et al. v. US EPA. The revised regulatory definition of “Waters of the U.S.” continues to generate litigation in the federal courts. On May 28, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the 2015 rulemaking proceedings used by EPA and the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers to redefine this important component of the Clean Water Act were flawed in that the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) were violated because insufficient notice was provided by these agencies that “adjacent” waters newly subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of these agencies, can be determined on the basis of specific distances, which was a change in the agencies’ thinking, and insufficient notice of this change was provided to the public. In addition, the final rule “also violated the APA by preventing interested parties from commenting on the scientific studies that served as the technical basis” for the rule. However, the court did not vacate the new rule, but remanded the matter to the “appropriate administrative agencies” to give them an opportunity to fix this problem.
State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma v. US EPA and the United States Army Corps of Engineers. A day later, on May 29, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma rejected arguments that the new redefinition should be preliminarily enjoined.While this case was filed in 2015, intervening litigation in the federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, caused a substantial delay in the disposition of this case. The court, noting that the tests for granting such an injunction against the federal government are fairly exacting, held that the plaintiffs, the State of Oklahoma and a number of industry groups and associations, failed to convince the court that the harm they would suffer if the rules remained effective would be irreparable. Presumably, this case will be going to trial in the near future.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
