The Colorado Supreme Court affirms Woodbridge II’s “Adverse Use” Distinction
December 20, 2021 —
Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogLast year, I posted regarding the Colorado Court of Appeals’ decision in Woodbridge II, which concluded that the “adverse use” element for prescriptive easement claims only requires the claimant to “show a nonpermissive or otherwise unauthorized use of property that interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Woodbridge II), ¶ 2. Thus, Woodbridge II concluded, the claimants acknowledgement or recognition of an owner’s title alone is insufficient to defeat “adverse use” in the prescriptive easement context. Id. That decision was up for review by the Colorado Supreme Court at the time of my prior post. It has now been affirmed, thereby settling an arguable appellate decision split created by Woodbridge II. See Lo Viento Blanco, LLC v. Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 2021 CO 56 (“Woodbridge”).
“Like the division below, and for much the same reasons,” the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in Woodbridge “that under Colorado law, a claimant’s acknowledgement or recognition of the owner’s title during the claimant’s asserted prescriptive period does not interrupt the prescriptive use or undermine the claimant’s adverse use.” Woodbridge, ¶ 2. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Gabriel’s opinion agreed with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning “that although Woodbridge recognized that it did not hold title, no evidence indicated that it had acted in subordination to the owner’s title.” Id. ¶ at 13. The Court further agreed with Woodbridge II’srejection of Lo Viento’s “permissive use” argument because “the permission offered … was conditional and Woodbridge never agreed to any of the conditions set forth therein.” Id. On that basis, Woodbridge confirmed that “a claimant seeking to establish a prescriptive easement need not show that it asserted exclusive ownership of the property during the prescriptive period,” but only “that its use was without permission or otherwise unauthorized and that it interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Id. at ¶ 23.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & WilmerMr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at
lmecklenburg@swlaw.com
First Trump Agenda Nuggets Hit Construction
January 26, 2017 —
Pam Radtke Russell, Mary B. Powers & Debra K. Rubin - Engineering News-RecordPresident Donald J. Trump began making good on campaign promises to put Americans back to work and reduce the size of government, as he signed orders and memoranda setting in motion approval of the Obama administration-halted Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines and streamlining of infrastructure and manufacturing permitting processes. But firms and watchdog groups are concerned how an announced freezing of government hiring and contracting will play out, as well as the future of environmental protection.
Reprinted courtesy of Engineering News-Record staff
Pam Radtke Russell,
Mary B. Powers and
Debra K. Rubin Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Ms. Rubin may be contacted at
rubind@enr.com
Brief Discussion of Enforceability of Anti-Indemnity Statutes in California
September 10, 2014 —
William M. Kaufman – Construction Lawyers BlogCalifornia Civil Code Section 2782 has been amended numerous times over the last several years. Essentially, Anti-indemnity statutes may not be fully effective for contracts entered into before January 1, 2009. Some developers and general contractors attempted to comply with the new law, and changed the indemnity provisions of their contracts post January 1, 2006. The time bracket, or zone of danger if you will, is between 1/1/06 and 1/1/09—during those three years California Civil Code §2782 was amended several times. After 1/1/09 Type I indemnity is gone in a residential construction context.
The 2005 amendment to Civil Code §2782 rendered residential construction contracts entered into after 1/1/06 containing a Type I indemnity provision in favor of builders unenforceable;
The 2007 amendment added contractors not affiliated with the builder to the list of contracting parties who could not take advantage of a Type I indemnity provision;
However, the 2008 amendment changed the effective date to 1/1/09, dropped any mention of 2006, and added GCs, other subs, their agents and servants, etc., to the list of possible contracting parties who could not take advantage of a Type I indemnity provision[.]
Reprinted courtesy of
William M. Kaufman, Lockhart Park LP
Mr. Kaufman may be contacted at wkaufman@lockhartpark.com, and you may visit the firm's website at www.lockhartpark.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Subcontractors Found Liable to Reimburse Insurer Defense Costs in Equitable Subrogation Action
August 03, 2020 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Pulte Home Corp. v. CBR Electric, Inc. (No. E068353, filed 6/10/20), a California appeals court reversed the denial of an equitable subrogation claim for reimbursement of defense costs from contractually obligated subcontractors to a defending insurer, finding that all of the elements for equitable subrogation were met, and the equities tipped in favor of the insurer.
After defending the general contractor, Pulte, in two construction defect actions as an additional insured on a subcontractor’s policy, St. Paul sought reimbursement of defense costs solely on an equitable subrogation theory against six subcontractors that had worked on the underlying construction projects, and whose subcontracts required them to defend Pulte in suits related to their work. After a bench trial, the trial court denied St. Paul’s claim, concluding that St. Paul had not demonstrated that it was fair to shift all of the defense costs to the subcontractors because their failure to defend Pulte had not caused the homeowners to bring the construction defect actions.
The appeals court reversed, holding that the trial court misconstrued the law governing equitable subrogation. Because the relevant facts were not in dispute, the appeals court reviewed the case de novo and found that the trial court committed error in its denial of reimbursement for the defense fees. The appeals court found two errors: First, the trial court incorrectly concluded that equitable subrogation requires shifting of the entire loss. Second, the trial court applied a faulty causation analysis – that because the non-defending subcontractors had not caused the homeowners to sue Pulte, thereby necessitating a defense, St. Paul could not meet the elements of equitable subrogation.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Good-To-Know Points Regarding (I) Miller Act Payment Bonds And (Ii) Payment Bond Surety Compelling Arbitration
December 22, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesEvery now and then I come across an opinion that addresses good-to-know legal issues as a corollary of strategic litigation decisions that are questionable and/or creative. An opinion out of the United States District Court of New Mexico, Rock Roofing, LLC v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, 2019 WL 4418918 (D. New Mexico 2019), is such an opinion.
In Rock Roofing, an owner hired a contractor to construct apartments. The contractor furnished a payment bond. The contractor, in the performance of its work, hired a roofing subcontractor. A dispute arose under the subcontract and the roofer recorded a construction lien against the project. The contractor, per New Mexico law, obtained a bond to release the roofer’s construction lien from the project (real property). The roofer then filed a lawsuit in federal court against the payment bond surety claiming it is entitled to: (1) collect on the contractor’s Miller Act payment bond (?!?) and (2) foreclose its construction lien against the lien release bond furnished per New Mexico law.
Count I – Miller Act Payment Bond
Claiming the payment bond issued by the contractor is a Miller Act payment bond is a head scratcher. This claim was dismissed with prejudice upon the surety’s motion to dismiss. This was an easy call.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Existence of “Duty” in Negligence Action is Question of Law
February 06, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn a negligence action, the issue of whether a duty applies is a question of law. See Limones v. School Dist. of Lee County, 161 So.3d 384, 389 (Fla. 2015) (“[T]he existence of a duty is a legal question because duty is the standard to which the jury compares the conduct of the defendant.”); McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992) (“Since duty is a question of law, an appellate court obviously could reverse based on its purely legal conclusion that no such duty existed.”). Thus, the trial court determines, as a matter of law, whether a legal duty of care applies in a negligence action.
Florida law recognizes the following four sources of duty: (1) statutes or regulations; (2) common law interpretations of those statutes or regulations; (3) other sources in the common law; and (4) the general facts of the case.
See id.
Oftentimes it is the fourth source – the general facts of the case – that comes into play to determine whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
What Is a Construction Defect in California?
October 25, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFWilliam Naumann answers that question for the site SuperLawyers. Mr. Naumann notes that a construction defect “is a deficiency in the design or construction of a building or structure,” with specific examples of including “significant cracks in the slab and/or foundation; unevenness in floor slabs caused by abnormal soils movement; leaky roofs, windows, or door,” though he admits that he has not provided an all-inclusive list.
He also discusses the deadlines for various types of construction defects, which in California range from 1 year to 10 years, depending on what the defect is. Untreated wood posts only get two years, while steel fences must be free of defects for four.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Cross-Motions for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings for COVID-19 Claim Denied
May 24, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court denied both parties' motions for partial judgment on the pleadings seeking clarification of the policy's contamination exclusion. Thor Equities, LLC v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62967 (S.D. N.Y. March 31, 2021).
Thor was a commercial landlord, renting properties across the country to hundreds of tenants, for use in a variety of businesses, including office space, retail stores, restaurants, and bars. When state governments began shutting down businesses and issuing stay-at-home orders in March 2020, many of Thor's tenants had to close shop and sought abatements or other accommodations. Thor alleged it suffered significant business interruption as a result of the pandemic.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
