Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

San Francisco House that Collapsed Not Built to Plan

February 14, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
Last December, a San Francisco, California “developer’s Twin Peaks house collapsed and slid down a hill during renovations.” The San Francisco Chronicle reported that the house “was being supported by three reinforcing towers, rather than the nine required under its approved plans, according to documents provided to city building inspectors.” According to a report by Department of Building Inspection chief Tom Hui, developer Mel Murphy "’failed to follow and implement the approved plans and the sequence of construction’ in his permit,” as quoted by The San Francisco Chronicle. The report also stated that the work “was not independently inspected as required” though this is “vehemently disputed by Murphy.” Read the court decision
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CSLB “Fast Facts” for Online Home Improvement Marketplaces

August 20, 2018 — Garret Murai - California Construction Law Blog
As more and more online home improvement marketplaces like Angie’s List come online, questions have arisen as to whether such online marketplaces must hold a contractor’s license. The California Contractor’s State License Board has put together a “Fast Facts” sheet to help online home improvement marketplaces navigate the ins and outs of contractor’s license requirements, salesperson requirements, and advertising requirements. The short answer is that these marketplaces do not need a contractor’s license as long as the customer is contracting directly with the listed contractors (not the marketplace). Here’s the slightly longer explanation: July 20, 2018 CSLB #18-10 CSLB Hopes to Clear Up Confusion about License and Contracting Requirements for Online Home Improvement Marketplace Companies SACRAMENTO – Over the past few months, the Contractors State License Board (CSLB) has been addressing emerging issues involving online marketplaces and contractor referral websites. In its most basic form, online marketplaces are e-commerce websites that link consumers to products and/or services that are provided by multiple third parties. In these situations the e-commerce operator processes the transactions. Many referral websites charge contractors for leads. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel, Rosen, Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

E-Commerce Logistics Test Limits of Tilt-Up Construction

January 28, 2019 — Jeff Rubenstone - Engineering News-Record
While “fulfillment centers” and other e-commerce logistic facilities drive a hot market for the manufacturing sector, traditional construction methods such as tilt-up concrete panels are being pushed to ever-greater heights. At a recent project in Tulsa, Okla., contractor Clayco oversaw installation of tilt-up composite panels that reached 81 ft in height, using an unusual brace and a lot of careful pre-planning. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Jeff Rubenstone, ENR
Mr. Rubenstone may be contacted at rubenstonej@enr.com

Construction Litigation Roundup: “Just Hanging Around”

August 14, 2023 — Daniel Lund III - Lexology
A subcontractor asserting a payment bond claim for “standby” time for its equipment on the Cline Avenue bridge project (over Indiana Harbor and Ship Canal in East Chicago, Indiana) received pushback from the payment bond surety. In fact, the duration of the standby time occurred after the surety’s principal, the general contractor, had been placed in default and terminated on the general contract. According to the surety: “After termination of the contract… it is impossible for labor, materials, and equipment to have been furnished for use in performing the terminated contract.” The surety filed a motion for summary judgment. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Daniel Lund III, Phelps
Mr. Lund may be contacted at daniel.lund@phelps.com

Insurer Must Defend Insured Against Construction Defect Claims

November 14, 2018 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
Finding various exclusions inapplicable, the Federal District Court ruled that the insurer owed a defense to the general contractor based upon Texas law. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Slay Engineering, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139363 (W.D. Texas Aug. 15, 2018). Huser Construction had a CGL policy issued by Mt. Hawley Insurance Company. Huser contracted to design and construct a municipal sports complex with the City of Jourdanton. The project consisted of four baseball fields, a softball field, parking lots and swimming pool. Huser subcontracted with Cody Pools, Inc. to design and build the swimming pool. Huser also subcontracted with Q-Haul, Inc. to perform earth work, grading and storm drainage work at the site. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Trial Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment On Ground Not Asserted By Moving Party Upheld

December 17, 2015 — Laura C. Williams & R. Bryan Martin – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In Marlton Recovery Partners, LLC v. County of Los Angeles, et al. (filed 11/20/15), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants County of Los Angeles, the County Treasurer-Tax Collector and Board of Supervisors (collectively the “County”) despite the fact summary judgment was granted on grounds not raised by the County. The Court of Appeal determined that because the plaintiff could not have shown a triable issue of material fact on the ground of law relied upon by the trial court, summary judgment was proper. In the underlying case, plaintiff sought cancellation of penalties on delinquent property taxes for 26 parcels under Revenue and Taxation Code §4985.2, which allows the tax collector to cancel such penalties under certain circumstances. The County denied the request prompting plaintiff to challenge the denial on a petition for peremptory writ of mandate to the trial court. Reprinted courtesy of Laura C. Williams, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and R. Bryan Martin, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Ms. Williams may be contacted at lwilliams@hbblaw.com Mr. Martin may be contacted at bmartin@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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Do Not Pass Go! Duty to Defend in a Professional Services Agreement (law note)

April 03, 2019 — Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North Carolina
Recently a client asked me to review a contract for his Firm. The Owner, who had prepared the draft, had inserted a rather stringent “duty to defend” clause. As I told my client, a duty to defend clause is not a good idea for a couple of reasons. First, if you agree to provide a defense, what that means is that you are footing the bill for the Owner if the Owner is sued by another party. Think about that for a minute. You are paying legal fees for someone else’s legal defense. You may or may not be able to direct the litigation or have a say in who is hired. Can you say open check book? Secondly, and more importantly, the duty to defend is almost never insurable. What that means is that your professional liability carrier will not be footing the bill—your Firm will be doing it. This is not a case of adding the Owner as an additional insured, so do not confuse the two. Agreeing to a duty to defend is an extremely burdensome, and potentially costly, mistake. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale Liggett PLLC
Ms. Brumback may be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com

Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit

May 09, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.

First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”

The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”

Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”

The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”

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FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES