Can a Non-Signatory Invoke an Arbitration Provision?
February 02, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesAs you know from prior postings, arbitration is a creature of contract. Hence, if you want your disputes to be resolved through arbitration, as opposed to litigation, make sure to include an arbitration provision in your agreement that covers all disputes arising out of or relating to the agreement.
Under certain circumstances, a non-signatory to an agreement wants to invoke an arbitration clause in the agreement. The non-signatory will move to compel a signatory to the agreement (with an arbitration provision) to arbitrate a dispute with the non-signatory. Can a non-signatory do this? Yes, under certain circumstances.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Georgia Supreme Court Determines Damage to "Other Property" Not Necessary for Finding Occurrence
July 31, 2013 —
Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiThe Georgia Supreme Court has determined that an "occurrence" may arise under a CGL policy even if "other property" is not damaged. Taylor Morrison Servs. v. HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co., 2013 Ga. LEXIS 618 (Ga. July 12, 2013).
Taylor Morrison, the insured, was a homebuilder. It was sued in a class action by more than 400 homeowners in California alleging that the concrete foundations of their homes were improperly constructed. This led to water intrusion, cracks in the floors and driveways, and warped and buckled flooring.
At first, HDI-Gerling defended under a reservation of rights. Subsequently, however, HDI-Gerling sued Taylor Morrison in federal district court in Georgia, seeking a declaratory judgment that there was no coverage. The district court granted summary judgment to HDI-Gerling after determining that there was no "occurrence" when the only "property damage" alleged was damage to work of the insured. Georgia law was applied to the dispute.
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defect Journal Marks First Anniversary
January 06, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFNovember 2011 marked the first anniversary of the Construction Defect Journal. During the first year our staff and contributors in the insurance and legal communities have compiled several hundred articles of interest to the construction defect and claims community.
Each of these articles are maintained in the CDJ archives, and are accessible at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/archives.html. Each story in the archives is listed in the order it was posted to the archives. Each story in the archives opens up in its own page, so you can easily locate topics and articles of interest.
If you’re new to Construction Defect Journal, or just want peruse past articles, please take a moment to visit the CDJ Archives page. Also please feel encouraged to submit your firm’s articles or legal publications of interest to the CD community at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/submitStory.html.
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Court Finds That Limitation on Conditional Use Permit Results in Covered Property Damage Due to Loss of Use
November 06, 2018 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Thee Sombrero, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. (No. E067505, filed 10/25/18), a California appeals court held that a property owner’s loss of the ability to use his property as a nightclub, based on revocation of a city’s conditional use permit (“CUP”), constituted covered property damage.
In Sombrero, lessees operated a nightclub under the property owner’s conditional use permit from the City of Colton. A company hired to provide security negligently allowed admission to an armed patron, who shot and killed another patron. The City revoked the owner’s permit, and the owner was only able to negotiate the reinstatement of a limited permit, for use as a banquet hall only.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Goldman Veteran Said to Buy Mortgages After Big Short
February 05, 2015 —
Heather Perlberg – Bloomberg(Bloomberg) -- Dan Sparks helped Goldman Sachs Group Inc. profit from its bets against subprime mortgages. Now he’s expanding credit to Americans hurt when those types of loans soured and the housing market collapsed.
Sparks’s SG Capital Partners this year began buying home loans made through origination partners across the U.S., with a focus on mortgages without government backing, said two people with knowledge of the business who asked not to be identified because the information is private. Mortgages that don’t qualify for purchase by government agencies include large-balance jumbo loans and those to borrowers with lower credit scores or higher debt.
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Heather Perlberg, BloombergMs. Perlberg may be contacted at
hperlberg@bloomberg.net
EEOC Chair Issues New Report “Building for the Future: Advancing Equal Employment Opportunity in the Construction Industry”
June 05, 2023 —
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionWASHINGTON – The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Chair Charlotte A. Burrows issued a report today titled, “
Building For The Future: Advancing Equal Employment Opportunity in the Construction Industry.” The report provides findings and next steps based on the agency’s enforcement experience, witness testimony presented at the EEOC’s
May 2022 hearing on discrimination and harassment in construction and other Commission hearings, and academic research.
“The recent historic federal infrastructure investments provide a once-in-a-generation opportunity to break down barriers and expand opportunity in the construction industry,” said EEOC Chair Charlotte A. Burrows. “While discrimination has long been an issue in the industry, we can decide the future. I look forward to working with industry leaders, employers, and unions to help ensure safe and inclusive workplaces for all workers.”
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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9 Basic Strategies for Pursuing Coverage for Construction Accident Claims
September 05, 2022 —
William S. Bennett - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Construction accidents happen all the time. Accidents involving worker injuries or damage to property can shut down a job site and cause significant losses. Contractors should be diligent and aggressive in examining all of the available options for recovery under their different insurance policies and bonds. This article will provide a refresher on some basic tips to help policyholders improve claims practices with respect to construction accidents.
1. Identify relevant insurance policies:
Identifying what policies exist that might cover the loss can sometimes be easier said than done. Construction accidents come in many different forms and can involve many different parties who suffer various types of losses. The general contractor, owner, subcontractors, and vendors could all be involved or affected in some way. Each of these parties has its own insurance coverage and will have promised each other various forms of risk transfer through those policies and through their contracts.
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William S. Bennett, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Bennett may be contacted at
wsb@sdvlaw.com
