A License to Sue: Appellate Court Upholds Condition of Statute that a Contracting Party Must Hold a Valid Contractor’s License to Pursue Action for Recovery of Payment for Contracting Services
June 21, 2017 —
Omar Parra & Jesse M. Sullivan - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPCalifornia Business & Professions Code section 7031(a) requires a party to have contractor’s license in order to maintain an action for compensation for services performed for which a contractor’s license is needed. In Phoenix Mechanical Pipeline, Inc. v. Space Exploration Technologies Corp., No. B269186 (2017 WL 2544856) (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2017), the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District considered the scope of this statute in denying, in part, Phoenix Mechanical Pipeline, Inc.’s (“Phoenix Pipeline”) appeal of a trial court ruling granting Space Exploration Technologies Corporation’s (“SpaceX”) demurrer to Phoenix Pipeline’s second amended complaint, without leave to amend.
Phoenix Pipeline filed the underlying lawsuit for, among other claims, breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from an agreement with SpaceX for Phoenix Pipeline to perform various plumbing, concrete removal and electrical services. Phoenix Pipeline alleged SpaceX paid for such services from 2010 to October 2013, but failed to pay Phoenix for services performed from October 2013 to August 2014, totaling just over $1,000,000. According to Phoenix Pipeline, this work was performed pursuant to a series of invoices, which constituted individual agreements between SpaceX and Phoenix Pipeline.
Reprinted courtesy of
Omar Parra, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Jesse M. Sullivan, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Parra may be contacted at oparra@hbblaw.com
Mr. Sullivan may be contacted at jsullivan@hbblaw.com
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Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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The Road to Hell is Paved with Good Intentions: A.B. 1701’s Requirement that General Contractors Pay Subcontractor Employee Wages Will Do More Harm Than Good
November 02, 2017 —
Steven M. Cvitanovic & Omar Parra - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPTales of subcontractors who close up shop before paying their employees are not all that uncommon, but they are certainly not common enough to require General Contractors to pay for that same labor twice. Last month, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1701, which requires the General Contractor of a private construction project to pay all unpaid wages and fringe benefits owed to an employee of a subcontractor, irrespective of the tier, and even if the General Contractor made the payment. With the Governor’s recent signature, Assembly Bill No. 1701 is now the law of the land. Here is what you need to know:
- It applies to all private (but not public) construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2018;
- It gives a subcontractor’s employee a direct cause of action against the General Contractor for any unpaid wages and fringe benefits, even if the General Contractor has fully paid the subcontractor;
- It gives a third party owed fringe or other benefits a cause of action against the General Contractor;
- All actions by the employee or third party must be filed within one year of the earliest of the recordation of the notice of completion, the recordation of the notice of cessation of work, or the actual completion of the work;
- The General Contractor cannot contract to avoid the liability imposed by Assembly Bill No. 1701, but it can seek indemnity from the subcontractor; and
- At the General Contractor’s request, the subcontractor shall provide the General Contractor with its payroll records.
Reprinted courtesy of
Steven Cvitanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Omar Parra, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com
Mr. Parra may be contacted at oparra@hbblaw.com
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Why Metro Atlanta Is the Poster Child for the US Housing Crisis
January 04, 2023 —
Brentin Mock - BloombergLast year, the Federal Reserve declared that not one of the 13 counties that make up metro Atlanta qualified as an affordable housing market. In many places, monthly housing costs consume more than 40% of homeowners’ incomes, well beyond the 30% threshold that the Federal Reserve uses to monitor market affordability.
Accelerating housing prices have been the narrative for virtually every major US metro lately, but Atlanta is somewhat “paradigmatic” of the trend, according to Georgia State University urban studies professor Dan Immergluck. Since arriving in Atlanta in 2005, Immergluck has been tracking and documenting the direction of metro Atlanta’s housing conditions, focusing on segregation and gentrification patterns.
His new book, Red Hot City: Housing, Race and Exclusion in 21st-Century Atlanta, released in October, is the culmination of much of that scholarship. What Red Hot City reveals is that while exorbitant house prices are typically the result of market forces, Atlanta can blame a lot of its own policy decisions over the last 20 years, particularly as it pertains to large civic projects like the BeltLine and Centennial Yards, a massive new development planned for south downtown Atlanta.
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Brentin Mock, Bloomberg
Policing Those Subcontractors: It Might Take Extra Effort To Be An Additional Insured
June 14, 2011 —
Douglas Reiser, Builders Council BlogI just came across a case that I think truly paints the insurance dilemma for contractors. Thanks to this recent Illinois case, I don’t have to make up any factual scenarios—so kudos to Attorney Robert Boylan for posting it.
In reading over my RSS feeds this weekend, I noticed a great writeup on long-time blogger Josh Glazov’s Construction Law Today. Attorney Robert Boylan’s post describes a recent Illinois case where a general contractor was denied its additional insured status on a second-tier subcontractor’s insurance. The reason for the denial: the general contractor failed to procure an agreement in writing with the second-tier subcontractor, requiring it to be listed as an additional insured.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania Confirms Carrier Owes No Duty to Defend Against Claims for Faulty Workmanship
April 05, 2021 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia & Marianne Bradley - White and Williams LLPOn March 17, 2021, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued its decision in Estate Chimney & Fireplace v. IFG Companies & Burlington Insurance Company, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50360 (E.D. Pa. March 17, 2021), finding that an insurance carrier had no duty to defend its insured where the allegations in the underlying litigation involved claims of faulty workmanship.
Estates Chimney & Fireplace, LLC (Estates Chimney) had performed inspections and replaced chase covers for a number of chimneys in a condominium complex. Chase covers are pieces of metal, which are placed over chimneys in order to keep out environmental elements. Several condominium owners sued Estates Chimney, alleging that Estates Chimney had improperly installed, then improperly replaced, their chimney caps, which caused their chimneys to cease working properly. As a result, the underlying plaintiffs allegedly incurred costs to repair or replace the chimney caps and chimneys.
Estates Chimney sought coverage from its carrier, who denied coverage based upon its determination that the claims in the underlying lawsuits arose out of faulty workmanship, which did not result in damage to the property of a third party. Estates Chimney filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that it was entitled to coverage under the policy. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the Eastern District ruled in favor of the carrier.
Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony L. Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP and
Marianne Bradley, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Bradley may be contacted at bradleym@whiteandwilliams.com
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Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly Honors Construction Attorney
November 20, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFMassachusetts Lawyers Weekly has named Grace V. B. Garcia one of its 2013 Top Women of the Law. She is an attorney at Morrison Mahoney LLP in Boston, and her practice focuses on construction law, product liability, premises liability, commercial litigation, and American with Disability Act cases.
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In South Carolina, Insurer's Denial of Liability Does Not Waive Attorney-Client Privilege for Bad Faith Claim
October 14, 2019 —
Ashley L. Cooper & Bethany L. Barrese - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Determining the scope of discovery can be challenging, particularly when an insurance bad faith claim is involved. Courts often face the difficult decision of weighing the importance of preserving attorney-client privilege with the public policy rationale of protecting an insured against their insurer’s bad faith behavior. The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently recognized this dilemma by rejecting a hardline approach to bad faith discovery disputes and adopting a case-by-case analysis.
The case, In re Mt. Hawley Ins. Co.,1 arose out of a construction defect claim. ContraVest Construction Company (“ContraVest”) constructed a development in South Carolina and was later sued for alleged defective construction. ContraVest sought coverage for the lawsuit from its insurers, including Mount Hawley Insurance Company (“Mount Hawley”), which had provided excess commercial liability insurance to ContraVest during the relevant timeframe. Mount Hawley denied the claim, which prompted ContraVest to sue it for bad faith, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ashley L. Cooper, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
Bethany L. Barrese, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Ms. Cooper may be contacted at alc@sdvlaw.com
Ms. Barrese may be contacted at blb@sdvlaw.com
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