Litigation Roundup: “You Can’t Make Me Pay!”
August 19, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyThe foregoing is an accurate statement, generally speaking, for Louisiana public entities. Statutory and constitutional provisions in Louisiana protect public entities from being forced to pay monies – including satisfying court judgments – when the monies have not been specifically allocated for the purpose. Correspondingly, there is ordinarily no means to seize public assets to satisfy judgments.
On the other hand, writs of mandamus in Louisiana – actions designed to compel a public official to undertake a ministerial duty over which the public official has no discretion – can be aimed at forcing a public official (on behalf of the public entity) to pay money.
In an inverse condemnation case, plaintiffs prevailed on the theory that a Louisiana public entity had “damaged and interfered with their use and enjoyment of their private homes and church” during a New Orleans drainage project. The plaintiffs pursued a writ of mandamus to compel payment their approximately $1.5 million judgment for damages and fees as a “ministerial duty” of the public entity. To be sure, in connection with the judgment, the public entity had not at any time specifically allocated funds for the payment.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Construction Mezzanine Financing
March 29, 2017 —
Tim Davis & Steven Coury - White and Williams LLPConstruction mezzanine lending is on the rise and more development deals are getting done with a capital stack that includes mezzanine debt in addition to the traditional components of sponsor equity and senior mortgage debt. Below are important issues and concepts to bear in mind when structuring the financing of a construction project that includes a mezzanine debt component.
Funding Sequence
Funding Sequence
When will the proceeds of the mezzanine loan be advanced? In some instances, the mezzanine loan proceeds will be advanced only after all of the borrower’s equity has been contributed to the construction of the project. In other instances, the borrower’s equity and the mezzanine loan proceeds go in either pari passu or simultaneously at another ratio. If the equity is not entirely contributed in advance, the mezzanine lender may require that the uncontributed equity be held by the mezzanine lender or held in a pledged account. The mezzanine lender may also further mitigate the risk of non-funding of the equity by requiring an equity funding guaranty (as discussed below).
Additionally, when will the mezzanine loan proceeds be advanced in relation to the senior mortgage loan proceeds? Will the entire mezzanine loan be advanced prior to any senior mortgage loan advance or will they be advanced pari passu? Depending on the business deal, the mezzanine loan agreement will need to reflect how and when the equity, the mezzanine debt, and the mortgage debt will be advanced.
Reprinted courtesy of
Tim Davis, White and Williams LLP and
Steven Coury, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Davis may be contacted at davist@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Coury may be contacted at courys@whiteandwilliams.com
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Wait! Don’t Sign Yet: Reviewing Contract Protections During the COVID Pandemic
April 13, 2020 —
Danielle S. Ward - Balestreri Potocki & HolmesAs the circumstances of the COVID pandemic change day by day, and we all rush to keep business moving where and when we can, companies should consider hitting the “pause button” before renewing or executing any new contracts. Developing contracts often takes considerable time and expense, and companies are not in the habit of reworking them often. A change in law may prompt a company to revisit their contract terms, but otherwise business is often carried out with a standard form contract for a period of years. With the COVID pandemic affecting nearly every business and industry, life is not business as usual, and companies should make sure their contracts consider what previously seemed like an unforeseeable event.
Force Majeure clauses are included in many contracts to excuse contract performance when made impossible by some unforeseen circumstance. These clauses typically fall under two categories: general and specific. General force majeure clauses excuse performance if performance is prevented by circumstances outside the parties’ control. By contrast, specific force majeure clauses detail the exhaustive list of circumstances (acts of god, extreme weather, war, riot, terrorism, embargoes) which would excuse contract performance. Force majeure clauses are typically interpreted narrowly. If your contract has a specific clause and pandemic or virus is not one of the listed circumstances it may not apply. Whether a particular existing contract covers the ongoing COVID pandemic will vary depending on the language of the contract.
Force majeure clauses previously made headlines when the great economic recession hit in 2008. A number of courts held that simple economic hardship was not enough to invoke force majeure. The inability to pay or lack of desire to pay for the contracted goods or services did not qualify as force majeure. In California, impossibility turns on the nature of the contractual performance, and not in the inability of the obligor to do it. (Kennedy v. Reece (1964) 225 Cal. App. 2d 717, 725.) In other words, the task is objectively impossible not merely impossible or more burdensome to the specific contracting party.
California has codified “force majeure” protection where the parties haven’t included any language or the circumstances in the clause don’t apply to the situation at hand. Civil Code section 1511 excuses performance when “prevented or delayed by an irresistible, superhuman cause, or by the act of public enemies of this state or of the United States, unless the parties have expressly agreed to the contrary.” (Civ. Code § 1511.) What qualifies as a “superhuman cause”? In California, the test is whether under the particular circumstances there was such an insuperable interference occurring without the party's intervention as could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and care. (Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. S. T., Ltd. (1946) 29 Cal.2d 228, 238.)
If you find yourself in an existing contract without a force majeure clause, or the statute does not apply, you may consider the doctrine of frustration of purpose. This doctrine is applied narrowly where performance remains possible, but the fundamental reason the parties entered into the contract has been severely or substantially frustrated by an unanticipated supervening circumstance, thus destroying substantially the value of the contract. (Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Twining (1963) 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 314-15.) In other words, performance is still possible but valueless. Note this defense is not likely to apply where the contract has simply become less profitable for one party.
Now that COVID is no longer an unforeseeable event, but rather a current and grave reality, a party executing a contract today without adequate protections may have a difficult time proving unforeseeability. Scientists are not sure whether warm weather will suppress the spread of the virus, as it does with the seasonal flu, but to the extent we get a reprieve during the summer we may see a resurgence of cases this Fall or Winter. Companies should take care in reviewing force majeure clauses, and other clauses tied to timely performance such as delay and liquidated damages before renewing or executing new contracts.
Your contract scenario may vary from the summary provided above. Please contact legal counsel before making any decisions. During this critical time, BPH’s attorneys can be reached via email to answer your questions.
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Danielle S. Ward, Balestreri Potocki & HolmesMs. Ward may be contacted at
dward@bph-law.com
5 Questions about New York's Comprehensive Insurance Disclosure Act
February 14, 2022 —
Richard W. Brown & Michael V. Pepe - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.On December 31, 2021, New York enacted the Comprehensive Insurance Disclosure Act (“CIDA”), requiring defendants to provide plaintiffs with “complete” information for any insurance policy through which a judgment could be satisfied, within sixty (60) days after serving an answer. The stated goal is to reduce delay tactics by compelling disclosures of all policies implicated by a claim as well as other claims, contracts, or agreements that may deplete available coverage or residual limits of policies that have already been eroded by other payments. The impact of CIDA’s disclosure requirements may be scaled back by proposed amendments currently pending before the New York state legislature.
1. What does CIDA Require?
CIDA requires the automatic disclosure of insurance information to plaintiffs. New York’s Civil Practice Law & Rules (“CPLR”) 3101(f) permits civil discovery of the contents of existing insurance agreements by which an insurer may be liable for all or part of a judgment. However, CIDA amends the CPLR to mandate that defendants must automatically disclose the following information in all pending cases starting March 1, 2022, or within sixty (60) days of filing an answer to a complaint going forward:
- Complete copy of all insurance policies that are available to satisfy all or part of a potential judgment.
- This includes Primary, Excess, and Umbrella policies.
- The relevant applications for insurance.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard W. Brown, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and
Michael V. Pepe, Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Mr. Brown may be contacted at RBrown@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Pepe may be contacted at MPepe@sdvlaw.com
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Balancing Risk and Reward: The Complexities of Stadium Construction Projects
April 15, 2024 —
Gregory A. Eichorn - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.From grand designs to opening day, stadium construction projects present a captivating blend of high-profile opportunities and significant challenges and risks. Navigating this complex landscape is not easy, but when managed properly, the potential rewards, both in terms of reputation and finances, can make it a gamble worth taking. While each stadium project is different, some of the more common risks include:
- Securing adequate labor, materials and equipment based on the size of the project;
- Logistical concerns regarding the concurrent performance of multiple trade scopes on a single site;
- Protection of work in place from weather due to the large footprint of the stadium project;
- Cash flow issues caused by protracted change order processing, conflicting and/or onerous payment requirements from project financing entities, and reimbursement of considerable monthly general condition costs; and
- Meeting the schedule requirements for the project.
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Gregory A. Eichorn, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Mr. Eichorn may be contacted at
geichorn@pecklaw.com
When Coronavirus Cases Spike at Construction Jobsites
July 27, 2020 —
Richard Korman, Scott Judy & Jeff Rubenstone - Engineering News-RecordWhen Covid-19 took hold in several US states in early spring, Choate Construction responded, as many contractors did, by quickly adopting federal workplace safety guidelines for disinfecting surfaces and maintaining social distancing. Enhanced by various state lockdown measures for businesses and the general public, the new safety system seemed to work with only a handful of workers on Choate’s projects testing positive.
Reprinted courtesy of Engineering News-Record reporters
Richard Korman,
Scott Judy and
Jeff Rubenstone
Mr. Korman may be contacted at kormanr@enr.com
Mr. Judy may be contacted at judys@enr.com
Mr. Rubenstone may be contacted at rubenstonej@enr.com
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New York Court Temporarily Enjoins UCC Foreclosure Sale
September 21, 2020 —
Steven E. Ostrow, Timothy E. Davis, Steven E. Coury & Kristen E. Andreoli - White and WilliamsNew York courts have become a battleground for challenges to foreclosure sales under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Another trial court of the New York State Supreme Court (New York County) issued a preliminary injunction in Shelbourne BRF LLC v. SR 677 Bway LLC, halting a mezzanine lender’s August 19, 2020 UCC foreclosure sale. The decision confirms that the impact of the pandemic on the value of commercial real estate, and upon traditional steps taken to conduct a foreclosure auction, are both key factors that courts will continue to consider in determining whether a UCC foreclosure sale scheduled during the pandemic can be conducted in a commercially reasonable manner as required by the UCC.
THE CASE
In Shelbourne, the mezzanine borrowers owned the membership or equity interests in the companies (collectively, the “Property Owner”) that held title to a 12-story office building in Albany, New York. As security for the $3.35 million mezzanine loan, the mezzanine borrowers pledged their equity interests to the mezzanine lender. In May 2020, the mezzanine lender declared a default under the mezzanine loan as a result of the Property Owner’s default under the $28.5 million senior loan secured by a mortgage against the office building. The mezzanine lender then scheduled a public UCC foreclosure sale of the equity interests in the Property Owner for August 19, 2020. If the sale had been held, the equity interests in the Property Owner (and right to control the Property Owner and office building) would have been transferred to the successful bidder, either the mezzanine lender or a third party purchaser.
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams attorneys
Steven E. Ostrow,
Timothy E. Davis,
Steven E. Coury and
Kristen E. Andreoli
Mr. Ostrow may be contacted at ostrows@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Davis may be contacted at davist@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Coury may be contacted at courys@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Andreoli may be contacted at andreolik@whiteandwilliams.com
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Environmental Justice Legislation Update
May 17, 2021 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelEnvironmental Justice, as an urgent priority of the Federal Government, dates back to 1994, and President Clinton’s issuance of Executive Order 12898. This order directed federal agencies to identify and address, as appropriate, the disproportionately high and adverse human health and environment effects of its many programs, policies and procedures on minority populations and low-income populations. The primary legal basis for this order was Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in particular, Sections 601 and 602, which prohibit discrimination in programs and activities receiving federal financial aid and assistance. Over the years, the Supreme Court has reviewed the scope and importance of Title VI. In Alexander v. Sandoval, decided in 2001, the Court concluded that while private parties could sue to enforce Section 601 or its implementing regulations, as written, Section 601 only prohibits intentional discrimination. Noting that disproportionate impact is not the sole touchstone of invidious racial discrimination. Moreover, the Court also ruled in Sandoval that private parties cannot sue to enforce regulations implementing Section 602. Perhaps as an acknowledgement of these shortcomings, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has established an administrative system to process environmental justice complaints at 40 CFR Part 7. Without strengthening the statutory base of environmental justice, the program may continue to be the subject of countless symposiums and seminars. However, this may change soon.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
