Appraisal Process Analyzed
August 19, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe California Court of Appeal offered a primer in the appraisal process in reversing the trial court's confirmation of the appraisal award. Lee v. California Capital Ins. Co., 2015 Cal. App. LEXIS 530 (Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 2015).
A fire damaged an apartment building owned by the insured. The fire started in unit 3 on the ground floor. The insurer argued the fire did not extend beyond unit 3. The insured claimed that the fire damaged six of the 12 apartments with fire or smoke.
The insured's public adjuster submitted a claim to the insurer that exceeded $800,000. The statement of loss included costs for cleaning, asbestos abatement, reconstruction of affected apartments, and loss of rent. The public adjuster said the loss consisted of burn damage to unit 3 and some damage to the "common" walls located between the apartments on the two floors above unit 3. All of the interior rooms of five apartments other than unit 3 would need to be completely dismantled and then replaced.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Times Square Alteration Opened Up a Can of Worms
January 26, 2017 —
Nadine M. Post – Engineering News-RecordCompared with some of its Manhattan neighbors, a high-rise on the corner of Seventh Avenue and West 47th Street looks standard. Like many buildings in Times Square, the 41-story retail-entertainment-hotel development, nearly topped out, has a tower springing from a boxy base that will sport a flashy billboard.
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Nadine M. Post, Engineering News-RecordMs. Post may be contacted at
postn@enr.com
New Jersey School Blames Leaks on Construction Defects, May Sue
January 28, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe Carlstadt Board of Education recently commissioned a investigation into the water leaks at Carlstadt Public School. The report has not been released in full, but redacted board minutes make reference to "a lack of waterproofing, drainage and clogged or buried weep holes." The investigation is ongoing and the board's business administrator, Pamela Baxley, states that its "ability to recover damages in potential litigation may be impacted should this information be released prior to the conclusion of their investigation."
The building in question opened in April 2007, and the leaking began that October. The contractor has fixed leaks, but further leaks have occurred.
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Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Environmental Roundup – May 2019
July 09, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelFederal Courts of Appeal
Dam Claims Collapse
On May 7, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided the case of Navelski, et al. v. International Paper Company. After a major storm, a dam constructed by International Paper to serve the operations of its local paper mill, was breached, releasing millions of gallons of water into a nearby creek resulting in the flooding of many homes located downstream from the creek. IP was sued by the homeowners in a class action, alleging negligence and strict liability for conducting an abnormally dangerous activity. The trial court dismissed the strict liability claim, and the jury found IP was not negligent in the operation of the dam. On appeal, the court upheld the jury verdict, agreeing that the verdict was supported by the evidence heard by the jury. The appeals court also agreed that the strict liability claim was properly dismissed as a matter of law because the operation of this dam was not an abnormally dangerous activity under Florida law. The plaintiffs had also argued that the jury should not have been advised that the home county, Escambia County, has applied for a FEMA grant which apparently made the case that some of the downstream homes were naturally prone to flooding. A redacted version of the application was allowed to be shown to the jury, but the appeals court held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the court ruling was prejudicial.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Is the Event You Are Claiming as Unforeseeable Delay Really Unforeseeable?
September 26, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIs the item or event you are claiming as an unforeseeable, excusable delay really unforeseeable? This is not a trick question.
Just because your construction contract identifies items or events that constitute unforeseeable, excusable delay does not mean those items can be used as a blanket excuse or crutch for the contractor. That would be unfair.
For instance, it is not uncommon for a construction contract to list as unforeseeable, excusable delay the following events or items: “(i) acts of God or of the public enemy, (ii) act of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, (iii) acts of another Contractor in the performance of a contract with the Government, (iv) fires, (v) floods, (vi) epidemics, (vii) quarantine restrictions, (viii) strikes, (ix) freight embargoes, (x) unusually severe weather, or (xi) delays of subcontractors or suppliers at any tier arising from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of both the Contractor and the subcontractors or suppliers.” See, e.g., F.A.R. 52.249-10(b)(1). While the itemization of excusable delay may be worded differently, the point is there may be a listing as to what items or events constitute excusable delay. An excusable delay would justify additional time and, potentially, compensation to the contractor.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
From Both Sides Now: Looking at Contracts Through a Post-Pandemic Lens
August 03, 2020 —
Lori S. Smith - White and WilliamsA little over a year ago, I wrote a blog post about the danger of relying on precedent. Now, more than ever, clients and their advisors need to revisit contract forms on which they may have been relying for years. While many of us have lived through times that required certain adjustments in how we viewed contractual obligations — recessions, wars, oil embargoes, natural disasters, 9/11 — none of these events had the widespread and long-lasting impact that the current COVID-19 pandemic is having. None of these events shut down the U.S. economy and impacted global supply chains across every industry in the manner we are now experiencing.
With this in mind, there is a need to figure out what the “new normal” will look like for contract negotiations in a post-pandemic world. Business professionals need to now anticipate more widespread disruption than we could have ever before imagined. It isn’t just force majeure clauses or material adverse effect provisions, as these will likely add pandemics and government shutdowns to their ever-growing list of contemplated risks, if they were not already expressly covered. And it is not clear, at least in the near-term, whether a resurgence or mutation of COVID-19 or the emergence of another virus can truly be seen as unforeseeable in a post-COVID world. The issues are much more fundamental to the approach that parties may take in negotiating contracts. Commercial contracts between purchasers, vendors, distributors, licensors and licensees will need to evaluate allocation of risk from both sides and come to a new happy medium that all can live with in an ever-evolving world. While parties should review their standard contracts in their entirety, some key provisions to think about include:
- Length of the contract and exclusivity. Depending on which side you are on, you may want to reconsider a long-term arrangement that ties your company to a particular vendor or distributor. Supply chain disruption can have a seriously detrimental impact on your business. Are requirements contracts where a particular supplier is required to make available all of your needs for a certain good or service really the best arrangement for your business? What about take or pay arrangements where you are obligated to which are common in certain industries pay a minimum amount or a penalty to a supplier whether or not you actually purchase the contemplated volume of goods ? Do you really want to be tied up in an exclusive arrangement, or do you need flexibility to maintain secondary or tertiary sources of supply? Do you want to provide a licensee with an exclusive right to your technology (even within a limited field of use or industry sector)?
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Lori S. Smith, White and WilliamsMs. Smith may be contacted at
smithl@whiteandwilliams.com
All Risk Policy Only Covers Repair to Portion of Dock That Sustains Damage
January 06, 2012 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiA portion of a dock on Lack Michigan operated by the Ports of Indiana suffered visible damage. See Ports of Indiana v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130979 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 14, 2011). Lexington Insurance Company insured the port. Lexington agreed that a portion of the dock was damaged and paid $1.2 million for repairs. A dispute arose, however, over whether additional sections of the dock were damaged and whether the damage was the result of more than one "occurrence."
An expert report opined that a significant drop creating record lows in the water level of Lake Michigan in 2007 caused damage to the dock. Lexington maintained that only 128 feet of the dock was damaged; other portions of the dock did not sustain "direct physical loss or damage."
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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