Tennessee High Court Excludes Labor Costs from Insurer’s Actual Cash Value Depreciation Calculations
May 27, 2019 —
Michael S. Levine & Geoffrey B. Fehling - Hunton Andrews KurthThe Tennessee Supreme Court has refused to construe an ambiguous definition of actual cash value to allow for deduction of labor costs as part of depreciation calculations where that subset of repair costs are not clearly addressed in the policy. Despite the split of authority nationwide, the Tennessee case presents a straightforward application of policy interpretation principles to a common valuation issue in first-party property claims.
In Lammert v. Auto-Owners (Mutual) Insurance Co., No. M2017-2546-SC-R23-CV (Tenn. Apr. 15, 2019), insureds brought a class-action lawsuit against their property insurer, Auto-Owners, alleging breach of contract. The plaintiffs each owned buildings damaged by a hail storm and had each submitted claims to Auto-Owners. Auto-Owners accepted the claims and determined that the losses would be determined on an actual cash value basis. In performing those valuations, Auto-Owners depreciated both the building materials and the labor costs associated with repairing the properties. The insureds challenged the labor cost depreciation. Auto-Owners moved to dismiss the lawsuit. In response, the insureds requested that the district court certify to the Tennessee Supreme Court whether, “[u]nder Tennessee law, may an insurer in making an actual cash value payment withhold a portion of repair labor as depreciation when the policy (1) defines actual cash value as ‘the cost to replace damaged property with new property of similar quality and features reduced by the amount of depreciation applicable to the damaged property immediately prior to the loss,’ or (2) states that ‘actual cash value includes a deduction for depreciation?”’
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Geoffrey B. Fehling, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Fehling may be contacted at gfehling@HuntonAK.com
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Flood Policy Does Not Cover Debris Removal from Property
May 07, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Third Circuit affirmed the granting summary judgment to the insurer over a dispute as to debris removal under a Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP). Torre v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4902 (3rd Cir. March 26, 2015).
The Torres' property sustained substantial damage from Hurricane Sandy. Claims for flood damage were submitted to Liberty. Liberty paid a total of $235,751.68, which included the cost of removing debris from the house. An additional $15,520 for the cost of removing sand and other debris deposited on their land in front of and behind the Torres' home was denied on the grounds that the SFIP did not cover such removal.
The Torres filed suit and cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The district court denied the Torres' motion and granted Liberty's motion.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Court of Appeal Puts the “Equity” in Equitable Subrogation
October 05, 2020 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogSubrogation as a concept is well understood in insurance circles. According to the Institute of Risk Management Institute’s glossary of insurance terms subrogation is “the assignment to an insurer by the terms of [a] policy or by law, after payment of a loss, of the rights fo the insured to recover the amount of the loss from one legally liable for it.” In other words, if an insurer comes out of pocket for something someone else broke, the insurer can turn to that responsible party for reimbursement of its out of pocket costs.
Typically, subrogation is, as stated in IRMI’s glossary of insurance terms, a matter of contract and the rights and responsibilities of parties are set forth within the terms of a policy. However, subrogation may, as stated in IRMI’s glossary, also be matter of law. And this is where equitable subrogation comes in.
“Equitable subrogation,” according to IRMI, is “the right of subrogation granted under common law when one party has made a payment on behalf of another and becomes entitled to whatever recovery rights the other party has against a responsible third party.”
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Reminder: Always Order a Title Search for Your Mechanic’s Lien
June 02, 2016 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsMechanic’s liens are close to my heart as a construction attorney. These powerful tools for collection have been (and likely will be) discussed often here at Construction Law Musings. In fact, they rated their own page here at this little construction blog.
While the form for a mechanic’s lien that is found in the Virginia Code looks simple enough, what goes into that form is key to getting past the initial stage of the mere recording of the lien and moving on to where a lien claimant wishes to go: Payment. Everything from the proper amount of the lien to the timing of filing, the parties named, type of work performed and who signs the lien can trip you up even before you get a chance to have a judge examine your payment claim. In short, this simple form has many pitfalls.
On final item that is not often discussed is the description of the property and who the owner is on a project. A mistake on either of these fronts can be fatal as well. Often the “Owner” listed on the construction documents (the contracts, etc.) is not the same as the owner of the real estate to which your lien would attach. Sometimes a company may hire the general contractor as owner and either be a tenant of the property or could be the operating entity, but not the land holder. In either of these scenarios, merely naming the contract “owner” can be a mistake that could cost you your lien. The owner for lien purposes must be the land owner or there will be a problem.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
You Cannot Arbitrate Claims Not Covered By The Arbitration Agreement
March 16, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesRegardless of the type of contract you are dealing with, “[a]rbitration provisions are contractual in nature, and therefore, construction of such provisions and the contracts in which they appear is a matter of contract interpretation.” Wiener v. Taylor Morrison Services, Inc., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D3012f (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). This means if you want to preserve your right to arbitrate claims you want to make sure your contract unambiguously expresses this right. Taking this one step further, if you want to make sure an arbitrator, and not the court, determines whether the claim is arbitrable if a dispute arises, you want to make sure that right is expressly contained in the arbitration provision.
For example, in Wiener, a homeowner sued a home-builder for violation of the building code – a fairly common claim in a construction defect action. The homeowner’s claim dealt with a violation of building code as to exterior stucco deficiencies. The home-builder moved to compel the lawsuit to arbitration based on a structural warranty it provided to the homeowner that contained an arbitration provision. The structural warranty, however, was limited and did not apply to non-load-bearing elements which, per the warranty, were not deemed to have the potential for a major structural defect (e.g., a structural defect to load-bearing elements that would cause the home to be unsafe or inhabitable). The trial court compelled the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision in the structural warranty.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
California Contractors – You Should Know That Section 7141.5 May Be Your Golden Ticket
February 18, 2020 —
Amy L. Pierce, Mark A. Oertel & John Lubitz - Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLPUnder California’s Contractors’ State License Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 7000 et seq., all contractors’ and subcontractors’ licenses expire two years from the last day of the month in which the license issued, or two years from the date on which the renewed license last expired. The Contractors State License Board (CSLB) sends licensees a renewal application 60 to 90 days prior to the date the license is set to expire.
Most contractors have various controls in place to make sure that the renewal application is timely filed and the required fee paid. Even so, we are only human and mistakes are made, and a renewal application filing deadline can be missed for a variety of reasons, e.g., the licensee’s mailing address has not been updated on the CSLB’s records, the individual responsible for filing the license renewal is out on leave, there has been a death in the family or a serious health issue, etc. Quoting Robert Burns, even “[t]he best-laid schemes of mice and men go oft awry” (To a Mouse, 1786).
General contractors should be cognizant of both their and their subcontractors’ license renewal obligations and deadlines.
If a licensee missed timely filing its renewal application, Business & Professions Code Section 7141.5may provide some relief. Section 7141.5 provides that the Registrar of Contractors,
“may grant the retroactive renewal of a license if the licensee requests the retroactive renewal in a petition to the registrar, files an application for renewal on a form prescribed by the registrar, and pays the appropriate renewal fee and delinquency fee prescribed by this chapter. This section shall only apply for a period not to exceed 90 days from the due date and only upon a showing by the contractor that the failure to renew was due to circumstances beyond the control of the licensee.”
Reprinted courtesy of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP attorneys
Amy Pierce,
Mark Oertel and
John Lubitz
Ms. Pierce may be contacted at Amy.Pierce@lewisbrisbois.com
Mr. Oertel may be contacted at Mark.Oertel@lewisbrisbois.com
Mr. Lubitz may be contacted at John.Lubitz@lewisbrisbois.com
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California Federal Court Finds a Breach of Contract Exclusion in a CGL Policy Bars All Coverage for a Construction Defect Action
July 19, 2021 —
Robert Dennison - Traub LiebermanThe Southern District of California published a decision in May 2021 in Associated Industries Ins. Co. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1921016 (S.D. Cal. 5/12/21) concerning the scope of a breach of contract exclusion in a general liability insurance policy as applied to a construction defect action.
The suit was filed by Associated Industries Insurance Company against Mt. Hawley Insurance Company for equitable contribution for amounts spent to defend and indemnify the parties co-insured, referred to as JGCI in the decision. JGCI agreed to build a building for a third party pursuant to a written construction contract. The City of Davis issued a certificate of occupancy for the building on May 6, 2005. The City’s permits stated the building was final on that date. Mt. Hawley issued the first of several annual general liability insurance policies in September 2005.
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Robert Dennison, Traub LiebermanMr. Dennison may be contacted at
rdennison@tlsslaw.com
Avoiding Disaster Due to Improper Licensing
February 18, 2019 —
Candace Matson - Construction & Infrastructure Law BlogIT’S NOT ENOUGH FOR A CONTRACTOR TO BE LICENSED . . . it must be properly licensed.
We are reminded of this by the recent case of JMS Air Conditioning and Appliance Service, Inc. v. Santa Monica Community College District, Bernards Bros., Inc., 30 Cal. App. 5th 945 (2018). In that case, JMS entered into an $8.2M subcontract with Bernards to install an HVAC system in a new facility being built for the District. JMS held a C-20 warm-air heating, ventilating and air-conditioning license. A year into the project, Bernards sought permission from the District to substitute another subcontractor for JMS (as required under Public Contract Code Section 4107 for listed subcontractors on public works of improvement). Among other things, Bernards contended that JMS was not properly licensed to perform that portion of the work which consisted of hydronic plumbing and hydronic boiler work. JMS countered that this work was an integral part of installing an HVAC system, and relied on Business & Profession Code Section 7059, which permits work that is “incidental and supplemental to the performance of the work for which the specialty contractor is licensed,” and a California State Licensing Board regulation which defines “incidental and supplemental” as meaning “essential to accomplish the work in which the contractor is classified.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, §831.)
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Candace Matson, Sheppard MullinMs. Matson may be contacted at
cmatson@sheppardmullin.com
