California Supreme Court Finds that When it Comes to Intentional Interference Claims, Public Works Projects are Just Different, Special Even
April 20, 2017 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogEarlier, we reported on a California Court of Appeals decision – Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. – which held for the first time that a second-place bidder on a public works contract could sue a winning bidder who failed to pay its workers prevailing wages, under the business tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
Fast forward nearly two years, several amicus briefs, and “one doghouse”* later and the California Supreme Court has . . . reversed.
The Roy Allan Slurry Seal Case
To catch you up, or rather, refresh your recollection . . .
Between 2009 and 2012, American Asphalt South, Inc. was awarded 23 public works contracts totaling more than $14.6 million throughout Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino and San Diego counties. Two of the losing bidders on those projects – Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. and Doug Martin Contracting, Inc. – sued American in each of these counties for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage as well as under the Unfair Practices Act (“UPA”) (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17000 et seq.) and the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (Bus. & Prof. Code §17200).
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Will There Be Construction Defect Legislation Introduced in the 2019 Colorado Legislative Session?
March 18, 2019 —
David McLain - Colorado Construction Litigation BlogWith the 2019 Colorado legislative session well underway, the construction industry is waiting with bated breath to see what the Democrat controlled legislature might do with respect to construction defect legislation. In recent years, having a split legislature has prevented any attempts to roll back positive changes in the law, either from the legislature or Colorado courts, that have been hailed by the construction community.
This year, odds are good that we will see at least one bill similar to two introduced last year that would hinder the ability to have disputes decided by binding arbitration. While not full frontal assaults on the Colorado Supreme Court decision in the Vallagio case, HB18-1261, the “Colorado Arbitration Fairness Act,” and HB 18-1262, the “Arbitration Services Provider Transparency Act,” would have negatively impacted the ability to resolve any type of case through arbitration. Anything that prevents the resolution of construction defect cases through arbitration will increase the judgments and settlements in such cases, ultimately increasing the costs of construction and for insurance for those in the industry.
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David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Where Mechanic’s Liens and Contracts Collide
July 02, 2018 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsToday at Construction Law Musings, we’re back to a discussion of mechanic’s liens.
This past week, the Loudoun County Circuit Court here in Virginia had an opportunity to discuss the interaction between mechanic’s liens, contracts and the law of fixtures. In TWP Enters. v Dressel, the Court considered a provision of a contract between the TWP Enterprises, a supplier of materials to the construction project, and the builder for the defendant. The provision between the supplier and builder essentially stated that until such time as TWP’s materials were paid for in full, TWP kept title to them (check out the case link above for the full text of the provision).
Needless to say, the builder did not pay and TWP filed a mechanic’s lien then sued to enforce that lien. The owners demurred to the complaint and asked the Court to dismiss the claim on several grounds, among them that the contractual provision described above precluded the enforcement of the lien because TWP retained title to the materials despite the fact that they had been incorporated into the structure of the building and were therefore part of the realty.
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Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Fair Share Act Does Not Preempt Common Law When Apportioning Liability
March 09, 2020 —
Mark T. Caloyer & Joelle Nelson - Lewis Brisbois NewsroomOn February 19, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a long awaited opinion in the matter of Roverano v. John Crane, Inc., No. 26 EAP 2018, No. 27 EAP 2018 (Pa. 2020). The Court’s opinion is a must-read for anyone involved in asbestos litigation in Pennsylvania.
In Roverano, the Court ruled that Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act (42 Pa.C.S. § 7102) does not preempt Pennsylvania common law favoring per capita apportionment of liability to strict liability defendants. In addition, the Court ruled that bankruptcy trusts, that are either joined as third-party defendants or that have entered into a release with the plaintiff, may be included on the verdict sheet for purposes of liability.
In this case, Mr. Roverano sued 30 defendants in strict liability and Defendant Crane filed a joinder complaint against Johns-Manville Personal Injury Trust. The case proceeded to trial against eight defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. At trial, some of the defendants filed motions in limine seeking a ruling that the Fair Share Act applied to asbestos cases. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that asbestos exposure cannot be quantified, and held that that it would apportion liability on a per capita basis consistent with the Court’s opinion in Baker v. AC&S, 755 A.2d 664 (Pa. 2000).
Reprinted courtesy of
Mark T. Caloyer, Lewis Brisbois and
Joelle Nelson, Lewis Brisbois
Mr. Caloyer may be contacted at Mark.Caloyer@lewisbrisbois.com
Ms. Nelson may be contacted at Joelle.Nelson@lewisbrisbois.com
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ADA Compliance Checklist For Your Business
February 06, 2019 —
Danielle Carter - Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPThe Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects people with disabilities against discrimination in three important settings:
1. Employment (ADA Title I)
2. Government Services and Public Transportation (ADA Title II)
3. Commercial Facilities and Places of Public Accommodation (ADA Title III)
Since business owners typically act as both employers and facility managers, they must pay careful attention to Title I and Title III of the ADA. A business owner’s ADA compliance checklist should include the following:
1. ADA Compliance Audit for Structural Accessibility. The ADA and its accompanying regulations set forth detailed legal standards and requirements for accessible design, which specify, for example, the minimum width of doors to conference rooms, the maximum height of public drinking fountains, and the maximum thickness of hallway carpeting. Many older buildings were built without features that accommodate people with disabilities, such that the ADA may require improvements to be made to existing facilities.
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Danielle Carter, Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPMs. Carter may be contacted at
info@bremerwhyte.com
Why You Make A Better Wall Than A Window: Why Policyholders Can Rest Assured That Insurers Should Pay Legal Bills for Claims with Potential Coverage
March 14, 2018 —
Alan Packer and Graham Mills - Newmeyer & Dillion, LLPUnfortunately, policyholders, such as manufacturers and contractors, routinely face the unnecessary challenge of how to access all of the insurance coverage which they have purchased. Frequently, the most pressing need is to get the insurance company to pay the legal bills when the policyholders have been sued. The recent Iowa federal district court opinion in
Pella Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company should help a policyholder in a dispute to require its insurance company to pay those legal bills sooner rather than later by highlighting that the duty to defend arises from the potential for coverage, and the insurer may not force the policyholder to prove the damage to obtain a defense.
In
Pella, a window manufacturer purchased several years of insurance coverage from Liberty Mutual. Similar to many companies, Pella had many “layers” of insurance coverage in any given year. These layers collectively function like a tower. The general idea is that each layer provides a certain amount of coverage after the insurance policy below it had paid its money. The Liberty Mutual insurance policies provided excess coverage.
After the
Pella window manufacturer made and sold its windows, it was sued in numerous lawsuits alleging that its windows were defective and that those defective windows caused a wide variety of damage to the structures in which they were installed. The window manufacturer tendered those lawsuits to its insurance companies in its tower of coverage, asking that the insurance companies pay its legal bills incurred in its defense. As to Liberty Mutual, the window manufacturer argued that the Liberty Mutual insurance policies were triggered, and so obligated to reimburse it, if a window was installed during the years that those policies provided coverage or if there was a mere allegation that a window was installed during the years that those policies provided coverage. Liberty Mutual opposed, arguing that the date of installation of the windows was insufficient to trigger the policies, and that the manufacturer was required to demonstrate the date that damage actually occurred to trigger a defense.
The key issue before the
Pella Court in this decision was a simple one: which insurance policies, if any, issued by Liberty Mutual had an obligation to pay the window manufacturer’s legal bills? The answer to that question is critical and financially significant. Getting an insurance company to honor its obligations and start paying the legal bills as soon as possible is very important for a policyholder because of the cost of defending oneself in a lawsuit; often the key reason why an insurance policy is even purchased is to provide the policyholder with the right to call upon the insurance company’s financial resources to defend it should it be sued.
In a ruling that will be welcomed by policyholders, the
Pella Court held that Liberty Mutual’s multiple insurance policies were triggered, and so obligated to pay for the window manufacturer’s defense, if one of two events occurred during the years in which those insurance policies provided coverage: (1) a window was actually installed during a year when the insurance policy provided coverage or (2) the window was alleged to be installed in the year that the insurance policy provided coverage. The Court agreed with the policyholder that once the windows were installed, property damage was alleged and “may
potentially have occurred” from that point on, thus the policies on the risk from that point forward. The practical effect of this ruling meant that Liberty Mutual had to reimburse the window manufacturer for the defense fees and costs that it had paid.
While
Pella was decided under Iowa law, the principles upon which it relied are similar to those applied under California law. Importantly, both California and Iowa law hold that an insurance company must provide a defense in response to a claim that is, or could be, covered by the insurance policy. The mere potential that the claim might be covered is enough for the insurance company to be obligated to pay for policyholder’s legal fees and costs.
Establishing that an insurance company must pay legal fees and costs as soon as possible allows a policyholder to save its own money. Why should a policyholder pay legal bills when it purchased an insurance policy as protection to ensure that it did not have to pay those bills? The answer is that a policyholder should not and, under
Pella, the policyholder does not have to. Rather, the insurance company must start paying for that defense from a very early date. Pella confirms for policyholders the position that their insurance companies should pay legal bills earlier rather than later.
Alan Packer is a partner in the Walnut Creek office for Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP, representing homebuilders, property owners, and business clients on a broad range of legal matters, including risk management, insurance matters, wrap consultation and documentation, efforts to counter solicitation of homeowners, subcontract documentation, as well as complex litigation matters. Alan can be reached at alan.packer@ndlf.com.
Graham Mills is a partner in the Walnut Creek offce of Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP, representing clients in the area of complex insurance law with an emphasis on insurance recovery, construction litigation, real estate litigation, and business litigation. He regularly examines and analyzes a wide variety of insurance policies. Graham can be reached at graham.mills@ndlf.com.
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Florida’s Statute of Limitations / Repose for Actions Founded on Construction Improvement Modified
April 25, 2023 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesOn April 13, 2023, Florida’s all-important four-year statute of limitations–Florida Statute s. 95.11(3)(c)–relating to actions founded on construction of an improvement of real property was modified. This is a key statute of limitations for ALL construction practitioners because it also includes the statute of repose for latent construction defects.
At the bottom of this posting is the current version fo s. 95.11(3)(c) with the underlined section being recent additions. (They hyperlink above will identify the deletions and additions.) Important things to note:
- Statute of Repose. The statute of repose has been reduced from 10 years to 7 years. There is now an objective date for when the repose period commences: “within 7 years after the date the authority having jurisdiction issues a temporary certificate of occupancy, a certificate of occupancy, or a certificate of completion, or the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, whichever date is earliest.”
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Resurgent Housing Seen Cushioning U.S. From World Woes: Economy
January 28, 2015 —
Steve Matthews – Bloomberg(Bloomberg) -- Real estate developer Crescent Communities in Charlotte, North Carolina, expects to sell 1,000 new homes this year across the Southeast U.S. and Texas, double the number of two years ago.
“Demand is the strongest since the recession” that ended in June 2009 and stemmed from the collapse in housing, said Chief Executive Officer Todd Mansfield. “The economy is getting better and the labor market is getting better.”
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Steve Matthews, BloombergMr. Matthews may be contacted at
smatthews@bloomberg.net
