Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

Texas Supreme Court Holds Anadarko’s $100M Deepwater Horizon Defense Costs Are Not Subject To Joint Venture Liability Limits

February 27, 2019 — Sergio F. Oehninger & Michael S. Levine - Hunton Andrews Kurth
Reversing a Texas Court of Appeals decision that allowed Anadarko’s Lloyd’s of London excess insurers to escape coverage for more than $100 million in defense costs incurred in connection with claims from the Deepwater Horizon well blowout, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the insurers’ obligations to pay defense costs under an “energy package” liability policy are not capped by a joint venture coverage limit for “liability” insured. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. et al. v. Houston Casualty Co. et al., No. 16-1013 (Tex. Jan. 25, 2019). While the Lloyd’s of London insurers had agreed to pay Anadarko $37.5 million for damages, they declined to cover $100 million-plus in defense fees, arguing that both Anadarko’s liability and defense expenses are subject to the $37.5 million joint venture limit for “liability” insured. Anadarko asserted that only amounts paid as damages to third parties are subject to that limit. Defense costs, however, are not amounts paid as damages to a third party and, thus, are not a “liability.” Those amounts, therefore, are not subject to the joint venture limit and are instead subject to the policy’s $150 million coverage limit. Reprinted courtesy of Sergio F. Oehninger, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth Mr. Oehninger may be contacted at soehninger@HuntonAK.com Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
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New York’s Second Department Holds That Carrier Must Pay Judgment Obtained by Plaintiff as Carrier Did Not Meet Burden to Prove Willful Non-Cooperation

November 23, 2020 — Craig Rokuson - Traub Lieberman
In the recent case of DeLuca v. RLI Insurance Company, 2020 WL 5931054 (October 7, 2020), the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department held that RLI had a duty to pay a judgment obtained by an underlying plaintiff against RLI’s insured, MLSC. The underlying plaintiff brought the action directly against the carrier after obtaining a judgment against MLSC, and when the judgment remained unsatisfied, serving RLI with the judgment. As an initial matter, the court found that the direct action by the plaintiff was proper under New York Insurance Law 3420(a), which allows for an injured plaintiff to maintain a direct action against a carrier if a judgment against that carrier’s insured remains unsatisfied for a period of 30 days and the carrier is served with that judgment. In that event, the plaintiff steps into the shoes of the insured and is entitled to the rights of the insured (and is also subject to the carrier’s coverage defenses). Reprinted courtesy of Craig Rokuson, Traub Lieberman Mr. Rokuson may be contacted at crokuson@tlsslaw.com Read the full story... Read the court decision
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Don’t Ignore a Notice of Contest of Lien

April 29, 2024 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A recent case, Jon M. Hall Company, LLC v. Canoe Creek Investments, LLC, 49 Fla.L.Weekly D812a (Fla. 2d DCA 2024), demonstrates four important things when it comes to liens:

An owner can shorten the time period to foreclose on the lien, whether against the real property or a lien transfer bond, to 60 days by recording a notice of contest of lien;
An owner can transfer a lien to a lien transfer bond during litigation;
An owner can record a notice of contest of lien to force the lienor to amend its lawsuit to sue the lien transfer bond surety within 60 days; and
A contractors’ failure to amend its lawsuit to sue the lien transfer bond within 60 days will extinguish its rights to pursue a claim against the lien transfer bond, and will otherwise extinguish the lien, fairly or unfairly.

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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

How to Get Your Bedroom Into the Met Museum

February 23, 2016 — James Tarmy – Bloomberg
A dressing room, i.e., a large closet devoted explicitly to the putting on and taking off of clothing, has just gone on permanent display at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. The room, labeled the Worsham-Rockefeller Dressing Room after its two previous owners, is a dizzying, gilded-age assemblage of competing wallpaper patterns, woodwork, and metal ornament. Still. The Met has one of the largest and most important collections of art in the world: Why did a dressing room end up migrating from a house slated for demolition on West 54th Street to a museum's hallowed halls? And what, for that matter, did every owner of the three-dozen period rooms do to get their homes on display? By narrating the history of the following rooms, three of the Met's curators have helped supply an answer to what it takes to get your bedroom into the Met. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of James Tarmy, Bloomberg

Recent Decision Further Jeopardizes Availability of Additional Insured Coverage in New York

July 08, 2024 — Nina Catanzaro & Bethany L. Barrese - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Additional insured endorsements often provide “blanket” coverage to persons or organizations as required by a written contract. However, the wording of the “blanket” language is critically important, as the inclusion of certain phrases in an additional insured endorsement can result in a denial of coverage for the upstream party. For example, risk transfer issues can arise when an additional insured endorsement provides coverage to parties “when you [the named insured] and such person or organization [the additional insured] have agreed in writing in a contract or agreement.” Courts in New York (among other jurisdictions) have interpreted this phrase to require contractual privity – that is, only the entity that contracted directly with the named insured is entitled to additional insured coverage, even if the named insured agreed in that contract to provide additional insured coverage for others as well. The same goes for the phrase “any person or organization with whom you [the named insured] have agreed to add as an additional insured by written contract.” Reprinted courtesy of Nina Catanzaro, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and Bethany L. Barrese, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. Ms. Catanzaro may be contacted at NCatanzaro@sdvlaw.com Ms. Barrese may be contacted at BBarrese@sdvlaw.com Read the court decision
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Still Going, After All This Time: the Sacketts, EPA and the Clean Water Act

September 13, 2021 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel
On August 16, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the Idaho property of Michael and Chantell Sackett was a regulated wetlands under the then-controlling 1977 EPA rules defining “waters of the United States,” and that the Sacketts dredging and filling of their property was subject to regulation by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or EPA. EPA’s case, as it has been for many years, was based on 2008 EPA and Corps inspection reports and Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test as the controlling opinion in the 2006 Supreme Court case, Rapanos v. United States. The Sacketts’ argument was that the text of the Clean Water Act, as interpreted by Justice Scalia and three other Justices, was controlling, but for several years, the Ninth Circuit has relied on Justice Kennedy’s opinion in these CWA controversies. The court’s opinion expressed considerable sympathy for the Sacketts as they negotiated the thicket of EPA’s regulatory processes, but it could not disregard circuit precedent. A few years ago, the Supreme Court ruled, in a unanimous decision, that EPA’s then extant administrative compliance orders were arbitrary and capricious. (See Sackett v. US, 566 US 120 (2015).) After that decision, the case was remanded to the federal district court, where it lingered for several more years. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury
Mr. Cavender may be contacted at anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com

Chinese Hunt for Trophy Properties Boosts NYC, London Prices

January 21, 2015 — Vinicy Chan – Bloomberg
What do New York’s most famous hotel, the Lloyd’s of London building and the headquarters of the U.K.’s top law firm have in common? They’re all owned by Chinese insurers. This new breed of buyers, who weren’t allowed to invest overseas before 2012, are flooding into the global market for prime commercial real estate after being given more freedom to deploy their $1.6 trillion of assets. That has meant good times for sellers of trophy real estate in major cities. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Vinicy Chan, Bloomberg
Ms. Chan may be contacted at vchan91@bloomberg.net

Plaintiffs Not Barred from Proving Causation in Slip and Fall Case, Even With No Witnesses and No Memory of Fall Itself

February 01, 2022 — David Hoynacki, Arezoo Jamshidi & Lawrence S. Zucker II - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
On January 19, 2022, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District (Los Angeles), held that a plaintiff is not barred as a matter of law from proving causation in a slip and fall case if there were no witnesses to the fall, and the plaintiff does not remember the fall itself. The Court of Appeal stated specifically that circumstantial evidence would permit a jury to make a “reasonable and probable inference” regarding contributing factors to a fall, even with no eye-witness evidence. In Kaney v. Mazza (BC619247, Jan. 19, 2022), plaintiff and appellant Lydia Kaney (Kaney), was visiting her sister in her rented home in September of 2014. At some point during the visit, the light in the bathroom at the top of the stairs stopped working—Kaney used the stairs, and fell. Kaney filed suit against her sister and the owner of the home alleging premises liability, negligence, and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In her deposition, Kaney testified that she remembered going up to the bathroom, and then waking up on the floor in pain. She could not remember how she fell; she did not know if she had missed a step, or if she had slipped and fallen backwards. She speculated that a worn-out bath mat may have been the cause of the slip and fall because the rubber traction on the bath mat was worn away. Reprinted courtesy of David Hoynacki, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP, Arezoo Jamshidi, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Lawrence S. Zucker II, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Hoynacki may be contacted at dhoynacki@hbblaw.com Ms. Jamshidi may be contacted at ajamshidi@hbblaw.com Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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