SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Lien Claimant’s Right to Execute against Bond Upheld in Court of Appeals

February 10, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council Blog

Stonewood v. Infinity Homes is a simple construction dispute over a matter of about $9,000.00. But sometimes these tiny little disputes turn into expensive legal battles over mere procedural quivering. In Stonewood, a small subcontractor won a big victory yesterday when the Divison 1 Court of Appeals upheld its judgment against a lien release bond posted by an owner.



Infinity Homes contracted with Stonewood Design to lay tile in one of its customer’s homes. Stonewood did the work, but Infinity withheld roughly $9,000.00 of the contract sums for what it alleged were trade damages left on the tile. The two parties were unable to come to an agreement over payment and Stonewood proceeded with a lien under RCW 60.04. It then filed an action to enforce the lien against the homeowner, Infinity and its bonding company.

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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com

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HOA Has No Claim to Extend Statute of Limitations in Construction Defect Case

October 28, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 20, 2011 in the case of Arundel Homeowners Association v. Arundel Green Partners, a construction defect case involving a condominium conversion in San Francisco. Eight years after the Notice of Completion was filed, the homeowners association filed a lawsuit alleging a number of construction defects, including “defective cabinets, waterproofing membranes, wall-cladding, plumbing, electrical wiring, roofing (including slope, drainage and flashings), fire-rated ceilings, and chimney flues.” Three years of settlement negotiations followed.

Negotiations ended in the eleventh year with the homeowners association filing a lawsuit. Arundel Green argued that the suit should be thrown out as California’s ten-year statute of limitations had passed. The court granted judgment to Arundel Green.

The homeowners then filed for a new trial and to amend its complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should not apply due to the doctrine of equitable estoppel as Arundel Green’s actions had lead them to believe the issues could be solved without a lawsuit. “The HOA claimed that it was not until after the statute of limitations ran that the HOA realized Arundel Green would not keep its promises; and after this realization, the HOA promptly brought its lawsuit.” The trial court denied the homeowners association’s motions, which the homeowners association appealed.

In reviewing the case, the Appeals Court compared Arundel to an earlier California Supreme Court case, Lantzy. (The homeowners also cited Lantzy as the basis of their appeal.) In Lantzy, the California Supreme Court set up a four-part test as to whether estoppel could be applied. The court applied these tests and found, as was the case in Lantzy, that there were no grounds for estoppel.

In Arundel, the court noted that “there are simply no allegations that Arundel Green made any affirmative statement or promise that would lull the HOA into a reasonable belief that its claims would be resolved without filing a lawsuit.” The court also cited Lesko v. Superior Court which included a recommendation that the plaintiffs “send a stipulation?Ķextending time.” This did not happen and the court upheld the dismissal.

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Impairing Your Insurer’s Subrogation Rights

May 06, 2024 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Liability insurance policies have a provision that allows them to subrogate to the rights of their insured. This provision is commonly referred to as a transfer of rights provision and reads: If the insured has rights to recover all or part of any payment we have made under this Coverage Part, those rights are transferred to us. The insured must do nothing after loss to impair them. At our request, the insured will bring “suit” or transfer those rights to us and help us enforce them. In a recent dispute, an insurer sued its insured claiming the insured breached the insurance policy-a contract—by impairing the insurer’s subrogation rights. In other words, the insurer claimed its insured breach the insurance contract and the transfer of rights provision above. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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Court of Appeals Issues Decision Regarding Second-Tier Subcontractors and Pre-Lien Notice

February 06, 2023 — Travis Colburn - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight
Velazquez Framing, LLC (“Velazquez”) v. Cascadia Homes, Inc. (“Cascadia”) is a Court of Appeals, Division 2 case where the primary issue on appeal was whether a second tier subcontractor was required to provide pre-lien notice under RCW 60.04 for its labor. The defendant, Cascadia, was the general contractor that planned to build a home on property it owned in Lakewood, Washington.[1] High End Construction, LLC (“High End”), submitted a bid to Cascadia for framing work on the home. High End began work on Cascadia’s home, but later subcontracted with Velazquez to complete the framing work.[2] Velazquez did not submit a prelien notice for its work on Cascadia’s home, and Cascadia claimed it was unaware that High End subcontracted with Velazquez for framing at the project. High End invoiced Cascadia and was paid for its work, but High End never paid Velazquez. Subsequently, Velazquez recorded a lien for both labor and materials, and later filed a complaint to foreclose its lien. Cascadia, due to the fact Velazquez did not provide it with prelien notice, moved for summary judgment, arguing prelien notice was required under RCW 60.04.031(1)[3] and the labor portion of a lien cannot be segregated where a subcontractor’s lien includes both labor and materials. Velazquez argued that no prelien notice was required under RCW 60.04.021[4] and RCW 60.04.031 and claimed that subcontractors can segregate the labor portion from the materials portion. The trial court granted Cascadia’s motion and ruled Velazquez did not fall within one of the exceptions for prelien notice in RCW 60.04.031(2), and therefore, could not enforce the lien. Velazquez appealed. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Travis Colburn, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight
Mr. Colburn may be contacted at travis.colburn@acslawyers.com

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Illinois Court Addresses Rip-And-Tear Coverage And Existence Of An “Occurrence” In Defective Product Suit

September 04, 2018 — Brian Bassett - TLSS Insurance Law Blog
In Lexington Ins. Co. v. Chi. Flameproof & Wood Specialties Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135871, 2018 WL 3819109 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2018), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that rip-and-tear costs could qualify as covered “property damage,” but the court rejected coverage for claims that the insured intentionally sold a noncompliant product as the suit did not allege an “occurrence.” Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”) issued a CGL policy to Chicago Flameproof & Wood Specialties Corp. (“Flameproof”). During the policy period, a third party ordered fire-retardant-treated lumber from Flameproof for construction in Minnesota. Flameproof instead sent materials that were not tested, certified, or labeled as compliant. The third party installed the materials, discovered the non-compliance, and then removed the materials. Removing the materials allegedly damaged other portions of the building on the project. The third party then sued Flameproof, alleging costs associated with replacing the lumber as well as property damage to the other materials from the removal of the lumber. Flameproof tendered the claim to Lexington seeking a defense. Lexington filed a declaratory action in the Northern District of Illinois. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Brian Bassett, Traub Lieberman Strauss & Shrewsberry LLP
Mr. Bassett may be contacted at bbassett@tlsslaw.com

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Delaware Supreme Court Allows Shareholders Access to Corporation’s Attorney-Client Privileged Documents

August 13, 2014 — Marc S. Casarino and Lori S. Smith – White and Williams LLP
Delaware corporations may be required to turn over internal documents of directors and officers, including those of in-house counsel, where the factors enumerated in Garner v. Walfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) weigh in favor of disclosure. In a July 23, 2014 decision of first-impression, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW, that the Garner doctrine applies to plenary shareholder/corporation disputes, as well as to books and records inspection actions under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. The Garner doctrine provides that a shareholder may invade the corporation’s attorney-client privilege in order to prove fiduciary breaches by those in control of the corporation upon a showing of good cause. The non-exhaustive list of factors by which a finding of good cause should be tested are: “(i) the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they represent; (ii) the bona fides of the shareholders; (iii) the nature of the shareholders’ claim and whether it is obviously colorable; (iv) the apparent necessity or desirability of the shareholders having the information and the availability of it from other sources; (v) whether, if the shareholders’ claim is of wrongful action by the corporation, it is of action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful legality; (vi) whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation itself; (vii) the extent to which the communication is identified versus the extent to which the shareholders are blindly fishing; and (viii) the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information in whose confidentiality the corporation has an interest for independent reasons.” Reprinted courtesy of Marc S. Casarino, White and Williams LLP and Lori S. Smith, White and Williams LLP Mr. Casarino may be contacted at casarinom@whiteandwilliams.com; Ms. Smith may be contacted at smithl@whiteandwilliams.com Read the court decision
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JPMorgan Blamed for ‘Zombie’ Properties in Miami Lawsuit

June 18, 2014 — Christie Smythe – Bloomberg
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) engaged in a “pattern of discriminatory” lending that led to foreclosures, the city of Miami said in a lawsuit filed last week in federal court, the latest in a series of similar claims against the nation’s largest banks. Last month, Banco Santander SA’s (SAN) U.S. unit was sued by the city of Providence, Rhode Island, over claims it stopped issuing mortgages in minority neighborhoods after the housing bubble burst. Santander Bank, previously named Sovereign Bank, pulled out of the neighborhoods and focused on white communities after being acquired by the Madrid-based lender in 2009, the city alleged. Miami and Los Angeles are among cities to have filed similar lawsuits against Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc. (C) and Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) for allegedly “red-lining” black and Hispanic areas as no-loan zones, and then “reverse red-lining,” flooding the areas with predatory mortgages even when minorities qualified for better terms. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Christie Smythe, Bloomberg
Ms. Smythe may be contacted at csmythe1@bloomberg.net

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Hawaii Supreme Court Finds Excess Can Sue Primary for Equitable Subrogation

October 21, 2015 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
In responding to a certified question from the U.S. Distric Court, the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that an excess carrier can sue the primary carrier for failure to settle a claim in bad faith within primary limits. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2015 Haw. LEXIS 142 (Haw. June 29, 2015). St. Paul, the excess carrier, and Liberty Mutual, the primary carrier, issued polices to Pleasant Travel Service, Inc. The primary policy covered up to $1 million. Pleasant Travel was sued for damages resulting from an accidental death. St. Paul alleged that Liberty Mutual rejected multiple pretrial settlement offers within the $1 million primary policy limit. A trial resulted in a verdict of $4.1 million against Pleasant Travel. The action settled for a confidential amount in excess of the Liberty Mutual policy limit. St. Paul paid the amount in excess. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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