Pa. Contractor Pleads No Contest to Prevailing-Wage Charges, Pays Workers $20.7M
September 20, 2021 —
Tom Ichniowski - Engineering News-RecordPennsylvania construction contractor Glenn O. Hawbaker Inc. has pleaded no contest to counts of theft of worker pay—in alleged violation of state prevailing-wage laws—and will pay 1,267 workers restitution of $20.7 million in unpaid wages, Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro said.
The company entered its plea to four felony counts of “theft by failure to make required disposition of funds received” on Aug. 3 before President Judge Pamela A. Ruest of the Centre County Court of Common Pleas in Bellefonte, Pa.
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Tom Ichniowski, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Ichniowski may be contacted at ichniowskit@enr.com
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Safe Harbors- not just for Sailors anymore (or, why advance planning can prevent claims of defective plans & specs) (law note)
August 17, 2011 —
Melissa Brumback, Construction Law in North CarolinaHave you ever considered a “Safe Harbor Provision” for your Owner-Architect or Owner-Engineer contract? Maybe it is time that you do.
As you are (probably too well) aware, on every construction project there are changes. Some of these are due to the owner’s change of heart, value engineering concerns, contractor failures, and material substitutions. Some may be because of a design error, omission, or drawing conflict. It happens.
A “Safe Harbor Provision” is a provision that establishes an acceptable percentage of increased construction costs (that is, a percentage of the project’s contingency). The idea is that if the construction changes attributable to the designer is within this percentage, no claim will be made by the Owner for design defects.
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
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Arizona Court Determines Statute of Limitations Applicable to a Claim for Reformation of a Deed of Trust (and a Related Claim for Declaratory Judgment)
October 16, 2018 —
Kevin J. Parker - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn a recent Arizona Court of Appeals case, Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pheasant Grove LLC, 798 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 15 (August 23, 2018), the Court of Appeals addressed the question of what statute of limitations was applicable to a declaratory judgment claim. In that case, a bank’s deed of trust inadvertently omitted one of the lots that was supposed to secure that bank’s loan. The deed of trust should have covered lots 8 and 9, but by its terms covered only lot 8. A different bank subsequently recorded a deed of trust that encumbered lot 9. In connection with the second bank’s foreclosure of its deed of trust, the first bank sought reformation and a declaratory judgment with regard to its deed of trust, seeking to have that deed of trust cover both lots 8 and 9, as intended. The trial court determined that the first bank’s reformation claim was filed too late, and also determined that the declaratory judgment claim was filed too late, beyond the applicable statute of limitations.
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Kevin J. Parker, Snell & WilmerMr. Parker may be contacted at
kparker@swlaw.com
OSHA Releases COVID-19 Guidance
June 15, 2020 —
L. Stephen Bowers & Joshua Tumen - White and Williams LLPThe United States Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) ensures safe and healthful working conditions for employees by setting and enforcing standards and by providing training, outreach, education and assistance.
The COVID-19 outbreak has increased demand for N95 filtering face piece respirators (N95 FFRs), limiting availability for workers in healthcare and emergency response. On April 3, 2020, OSHA issued interim guidance for employers to combat the supply shortages of N95 FFRs and to comply with the respiratory protection standard (29 CFR § 1910.134). This guidance will remain in effect until further notice and applies in all industries.
Employers must continue to manage their respiratory protection programs and be mindful of N95 FFR shortages. Specifically, employers should identify and evaluate respiratory hazards in the workplace, and develop and implement written respiratory protection programs. Businesses should reassess their engineering controls, work practices, and administrative controls to identify any changes they can make to decrease the need for N95 FFRs. Some examples provided in the guidance include using portable local exhaust systems or moving operations outdoors. Employers may also consider temporarily suspending non-essential operations, to the extent such operations are not already suspended due to state mandates.
Reprinted courtesy of
L. Stephen Bowers, White and Williams LLP and
Joshua Tumen, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Bowers may be contacted at bowerss@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Tumen may be contacted at tumenj@whiteandwilliams.com
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Bank of America’s Countrywide Ordered to Pay $1.3 Billion
July 30, 2014 —
Patricia Hurtado – BloombergBank of America Corp.’s Countrywide unit was ordered to pay $1.3 billion in penalties for defective mortgage loans it sold to Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Freddie Mac in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, a little more than half of what the U.S. had requested.
U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff in Manhattan issued the civil penalty against the Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank today in the first mortgage-fraud case brought by the federal government to go to trial.
Countrywide and Rebecca Mairone, a former executive with the mortgage lender, were found liable in October for selling thousands of bad loans to the two government-sponsored enterprises. Mairone was ordered today to pay $1 million.
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Patricia Hurtado, BloombergMs. Hurtado may be contacted at
pathurtado@bloomberg.net
More Musings From the Mediation Trenches
July 30, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsAs those that read this construction blog on a regular basis know, I became a Virginia Supreme Court certified mediator a few years ago. I did so because I believe that mediation as a form of alternate dispute resolution is in most cases a much better alternative to resolve a construction dispute than litigation.
While I still act as counsel to construction companies participating in mediations (and have posted my thoughts on this topic on numerous occasions), working with the General District Courts of Virginia and acting as a mediator for private disputes has given me an interesting perspective on how the flexibility and process of mediation can resolve disputes in a way that formal court litigation or other forms of ADR may not.
After almost 4 years of working with the general district courts here in Virginia and working with private companies and individuals to resolve their disputes, I have come to the conclusion that often the real issue is not the money (though that is the big one) but some other intangible issue, whether an emotional one or some conflict of personality or even what may seem in hindsight to be a minor miscommunication. Because of this fact of life, and the life of a mediator, the ability to “vent” in the confidential setting of a mediation and in a way that no Court with rules of evidence could allow can go a long way toward a resolution of the dispute.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFSafety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
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Montana Trial Court Holds That Youths Have Standing to Bring Constitutional Claims Against State Government For Alleged Climate Change-Related Harms
September 18, 2023 —
Paul A. Briganti & Julia Castanzo - White and Williams LLPOn August 14, 2023, in a “landmark” ruling, a Montana state court held that youth plaintiffs had standing to assert constitutional claims against the State of Montana, its governor and state agencies for “ignoring” the impact of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on climate change. Held v. State of Montana, Cause No. CDV-020-307 (1st Judicial Dist. Ct., Lewis & Clark Cty., Mt.). Agreeing with the plaintiffs, the court concluded that a limitation in the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), which prohibited the state from considering climate impacts when issuing permits for energy projects, violated the plaintiffs’ right under the state constitution to a “clean and healthful environment.”
MEPA, enacted in 1971, states that its purposes include “provid[ing] for the adequate review of state actions in order to ensure that . . . environmental attributes are fully considered by the legislature in enacting laws to fulfill constitutional obligations . . . .” In 2011, the legislature amended the statute to curtail the scope of environmental reviews. Under the so-called MEPA limitation, Montana agencies cannot consider “an evaluation of greenhouse gas emissions and corresponding impacts to the climate in the state or beyond the state’s borders.” Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-201(2)(a). In 2023, the legislature added a provision that eliminated equitable remedies (i.e., the ability to “vacate, void, or delay a lease, permit, license, certificate, authorization, or other entitlement or authority”) for litigants who “claim that [an] environmental review is inadequate based in whole or in part upon greenhouse gas emissions and impacts to the climate in Montana or beyond Montana’s borders . . . .” Id. § 75-1-201(6)(a)(ii).
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Paul A. Briganti, White and Williams LLP and
Julia Castanzo, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Briganti may be contacted at brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Castanzo may be contacted at castanzoj@whiteandwilliams.com
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