Seller Cannot Compel Arbitration for Its Role in Construction Defect Case<
March 01, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe buyer of a leaky home in Venice, California cannot be compelled to arbitration with the seller in a construction defect lawsuit, according to a decision in Lindemann v. Hume, which was heard in the California Court of Appeals. Lindemann was the trustee of the Schlei Trust which bought the home and then sued the seller and the builder for construction defects.
The initial owner was the Hancock Park Trust, a real estate trust for Nicholas Cage. Richard Hume was the trustee. In 2002, Cage agreed to buy the home which was being built by the Lee Group. Cage transferred the agreement to the Hancock Park Trust. Hancock had Richard Nazarin, a general contractor, conduct a pre-closing walk through. They also engaged an inspector. Before escrow closed, the Lee Group agreed to provide a ten-year warranty “to remedy and repair any and all damage resulting from water infiltration, intrusion, or flooding due to the fact that the door on the second and third floors of the residence at the Property were not originally installed at least one-half inch (1/2”) to one inch (1”) above the adjacent outside patio tile/floor on each of the second and third floors.”
Cage moved in and experienced water intrusion and flooding. The Lee Group was unable to fix the problems. Hume listed the home for sale. The Kamienowiczs went as far as escrow before backing out of the purchase over concerns about water, after the seller’s agent disclosed “a problem with the drainage system that is currently being addressed by the Lee Group.”
The house was subsequently bought by the Schlei Trust. The purchase agreement included an arbitration clause which included an agreement that “any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.” The warranty the Lee Group had given to Hancock was transferred to the Schlei trust and Mr. Schlei moved into the home in May 2003.
Lindemann enquired as to whether the work done would prevent future flooding. Nazarin sent Schlei a letter that said that measures had been taken “to prevent that situation from recurring.” In February, 2004, there was flooding and water intrusion. Lindemann filed a lawsuit against the Lee Group and then added the Hancock Park defendants.
The Hancock Park defendants invoked the arbitration clause, arguing that Lindemann’s claims “were only tangentially related to her construction defect causes of action against the Lee Group.” On June 9, 2010, the trial court rejected this claim, ruling that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law. “With respect to both the developer defendants and the seller defendants, the threshold issue is whether there was a problem with the construction of the property in the first instance. If there was no problem with the construction of the property, then there was nothing to fail to disclose.” Later in the ruling, the trial court noted that “the jury could find there was no construction defect on the property, while the arbitration finds there was a construction defect, the sellers knew about it, and the sellers failed to disclose it.” The appeals court noted that while Hancock Park had disclosed the drainage problems to the Kamienowiczs, no such disclosure was made to Sclei.
The appeals court described Hancock Park’s argument that there is no risk of inconsistent rulings as “without merit.” The appeals court said that the issue “is not whether inconsistent rulings are inevitable but whether they are possible if arbitration is ordered.” Further, the court noted that “the Hancock Park defendants and the Lee Group have filed cross-complaints for indemnification against each other, further increasing the risk of inconsistent rulings.”
The court found for Lindemann, awarding her costs.
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Following Mishaps, D.C. Metro Presses on With Repairs
February 23, 2017 —
Jim Parsons - Engineering News-RecordAn aggressive effort to overhaul the aging Metro system in Washington, D.C., is producing results as it nears the one-year mark, with more than 28,000 cross-ties and nearly two miles of grout pads now replaced.
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Jim Parsons, ENRENR may be contacted at
ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
Who Says You Can’t Choose between Liquidated Damages or Actual Damages?
October 11, 2017 —
Kevin Walton - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn Colorado, courts enforce liquidated damages provisions if three elements are satisfied: (1) the parties intended to liquidate damages; (2) the amount of liquidated damages was a reasonable estimate of the presumed actual damages caused by a breach; and (3) at the time of contracting, it was difficult to ascertain the amount of actual damages that would result from a breach. But what happens when a contract gives a party a right to choose between liquidated damages or actual damages? This seems troublesome because it allows a party to set the floor for their damages without limitation if actual damages exceed the contractual amount. As a matter of first impression, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed this issue in Ravenstar, LLC v. One Ski Hill Place, LLC, 401 P.3d 552 (Colo. 2017).
In Ravenstar, plaintiffs contracted to buy condominiums from a developer. As part of their contracts, plaintiffs deposited earnest money and construction deposits equal to 15% of each unit’s purchase price. Plaintiffs breached their contract by failing to obtain financing and failing to close by the closing date. Each contract’s damages provision provided that if a purchaser defaulted, the developer had the option to retain all or some of the deposits as liquidated damages or, alternatively, to pursue actual damages and apply the deposits to that award. After plaintiffs defaulted, the developer chose to keep plaintiffs’ deposits as liquidated damages. Plaintiffs sued for return of their deposits.
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Kevin Walton, Snell & WilmerMr. Walton may be contacted at
kwalton@swlaw.com
Crime Policy Insurance Quotes Falsely Represented the Scope of its Coverage
July 13, 2020 —
Brian J Clifford - Saxe Doernberger & VitaAn Indiana businessman found out the hard way how far his insurance company was willing to go to avoid paying a claim after it misrepresented the coverage of a crime policy it sold to him. The quote for the policy indicated that it included coverage for losses resulting from computer hacking. Despite this representation, when the policyholder’s bank accounts were hacked, the insurer denied coverage on the ground that there was no provision for hacking coverage in the policy. Fortunately, the Indiana Court of Appeals recognized the insured’s right to argue before a jury that the insurer’s quotes falsely represented the scope of its coverage.
In Metal Pro Roofing, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., Richard Cornett, principal of Metal Pro Roofing, LLC and Cornett Restoration, LLC (the “LLCs”), purchased a Cincinnati Insurance Company CinciPlus Crime XC+ Policy (the “Policy”). At the time Mr. Cornett purchased this coverage, and during all subsequent renewals, Cincinnati issued insurance quotes that stated:
Cincinnati can insure your money and securities while at your premises, inside your bank and even off site in the custody of a courier. While you’ve taken precautions to protect your money and securities, you run the risk of loss from employees, robbers, burglars, computer hackers and even physical perils such as fire.
Give yourself peace of mind with Cincinnati’s crime coverage to insure the money and securities you worked so hard to earn.
Crime Expanded Coverage (XC®)Plus Endorsement $125.00.
(Emphasis added.)
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Brian J Clifford, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMr. Clifford may be contacted at
bjc@sdvlaw.com
California Precludes Surety from Asserting Pay-When-Paid Provision as Defense to Payment Bond Claim
December 21, 2020 —
Nicholas Korst - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCIn a recent case in California, the Court of Appeals held that a surety who had issued a public works payment bond cannot rely on the “Pay-When-Paid” provision in the subcontract as a defense against the subcontractor’s claim against the payment bond.[1] The case was a public works project in Kern County, CA where the North Edwards Water District (the “District”) hired Clark Bros., Inc. (“Clark”) as the general contractor to build an arsenic removal water treatment plant. Clark hired subcontractor Crosno Construction (“Crosno”) to build and coat two steel reservoir tanks. The subcontract included the following “pay-when-paid” provision, which provided a definition of “reasonable time”:
If the Owner or other responsible party delays in making any payment to the Contractor from which payment to Subcontractor is made, Contractor and its sureties shall have a reasonable time to make payment. “Reasonable time” shall be determined according to the relevant circumstances, but in no event shall be less than the time Contractor and Subcontractor require to pursue to conclusion their legal remedies against the Owner or other responsible party to obtain payment, including (but not limited to) mechanics lien remedies. (emphasis added).
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Nick Korst, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Korst may be contacted at
nicholas.korst@acslawyers.com
Rio de Janeiro's Bursting Real-Estate Bubble
September 17, 2015 —
Juan Pablo Spinetto & Peter Millard – BloombergAt opposite ends of downtown Rio de Janeiro, projects tied to Donald Trump and Eike Batista-- one a billionaire-turned-politician, the other Brazil’s most famous ex-billionaire -- have come to represent the city’s real estate bust.
The 23-story Serrador building, a granite-and-glass art deco tower near Rio’s Santos Dumont airport, has sat empty since Batista’s failed empire of commodities companies abandoned it last year. Four miles away, in the city’s gritty port district, an ambitious office project that Trump lent his name to is still nothing more than a weed-filled lot about a year after construction was slated to begin.
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Juan Pablo Spinetto, Bloomberg and
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Court Rejects Efforts to Limit Scope of Judgment Creditor’s Direct Action Under Insurance Code Section 11580
May 01, 2019 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Ins. Co. of St. of PA v. Amer. Safety Indemnity Co. (No. B283684, filed 3/1/19) (“ICSOP”), a California appeals court rejected one insurer’s efforts to limit the scope of another insurer’s direct action as a judgment creditor under Insurance Code section 11580(b)(2).
In ICSOP, homeowners filed a claim in arbitration against their general contractor alleging damages from subsidence. While the arbitration was pending, the general contractor filed suit against the grading subcontractor seeking indemnity and contribution. The complaint attached the homeowners’ complaint in arbitration pleading damages of $2.3 million, and alleged that the subcontractors had a duty to indemnify for those damages. The arbitrator awarded the homeowners $1.1 million.
The general contractor was insured by plaintiff ICSOP, which paid the arbitration award. A default judgment was entered against the grading subcontractor for $1.5 million, that included both the arbitration award plus $356,340 for the general contractor’s attorney’s fees. American Safety insured the grading subcontractor but refused to indemnify ICSOP. ICSOP then sued American Safety on the default judgment, pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580(b). The trial court granted summary judgment for ICSOP and the appeals court affirmed.
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Protecting and Perfecting Your Mechanics Lien when the Property Owner Files Bankruptcy
June 19, 2023 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupIntroduction/Overview of the Mechanics Lien Law
The California mechanics lien is a powerful tool for contractors, subcontractors and materials suppliers to secure payment of unpaid construction debts. A contractor, subcontractor or materials supplier is allowed to record a mechanics lien on real property, based on the value added to the property by the claimant during the construction process.
The recorded mechanics lien provides the claimant with legal right to force the sale of the improved real property and thereby obtain the funds necessary to pay the delinquent debt. Under the usual procedure, the first step is the recording of mechanics lien with County Recorder’s office in the County where the property is located. A lawsuit to foreclose on the lien must then be filed in the County Superior Court of that County, within ninty (90) days after the mechanics lien is recorded. The goal of the lawsuit is to obtain a judgment for foreclosure on the mechanics lien by way of a forced sale of the property. The net proceeds of the sale will be used to pay the unpaid construction debt secured by the recorded mechanics lien, assuming that sale proceeds exceed the amount of senior liens and encumbrances.
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
