Hunton’s Geoffrey Fehling Confirmed to DC Bar Foundation’s Young Lawyers Network Leadership Council
December 30, 2019 —
Michael S. Levine - Hunton Andrews KurthCongratulations to Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP insurance recovery lawyer,
Geoffrey Fehling, on his confirmation by the DC Bar Foundation’s Board of Directors to the organization’s Young Lawyers Network Leadership Council.
As the leading funder of civil legal aid in the District of Columbia, DCBF awards grants to the District’s legal services organizations that provide free civil legal services to low-income and underserved people in the District. Since its inception, DCBF has awarded more than $80 million in grants.
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Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews KurthMr. Levine may be contacted at
mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Two Injured in Walkway Collapse of Detroit Apartment Complex
May 30, 2018 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFABC WXYZ Local News reported that a balcony collapsed at the Anthoes Garden Apartments in Detroit, Michigan. Two people were witnessed falling from the upper walkway through the second and third floors, landing on the cement, sidewalk below. Neighbors pulled the thirty-something woman out of the debris, but the sixty-something man remained trapped under cement chunks and told the rescuers that he could not breathe. The neighbors used car jacks to raise the cement blocks to relieve pressure while waiting for help to arrive.
Firefighters rescued residents from the apartments. The fire marshall condemned the building. However, according to ABC News, "people who live in apartments nearby are afraid to leave because of the walkway's instability."
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Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Warning! Danger Ahead for Public Entities
July 30, 2019 —
Michael J. Baker - Snell & Wilmer Under Construction BlogPublic entities are known to assert False Claims actions “to up the ante” to intimidate and aggressively address contractor construction claims. This strategy in the case of John Ross of Industrial Sheet Metal, Inc. (JRI) V. City of Los Angeles Department of Airports (LAWA), 29 Cal. App. 5th 378 (2018), backfired on the public entity, LAWA, in a big way and should serve as a warning to public entities about expanding claims to include False Claim actions. In this case, LAWA was awarded $1 in contract damages, its California False Claims Act (CFCA) claim was rejected by the jury as were JRI’s claims against LAWA. Despite losing on the substantive contract claims, the trial court found that JRI “prevailed in the action” under the relevant CFCA fee provision, Government Code 12652, subd. (g)(9)(B), regardless of JRI’s failure to prevail in the action as a whole. The California Appellate Court (hereinafter “Court”) affirmed the trial court’s finding.
The CFCA is analogous to the federal False Claims Act (FFCA; 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq.). Since the CFCA is patterned on similar federal legislation, it was appropriate for the Court to look to precedent construing this similar federal act in interpreting the CFCA provisions. Accordingly, the Court looked at the False Claims Act cases for guidance in upholding the trial court’s decision in its determination that JRI was the “prevailing party” for determining an attorney’s fees award against LAWA.
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Michael J. Baker, Snell & WilmerMr. Baker may be contacted at
mjbaker@swlaw.com
New York's New Gateway: The Overhaul of John F. Kennedy International Airport
September 09, 2024 —
Aileen Cho - Engineering News-RecordOn the cusp of the 70th anniversary of the originally named New York Airport’s opening in Queens, N.Y., a blue-ribbon panel in 2017 released a report to the governor of New York: The facility, once popularly known as Idlewild Airport, needed a comprehensive master plan and a total transformation. In the seven years since, builders at John F. Kennedy International Airport have been anything but idle, and the speed at which that $19-billion transformation of the roads and terminals is occurring could be called wild.
Reprinted courtesy of
Aileen Cho, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Cho may be contacted at choa@enr.com
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Termination for Convenience Clauses: Maybe More Than Just Convenience
June 06, 2022 —
Robert C. Shaia - ConsensusDocsA contractor begins work on a project and everything is going well, until one day the owner informs the contractor that it is being terminated for convenience. Possibly, there is no discussion about alleged defects, reasons for the termination, or any damages the owner might seek against the contractor. In that moment, the contractor may be unaware of any perceived wrongdoing or problems with its work.
The industry has typically accepted that, in this scenario, the owner implicitly waives the right to any remedies against the contractor, except those expressly set forth in the contract. Reasonable minds might assume that, if the owner believed it needed to seek further remedies, it would terminate the contractor for cause instead of convenience. And often overlooked during contract negotiations are the benefits of including an express “waiver of remedies” in the termination for convenience section.
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Robert C. Shaia, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar, & Fitzgerald, LLP (ConsensusDocs)Mr. Shaia may be contacted at
rshaia@watttieder.com
Court Finds That SIR Requirements are Not Incorporated into High Level Excess Policies and That Excess Insurers’ Payment of Defense Costs is Not Conditioned on Actual Liability
April 22, 2019 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Deere & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. (No. A145170, filed 2/25/19), a California appeals court held that the insured was not required to pay additional self-insured retentions (SIRs) in order to trigger higher level excess coverage because the retained limits applicable to the first layer of coverage did not also apply to the higher-layer excess policies.
In Deere, the insured was sued for injuries from alleged exposure to asbestos-containing assemblies used in Deere machines. In a declaratory relief action against its umbrella and excess insurers, the case was tried on: (1) whether the higher-layer excess policies were triggered once the first-layer excess policy limits, which were subject to an SIR paid by Deere, had been exhausted; and (2) whether the insurers’ indemnity obligation extended to Deere’s defense costs incurred in asbestos claims that had been dismissed. The trial court found in favor of the insurers, concluding that the retained limits in the first layer of coverage also applied to the higher-layer excess, which was not triggered until Deere paid additional SIRs. The court also concluded that the insurers were not obligated to pay defense costs when underlying cases were dismissed without payment to a claimant either by judgment or settlement.
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
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Florida Construction Defect Decision Part of Lengthy Evolution
August 05, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFLawyers are still working out all the implications of Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Maronda Homes. Three members of the firm Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed PA, Alexander Dobrev, Michael S. Provenzale, and Tara L. Tedrow on the firm’s web site. They characterize it as a “consumer-protection oriented decision,” quoting the court that the “house is the fondest dream and largest investment, both emotionally and financially, for Florida families.”
The court found that Section 553.835 of the Florida laws could not be applied to construction that occurred before the statute become effective in July, 2012. They describe the underlying issue as “the culmination of forty years of evolution to the implied warranty of habitability that is granted by the builder of a new home to the purchaser.” This lead to a 2010 District Court decision that expanded the area covered from “merely the structure itself, along with improvements ‘immediately supporting the residence’” but also those “which provide ‘essential services’ which support the home, make it habitable, or are necessary for living accommodations.”
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