Construction Defect Lawsuit Came too Late in Minnesota
June 28, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe Minnesota Court of Appeals has upheld a summary judgment in a construction defect case, Lee v. Gorham. Minnesota law requires that contractors warranty that the home will be free of major construction defects during the first ten years, but claims must “be brought within two years of the discovery of the breach.” The Lees received a home inspection report in 2009 that identified a variety of defects, including “several possible structural defects.” The court noted that the report stated, “Contact your builder in writing of the findings, and discuss your options with an attorney.”
The Lees contacted the contractor, Gorham Builders. After initial silence, Gorham told the Lees that problems would “have to be ‘turned over to [the] insurance company.’” Rodney noted in his testimony that he had two choices, to either sue Gorham or hire an outside contractor. Mr. Lee had concluded that the legal costs were likely to be equal to the cost of the contractor.
In June, 2011, the Lees changed their mind about bringing a suit. Gorham sought and received a summary judgment dismissing the case on the grounds that too much time had passed since the Lees learned of the construction defect. The Lees appealed.
The appeals court upheld the summary judgment. The Lees claimed that the 2009 home inspection did not alert them of a “major construction defect,” but the court concluded that the language of the report fit within the Minnesota statutory definition of a “major construction defect.”
Nor was the appeals court convinced that at any time did Gorham provide “assurances that it would cure the defects to the home.” Within the same month as the May 2009 inspection, Gorham had made it clear that any problems were an issue for the insurance company. Thus, the appeals court concluded that the Lee’s equitable-estoppel argument was without merit.
The Lees also brought to appeal the new argument that they did not realize they were dealing with “major construction defects” until they received a subsequent home inspection in 2011. The court noted that the second report does not detail “new defects or structural issues not identified in the 2009 inspection report.” In addition to being “without merit,” the court noted that this claim was not made in the district court and so the appeals court “need not consider this issue on appeal.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Florida's New Pre-Suit Notification Requirement: Retroactive or Prospective Application?
February 05, 2024 —
Holly A. Rice - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Florida’s newly formed Sixth District Court of Appeal (“Sixth DCA”) recently certified conflict with Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal on the issue of retroactive application of the pre-suit notice requirement contained in Florida Statute §627.70152.1 Earlier this year, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (“Fourth DCA”) held that the pre-suit notice provision applies retroactively, meaning, it applies to all suits filed after July 1, 2021, regardless when the insurance policy was issued.2 The Sixth DCA, in
Hughes v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company,3 directly rejected the Fourth DCA’s interpretation and instead found a retroactive application of the pre-suit notice to be unconstitutional under Florida law. Prior to the Fourth DCA’s ruling, most trial courts had found no retroactive application for the pre-suit notice provision.4
In August 2021, shortly after Florida Statutes Section 627.70152 went into effect on July 1, 2021, Rebecca Hughes (“Hughes”) sued Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (“Universal Property”) for breach of contract after Universal Property denied her insurance claim. Hughes did not file a pre-suit notice under Section 627.70152. Universal Property moved to dismiss based on Hughes’ failure to file the pre-suit notice, arguing that the pre-suit notice requirement applies to all lawsuits filed after July 1, 2021, even if the claimant’s insurance policy was issued before the statute’s effective date. The trial court agreed with Universal Property and dismissed the lawsuit.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Holly A. Rice, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Rice may be contacted at
HRice@sdvlaw.com
Rulemaking to Modernize, Expand DOI’s “Type A” Natural Resource Damage Assessment Rules Expected Fall 2023
December 23, 2023 —
Amanda G. Halter, Jillian Marullo & Ashleigh Myers - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThe U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) anticipates proposing a new rule that would revise its “Type A” Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) regulations under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in Fall 2023. The proposed rule would modernize DOI’s rarely used simplified Type A procedures for assessing damages for natural resource injuries tailored at sites involving minor releases of hazardous substances, with a smaller scale and scope of natural resource injury occurring in either coastal and marine areas or Great Lakes environments (the “Type A Rule”). (See 88 Fed. Reg. 3373; see 43 C.F.R. Pt. 11 Subpt. D.) The Type A Rule was last updated in 1997.
DOI previewed the proposal in January 2023 in its Office of Restoration and Damage Assessment’s (ORDA)
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR). In the ANPR, the ORDA surmised that the Type A Rule was rarely used in part because of its restricted scope, but also because “the model equation for each Type A environment is the functional part of the rule itself—with no provisions to reflect evolving toxicology, ecology, technology, or other scientific understanding without a formal amendment to the Type A Rule each time a parameter is modified.” Calling the existing rule “inefficient and inflexible,” the ORDA stated that its proposal to reformulate the rule “as a procedural structure” would “modernize the Type A process and develop a more flexible and enduring rule than what is provided by the two existing static models” (88 Fed. Reg. 3373).
Reprinted courtesy of
Amanda G. Halter, Pillsbury,
Jillian Marullo, Pillsbury and
Ashleigh Myers, Pillsbury
Ms. Halter may be contacted at amanda.halter@pillsburylaw.com
Ms. Marullo may be contacted at jillian.marullo@pillsburylaw.com
Ms. Myers may be contacted at ashleigh.myers@pillsburylaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
SCOTUS, Having Received Views of Solicitor General, Will Decide Whether CWA Regulates Indirect Discharge of Pollutants Into Navigable Water Via Groundwater
April 17, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelPrior to deciding whether to review an important February 1, 2018, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision involving the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act (CWA), Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, et al., v. County of Maui, the Supreme Court asked the Solicitor General for the views of the U.S. on the holdings of this case and the April 12, 2018 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision, Upstate Forever, et al., v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., et al.
On February 19, the Supreme Court confirmed that certiorari was granted to Question 1 presented by the Petition,
Whether the CWA requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater. (33 U.S.C. § 1362 (12)
In County of Maui , the Ninth Circuit held that indirect discharges to navigable waters through groundwater may be subject to the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) CWA the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting authority, and in Kinder Morgan, the Fourth Circuit held that such an indirect discharge may be subject to regulation under the CWA when there is a direct hydrological connection between the discharge into groundwater and the direct discharge into navigable, surface waters.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Construction Termination Issues Part 5: What if You are the One that Wants to Quit?
August 21, 2023 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North CarolinaArchitects and Engineers are sometimes pleasantly surprised to find out that they, also, can terminate those crazy, hard to deal with Owners—at least, if the Owners fail to make payments as required.
You can also terminate for Owner delays to the work, or where you think the contractor should be fired but the Owner disagrees. Again, the standard 7 days written notice is required. (See B101 §9.4).
Do you have to walk off the job if they are not paying you? No—you could exercise the smaller remedy of suspending services (with 7 days written notice) until payments are caught up or the contract performance is corrected by the Owner. (See B101 §9.1). Suspension rather than outright termination is a softer approach when working with an owner you do not want to burn (too many) bridges with.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale LiggettMs. Brumback may be contacted at
mbrumback@rl-law.com
Lenders and Post-Foreclosure Purchasers Have Standing to Make Construction Defect Claims for After-Discovered Conditions
October 10, 2013 —
W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCThe Colorado Court of Appeals has decided a case which answers a question long in need of an answer: do banks/lenders have standing to assert construction defect claims when they receive title to a newly-constructed home following a foreclosure sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure? The decision was released on August 1, 2013, in the case of Mid Valley Real Estate Solutions V, LLC v. Hepworth-Pawlack Geotechnical, Inc., Steve Pawlak, Daniel Hadin, and S K Peightal Engineers, Ltd. (Colorado Court of Appeals No. 13CA0519).
The background facts of the case are typical of a Colorado residential construction defect case generally. A developer contracted for an analytical soil engineering report from a geotechnical engineering firm (H-P) which made a foundation recommendation. The developer’s general contractor then retained an engineering firm (SPKE) to provide engineering services, including a foundation design. The general contractor built the foundation in accordance with the H-P and SPKE criteria and plans.
The house was not sold by the developer and went into default on the construction loan. These events resulted in a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure to a bank-controlled entity which purchased the house for re-sale. Shortly after receiving the developer’s deed, the bank-related entity discovered defects in the foundation that resulted in a construction defect suit against the two design firms and related individuals.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
W. Berkeley Mann, Jr.W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. can be contacted at
mann@hhmrlaw.com
Colorado Construction-Defects Reform Law Attempt Expected in 2015
January 14, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to the Denver Post, another attempt to change Colorado’s construction defect laws to spur condo development is likely this term. Reform supporters are encouraged by the city of Lakewood’s ordinance, Denver Post reported: “"A patchwork around the state on this issue is not the way to go," Rep. Brian DelGrosso, R-Loveland, said. "Hopefully, the Lakewood measure will spur the conversation this year."
Lakewood’s “measure gives builders a ‘right to repair’ faulty work before facing legal action and requires that a majority of home owners approve legal action before it is taken.”
However, “Nancy Stockton, president of the homeowners association at the Vallagio at Inverness in Arapahoe County, said following Lakewood's example statewide would only make it that much harder to hold builders accountable for the quality of their work.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
To Bee or Not to Bee - CA Court Finds Denial of Coverage Based on Exclusion was Premature Where Facts had not been Judicially Determined
November 28, 2018 —
Philip B. Wilusz - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.While I typically discuss cases concerning pollution, today I will change a few letters around and discuss pollination. The case, Unigard Insurance Co. et al. v. George Perry and Sons Inc. et al., asks whether there is coverage for a lawsuit brought against a commercial farm that is alleged to have killed off bee colonies used for pollination. The farm, owned by George Perry & Sons Inc. (“Perry”), allegedly used a pesticide that killed off the bee colonies that Perry had hired from Gary Mattes (“Mattes”) pursuant to an oral agreement. The bees, operating well outside of their weight class, were hired to pollinate Perry’s crops of watermelons and pumpkins. Interestingly, the bees would be brought to the farm in either large hives or “nukes,” which are smaller versions of hives.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at
pbw@sdvlaw.com
