Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

Additional Insured Secures Defense Under Subcontractor's Policy

October 14, 2013 — Tred Eyerly — Insurance Law Hawaii
The court determined there were sufficient allegations in the underlying complaint and third party complaints to raise a duty to defend for the additional insured. Ill. Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Waukegan Steel Sales, 2013 Ill. App. LEXIS 624 (Ill. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2013). Waukegan was named as an additional insured under subcontractor I-MAXX Metalworks, Inc.'s policy with Emcasco. An employee of I-MAXX, John Walls, was injured on the job site and sued Waukegan. The complaint alleged Waukegan was negligent in failing to property manage, operate and maintain the premises. I-MAXX had a policy with Emcasco which named Waukegan as an additional insured. The coverage was limited, however, to the additional insured's vicarious liability as a result of the insured's conduct. Emcasco refused to defend Waukegan because the allegations of direct negligence against Waukegan were excluded by the vicariously liability provision. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred Eyerly
Tred Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Ordinary Use of Term In Insurance Policy Prevailed

June 08, 2020 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
There are cases where you feel for the plaintiff, but understand why they did not prevail, despite the creative efforts of their counsel. The case of Robinson v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 958 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2020) is one of these cases. In Robinson, the plaintiff moved into a home that turned out to be infested with a highly venomous spider. Efforts to eradicate the spider proved unsuccessful and the spider apparently infested the entire home. The plaintiff made a claim under their homeowner’s property insurance policy arguing that their home suffered a physical loss caused by the spider infestation as the spider presented an irreparable condition that rendered the home unsafe for occupancy. (It probably did!). The property insurer denied coverage because the policy had an insurance exclusion for loss caused by birds, vermin, rodents, or insects. The insurer claimed the spider is an insect or vermin and, therefore, there is no coverage based on the exclusion. The insured creatively argued that “scientifically speaking” a spider is an arachnid and not an insect. Neither the trial court nor the Eleventh Circuit found this argument persuasive. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

Court Finds That Split in Underground Storage Tank is Not a Covered Collapse

July 13, 2017 — Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In Tustin Field Gas & Food v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (No. B268850, filed 7/3/17), a California appeals court ruled that a split in an underground storage tank, caused by the tank sitting on a rock for years, was not a covered “collapse” as a matter of law. Tustin Field owned a gas station in Palm Springs. The installer of the underground storage tanks did not follow the manufacturer’s instructions to bury them in pea gravel or crushed rock. Instead, the installer just dug a hole, placed the tanks into that hole, and then covered them with “native soil” containing rocks, boulders and other debris. The tanks were double-walled, steel with a fiberglass sheath. Sixteen years after installation, testing revealed that the fiberglass sheath on one tank was no longer intact. The tank was excavated and the fiberglass sheath was found to be cracked from the tank sitting on a nine-inch boulder. The insured paid to have the crack repaired and made a claim for the cost of excavating and repairing the tank. Reprinted courtesy of Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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Exceptions to Privette Doctrine Do Not Apply Where There is No Evidence a General Contractor Affirmatively Contributed to the Injuries of an Independent Contractor's Employee

November 17, 2016 — Renata L. Hoddinott & Lawrence S. Zucker II – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
The Court of Appeal of the State of California – Second Appellate District in Khosh v. Staples Construction Company, Inc. (10/26/16 – Case No. B268937) affirmed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendant under the Privette doctrine where plaintiff presented no evidence that the defendant affirmatively contributed to his injuries. Plaintiff Al Khosh (“Khosh”) was injured while performing electrical work on a project. He was employed by Myers Power Products, Inc. (“Myers”) a subcontractor for the project. Khosh sued the general contractor, Staples Construction Company, Inc. (“Staples”) to recover damages for his injuries. Reprinted courtesy of Renata L. Hoddinott, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Lawrence S. Zucker II, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Ms. Hoddinott may be contacted at rhoddinott@hbblaw.com Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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North Carolina Court Rules In Favor Of All Sums

July 13, 2020 — Lorelie S. Masters & Patrick M. McDermott - Hunton Andrews Kurth
A North Carolina court recently ruled in favor of all sums allocation. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. AG Insurance SA/NV, No. 17 CVS 5594 (N.C. Sup. Ct.). In that case, Duke Energy is seeking coverage for “liabilities linked to coal combustion residuals (‘CCRs’), i.e., coal ash, at fifteen Duke-owned power plants in North and South Carolina.” In a recent summary judgment decision, the court resolved a dispute between Duke and TIG Insurance Company, as successor to Ranger Insurance Company, about whether all sums allocation or pro rata allocation applied. The court found that “the non-cumulation provisions make plain” that all sums allocation applied. It also noted that “a large majority of the courts in other jurisdictions that have considered this issue have recognized that non-cumulation provisions such as those here compel all sums rather than pro rata allocation.” The decisions to the contrary, according to the court, had ruled “done so on public policy grounds” and not based on “the application of the rules of contract interpretation.” Reprinted courtesy of Lorelie S. Masters, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Patrick M. McDermott, Hunton Andrews Kurth Ms. Masters may be contacted at lmasters@HuntonAK.com Mr. McDermott may be contacted at pmcdermott@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
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A Termination for Convenience Is Not a Termination for Default

April 22, 2024 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A termination for convenience is NOT a termination for default. They are NOT the same. They should NOT be treated as the same. I am a huge proponent of termination for convenience provisions because sometimes a party needs to be able to exercise a termination for convenience, but the termination is not one that rises to a basis for default. However, exercising a termination for convenience does not mean you get to go back in time and convert the termination for convenience into a termination for default. It does not work like that. Nor should it. An opinion out of the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals – Williams Building Company, Inc. v. Department of State, CBCA 7147, 2024 WL 1099788 (CBCA 2024 – demonstrates a fundamental distinction between a termination for convenience and a termination for default, i.e., that you don’t get to conjure up defaults when you exercise a termination for convenience:

Because a termination for convenience essentially turns a fixed-price construction contract into a cost-reimbursement contract, allowing the contractor to recover its incurred performance costs, the resolution of this appeal will involve identifying the total costs that [Contractor] incurred in performing this contract before [Government] terminated it for convenience. Since [Government] terminated the contract for convenience rather than for default, it no longer matters whether, in the past,[Contractor] acted intentionally in overstating the amount of its incurred costs or committed a contract breach. Ultimately, as permitted in response to a termination for convenience, [Contractor] will recover those allowable costs that [Contractor]establishes it incurred in performing the contract.

Williams Building Company, supra.

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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

New Jersey Supreme Court Issue Important Decision for Homeowners and Contractors

September 08, 2016 — Wally Zimolong – Supplemental Conditions
The lack of insurance coverage for a contractor’s faulty workmanship is the bane of both homeowners looking to recover damage for defective work and contractors seeking to defend against such claims. In many states, like Pennsylvania, courts hold that faulty workmanship is not an “occurrence” that is covered by a standard commercial general liability insurance policy. In other words, courts hold that CGL policies cover damage to other property not part of the construction project itself. This is problematic for both the homeowner and the insured. For the homeowner, the lack of a policy providing indemnification sometimes means the homeowner is left trying to collect against a defendant, who is otherwise but has little to no assets against which to collect a judgment. For the contractor, the lack of a policy providing coverage means that assets are at risk and it could be forced to spend significant sums in attorneys fees defending the case. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLC
Mr. Zimolong may be contacted at wally@zimolonglaw.com

Continuing Breach Doctrine

May 28, 2024 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Have you ever heard of the “continuing breach” doctrine? Probably not. It is not a doctrine commonly discussed. It’s a doctrine used to try to argue around the statute of limitations. In an older Southern District Court of Florida case, Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 188 F.R.Ed. 667, 679 (S.D.Fla. 1999), the court explained: “Under this [continuing breach] doctrine, a cause of action for breach of a contract does not begin to accrue upon the initial breach; rather, on contracts providing serial performance by the parties, accrual of a breach of contract cause of action commences upon the occurrence of the last breach or upon termination of the contract.” Recently, this doctrine came up in an opinion by Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal. In Hernando County, Florida v. Hernando County Fair Association, Inc., 49 Fla.L.Weekly D947b (Fla. 5th DCA 2024), a plaintiff appealed the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of its breach of contract claim based on the statute of limitations. The plaintiff claimed the defendant breached the contract by its failure to substantially redevelop property. The trial court dismissed based on the statute of limitations. However, the complaint alleged the defendant’s failure to comply “with numerous other intertwined, ongoing, and continuing contractual duties and obligations.” Hernando County, supra. The Fifth District reversed based on the continuing breach doctrine: “Where the nature of the contract is continuous, statutes of limitations do not typically begin to run until termination of the entire contract.” Id. quoting and citing Allapattah Servs., Inc. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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