Broker for Homeowners Policy Has No Duty to Advise Insureds on Excess Flood Coverage
November 02, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiA broker who assisted the insureds in procuring a homeowners policy had no duty to advise the insureds to secure additional flood coverage. Ring v. Meeker Sharkey Assocs., LLC, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3458 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. Sept.26, 2017).
The insureds owned two beachfront properties that were located in a designated flood zone. They secured homeowners and flood insurance through Meeker's predecessor. Subsequently, Meeker became the insureds' homeowners insurance broker while Willis, N.A. was their flood insurance broker.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Construction Litigation Roundup: “Hold the Pickles, Hold the Lettuce?”
October 02, 2023 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyHold the pickles, hold the lettuce?
You can even hold the service… or at least proof of it!
In a dispute over the construction of a Burger King restaurant in Tupelo, Mississippi, a state court suit by the owner against its general contractor and architect was removed to federal court by one of the defendant parties, on the basis of the diversity of citizenship of the defendant parties from the plaintiff, per 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
For its part, plaintiff, upon achieving service of its state court complaint against the various defendants, filed a proof of service as to the party which sought to remove the case, but not as to the other defendants (even though the other defendants were served). Once the case was removed to federal court and after the deadline for removal has passed, plaintiff sought to have the matter remanded based on the lack of the consent of the entirety of the defendant group to the removal, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (“When a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.”).
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Three lawyers from Haight were recognized in The Best Lawyers in America© 2020 Edition
September 30, 2019 —
William G. Baumgaertner, Michael Leahy, & Denis Moriarty - Haight Brown & BonesteelCongratulations to Haight’s attorneys who were recognized in The Best Lawyers in America© 2020 Edition
Los Angeles, California
William G. Baumgaertner for personal injury and product liability litigation for plaintiffs and defendants
Michael Leahy for insurance law
Denis Moriarty for insurance law
Reprinted courtesy of Haight Brown & Bonesteel attorneys
William G. Baumgaertner,
Michael Leahy and
Denis J. Moriarty
Mr. Baumgaertner may be contacted at wbaum@hbblaw.com
Mr. Leahy may be contacted at mleahy@hbblaw.com
Mr. Moriarty may be contacted at dmoriarty@hbblaw.com
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Damages or Injury “Likely to Occur” or “Imminent” May No Longer Trigger Insurance Coverage
January 05, 2017 —
Masaki J. Yamada – Ahlers & Cressman PLLCWashington Courts allow an insurer to determine its duty to defend an insured against a lawsuit based only on the face of the complaint and the limitations of the insurance policy. This is otherwise known as the “eight corners” rule (four corners of the complaint plus the four corners of the policy). In other words, the insurance company is not permitted to rely on facts extrinsic to the complaint in order to deny its duty to defend an insured. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. VanPort Homes, Inc., 147 Wn.2d 751, 763 (2002). The laws in Washington provide greater protection to the insured over the insurer when it comes to the insurer’s duty to defend. The duty to defend a claim is triggered if a claim could “conceivably” be covered under the policy. See Woo v. Fireman’s Insurance, 161 Wn.2d 43 (2007). If there is any ambiguity in a policy with regard to coverage, the ambiguity is interpreted in favor of the insured.
As a result, contractors in Washington regularly tender claims or potential claims to their insurers even when damage has not occurred but will occur in the imminent future. Especially in the context of construction defect cases, a contractor will tender such a claim to its insurer to trigger the broad duty of the insurer to provide a defense. We also regularly recommend this to our contractor clients. For example, if a building owner serves a contractor with a claim that the construction and installation of a window system will imminently cause leaks and corrosion, we would recommend that the contractor tender the claim to its commercial general liability insurer. Washington courts have found a duty to defend when there are allegations in the complaint that covered damages will occur in the imminent future.
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Masaki J. Yamada, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMr. Yamada may be contacted at
myamada@ac-lawyers.com
Federal Court Denies Summary Judgment in Leaky Condo Conversion
August 04, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the US District Court for Illinois, Judge William Hibber has rejected the request for summary judgment sought by the developers of a condominium building in the case of Nautilus Ins. Co. v. 1735 W. Diversey, LLC (the insureds). The insureds renovated a building at 1735 W. Diversey, Chicago, converting it into condominiums. After the project was completed and all units sold, and a condominium association form, one of the owners found that unit suffered leaks during rainstorms. The condo board hired a firm, CRI, to investigate the cause of the leakage. CRI found “water infiltration through the exterior brick masonry walls, build-up of efflorescence on the interior surfaces of the masonry, and periodic spalling of portions of the brick masonry.”
The redevelopment firm had purchased coverage from Nautilus. “Shortly after the Board filed its first complaint, the Insureds tendered the mater to Nautilus and requested that it indemnify and defend them from the Board's underlying claims. Nautilus, however, rejected the Insureds’ tender and denied coverage under both insurance policies.” Nautilus stated that the water leakage did not constitute an occurrence under the policies. The court cited these policies in which an occurrence is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” The Illinois courts have determined that construction defects are not accidents.
The court concluded that the insured did not bring forth claims within the coverage of the policies and denied the motion for summary judgment.
Read the court’s decision…
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Don’t Fall in Trap of Buying the Cheapest Insurance Policy as it May be Bad for Your Business Risks and Needs
March 25, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesDon’t fall in the trap of buying the cheapest insurance policy. It will come and bite you in the butt big time! Consult with an insurance broker that understands construction and, importantly, your specific industry, to provide you coverage within your industry. Otherwise, you’ll be paying for a policy that may (i) not be a good policy, and (ii) may provide you minimal to no value for your industry’s RISKS and NEEDS when factoring in exclusions. When procuring insurance, think of the old adage “penny wise and pound foolish,” and don’t make decisions that fit within this adage!
The recent decision in Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Engineering & Development, Inc., 2024 WL 940527 (S.D. Fla. 2024) serves as an example. Here, a subcontractor was hired by a general contractor to perform underground utility work for a townhome development which consisted of 57 townhome units included in 18 detached structures. The subcontractor’s underground work was defective which caused damage to the property’s water line, sewer system, plumbing lines, pavers, etc. The general contractor was liable to the owner for this defective work. Although the general contractor was an additional insured under the subcontractor’s commercial general liability (CGL) policy, the subcontractor’s CGL carrier denied the duty to defend and initiated an insurance coverage lawsuit. Motions for summary judgment were filed.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
London Penthouse Will Offer Chance to Look Down at Royalty
March 05, 2015 —
Zainab Fattah – Bloomberg(Bloomberg) -- A penthouse “overlooking the Queen’s balcony” will cap a London luxury apartment project planned near Buckingham Palace, according to its Abu Dhabi-based owner.
The 10,000 square-foot (929 square-meter) apartment at No. 1 Palace St. across the street from the royal residence will probably fetch about 60 million pounds ($92 million), Jassim Alseddiqi, chief executive officer of Abu Dhabi Financial Group LLC, said in an interview in the capital of the United Arab Emirates on Monday.
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Zainab Fattah, BloombergMs. Fattah may be contacted at
zfattah@bloomberg.net
