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CGL Insurer’s Duty To Defend Broader Than Duty To Indemnify And Based On Allegations In Underlying Complaint

April 10, 2019 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
The duty to defend an insured with respect to a third-party claim is broader than the duty to indemnify the insured for that claim. The duty to defend is triggered by allegations in the underlying complaint. However, an insurer is only required to indemnify its insured for damages covered under the policy. A recent case example demonstrating the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify can be found in Southern Owners Ins. Co. v. Gallo Building Services, Inc., 2018 WL 6619987 (M.D.Fla. 2019). In this case, a homebuilder built a 270-unit condominium project where the units were included in 51-buildings. Upon turnover of the condominium association to the unit owners, the condominium association served a Florida Statutes Chapter 558 Notice of Construction Defects letter. There was numerous nonconforming work spread out among various subcontractor trades including nonconforming stucco work. The homebuilder incurred significant costs to repair defective work and resulting property damage, and relocated unit owners during repairs. The homebuilder then filed a lawsuit against implicated subcontractors. One of the implicated subcontractors was the stucco subcontractor. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

Florida “Property Damage” caused by an “Occurrence” and “Your Work” Exclusion

July 23, 2014 — Scott Patterson - CD Coverage
In J.B.D. Construction, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., * Fed.Appx. *, 2014 WL 3377690 (11th Cir. 2014), claimant property owner Sun City contracted with insured general contractor J.B.D. for the construction of a fitness center. The fitness center was to be physically connected to an existing Sun City building. J.B.D. utilized subcontractors for some of the work. Shortly after completion, leaks developed in the fitness center’s roof, windows and doors which J.B.D. attempted to fix. After Sun City refused to make the final contract payment, J.B.D. sued Sun City for contract amounts owed. Sun City counterclaimed for the construction defects, alleged damage to the fitness center and other property. J.B.D. tendered defense of the counterclaim to its CGL insurer Mid-Continent. After Mid-Continent failed to agree to defend, J.B.D. settled with Sun City, paying Sun City $182K. Following several demands from J.B.D. for reimbursement of defense costs and the settlement amount, Mid-Continent tendered the defense costs minus a deductible. J.B.D. then sued Mid-Continent for breach of duties to defend and indemnify. On cross motions for summary judgment, the federal district trial court entered judgment for Mid-Continent, finding no duties to defend or indemnify. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the duty to defend while affirming on the duty to indemnify. Applying Florida law, the court first held that the defective work, including the defective installation of the fitness center’s windows, doors, and roof, did not constitute “property damage.” Thus, the costs to repair or replace the defective work did not constitute damages because of “property damage.” The court next held that, while damage to other portions of the fitness center would constitute “property damage” caused by an “occurrence,” all such “property damage” fell within the “your work” exclusion. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Scott Patterson, CD Coverage

California Supreme Court to Examine Arbitration Provisions in Several Upcoming Cases

December 09, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

Glen C. Hansen, writing on Abbott & Kinderman’s Land Use Law Blog looks at several cases pending before the California Supreme Court which ask if a developer can insist on arbitration of construction defect claims, based on provision in the CC&Rs. Currently, there is a split of opinions in the California appeals courts on the issue.

Four of the cases are in California’s Fourth Appellate District. In the earliest case, Villa Milano Homeowners Association v. Il Davorge, from 2000, the court concluded that the arbitration clause was sufficient to require that construction defect claims undergo arbitration. However, the Fourth Appellate District Court concluded in three later cases that the arbitration clauses did not allow the developer to compel arbitration. In two cases, argued in 2008 and 2010, the court concluded that to do otherwise would deprive the homeowners of their right to a jury trial. In the most recent case, Villa Vicenza Homeowners Association v. Nobel Court Development, the court decided that the CC&Rs did not create contractual rights for the developer.

The Second Appellate District Court came to a similar decision in Promenade at Playa Vista Homeowners Association v. Western Pacific Housing, Inc. In their decision, the court noted that CC&Rs could be enforced by homeowners and homeowners associations, but not developers.

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Reminder: A Little Pain Now Can Save a Lot of Pain Later

April 28, 2016 — Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law Musings
I know, you think you hear it enough from me here at Construction Law Musings. I am seemingly constantly beating the drum of early advice from a construction attorney and the benefits of spending a bit of money now to avoid spending a lot of money later. I do this because real world examples of both the costs of failing to prepare early and the benefits of following this advice abound. An example of the costs of failing to prepare early can be found at the Construction Payment where the zLien folks discuss a New Hampshire case where a contractor lost two thirds of its potential damages because it did not properly set out the contractual terms and what was to be included in contractual damages. Without any clear line to go on, the Court found liability against the NHDOT for negligent misrepresentation and could only award damages up to a cap that was approximately a third of the damages awarded by the jury and about half of what the trial court had determined to be the damages. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PC
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit

May 09, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.

First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”

The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”

Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”

The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”

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Georgia Coal-to-Solar Pivot Shows the Way on Climate Regs

July 02, 2014 — Mark Drajem and Margaret Newkirk – Bloomberg
Georgia small-business owner Julian Smith keeps hearing that the Obama administration’s latest climate regulations will drive up local electric bills. He doesn’t believe the prediction, but he isn’t arguing: The fears are doing wonders for his solar-panel installation company. “My phone is blowing up with new customers,” Smith, owner of SolarSmith LLC of Savannah, said in an interview. “It turns out that if you tell everybody the amount they will spend on electricity will skyrocket, they will believe you.” In Smith’s home state, as in the rest of the nation, businesses and consumers are struggling to size up competing claims about the Environmental Protection Agency’s plan to cut carbon pollution from power plants, released June 2. The proposed regulations are among the most sweeping and complex in the EPA’s history, promising to revamp the way electricity has been generated and distributed for a century. Mr. Drajem may be contacted at mdrajem@bloomberg.net; Ms. Newkirk may be contacted at mnewkirk@bloomberg.net Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Mark Drajem and Margaret Newkirk, Bloomberg

Substitutions On a Construction Project — A Specification Writer Responds

July 03, 2022 — Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North Carolina
In response to the post about Substitute Materials on a construction project, Phil Kabza explains how his company, SpecGuy, handles tracking of all such materials on a project. Phil writes: Excellent and important topic, about which there is much confusion among design professionals and contractors. We try to maintain definitions for:

Pre-bid requests for prior approval of proposed comparable products where products are named in the specifications
True pre-bid substitution requests that present an alternate type of product from that specified (ie., not “comparable” but perhaps suitable)

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Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale Liggett

mbrumback@rl-law.com

Insurer Waives Objection to Appraiser's Partiality by Waiting Until Appraisal Issued

Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii