Brown Act Modifications in Response to Coronavirus Outbreak
March 30, 2020 —
Gregory J. Rolen - Haight Brown & BonesteelGov. Gavin Newsom waived certain provisions of the Bagley-Keene Act and Ralph M. Brown Act to make state and local legislative bodies safer while allowing California public entities to conduct business.
In an effort to promote social distancing and slow the spread of the coronavirus pandemic Gov. Newsom issued Executive Order N-25-20. The Executive Order authorizes state and local legislative bodies, such as school district and county office of education governing boards, to more easily hold public meetings by way of teleconference. The order took further steps to make public meetings accessible to the public via electronic means, including telephone.
The Brown Act generally requires legislative body members, a clerk, or other personnel to be physically present in a meeting in order to participate or establish a quorum. Executive Order N-25-20 temporarily eliminates this requirement. Furthermore, standard Brown Act requirements such as publicly noticing the teleconference location for each meeting participant is also suspended. Clearly, this is an attempt to protect the public, as well as Board members and staff, by temporarily discouraging large group settings in the conduct of the public’s business.
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Gregory J. Rolen, Haight Brown & BonesteelMr. Rolen may be contacted at
grolen@hbblaw.com
Arizona Supreme Court Confirms a Prevailing Homeowner Can Recover Fees on Implied Warranty Claims
November 21, 2017 —
Rick Erickson - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogOriginally published by CDJ on August 30, 2017
On August 9th, in Sirrah Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Wunderlich, the Arizona Supreme Court settled the question about recovery of attorneys’ fees after prevailing on implied warranty claims against a residential contractor. The simple answer is, yes, a homeowner who prevails on the merits can recover the fees they spent to prove that shoddy construction breached the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability. Why? Because, as Justice Timmer articulated, “[t]he implied warranty is a contract term.” Although implied, the warranty is legally part of the written agreement in which “a residential builder warrants that its work is performed in a workmanlike manner and that the structure is habitable.”
In other words, a claim based on the implied warranty not only arises out of the contract, the claim is actually based on a contract term. Since, in A.R.S. § 12-341.01, Arizona law provides for prevailing parties to recover their fees on claims “arising out of contract” and because the implied warranty is now viewed by the courts as a contract term, homeowners can recover their fees after successfully proving breach of the implied warranty.
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Rick Erickson, Snell & WilmerMr Erickson may be contacted at
rerickson@swlaw.com
Quick Note: Do Your Homework When it Comes to Selecting Your Arbitrator
July 26, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMany construction contracts contain arbitration provisions. Instead of litigating a dispute arising out of the contract, the parties will arbitrate the dispute per the arbitration provision. There are advantages to arbitration and certain disputes bode well for arbitration. The key is you want to make sure you select the RIGHT arbitrator or arbitrators. Do your homework regarding the arbitrator list presented to you by, say, the American Arbitration Association. Strike out those on the list that either do not have the requisite experience you need to decide the dispute or you believe they are not going to be impartial. For instance, if you want an arbitrator that you think will specifically follow the letter of the law or the precise terms of a contract, select those on the list that meet this requirement; strike out others that do not. The same philosophy would apply if you want an arbitrator to have specific factual knowledge or a factual understanding regarding a driving issue in the dispute. Do not neglect the homework required to select –or try to select — the arbitrator you believe is the most qualified to understand the issues.
Now, why is this important? It is important because you need to arbitrate a dispute with the understanding that the arbitrator’s award (decision) is FINAL. There are no appellate rights. None. Vacating an arbitrator’s award is very challenging and the bases to vacate an award are limited and, most of the time, will NOT apply.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
Dadelstein@gmail.com
Third Circuit Holds No Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Despite Insured’s Expectations
November 21, 2018 —
Brian Margolies - TLSS Insurance Law BlogIn its recent decision in Frederick Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31666 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2018), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had occasion to consider Pennsylvania’s doctrine of reasonable expectations in the context of a faulty workmanship claim.
Hallstone procured a general liability policy from Frederick Mutual to insure its masonry operations. Notably, when purchasing the policy through an insurance broker, Hallstone’s principal stated that he wanted the “maximum” “soup to nuts” coverage for his company. Hallstone was later sued by a customer for alleged defects in its masonry work. While Frederick agreed to provide a defense, it also commenced a lawsuit seeking a judicial declaration that its policy excluded coverage for faulty workmanship. The district court agreed that the business risk exclusions applied, but nevertheless found in favor of Hallstone based on the argument that Hallstone had a reasonable expectation that when applying for an insurance policy affording “soup to nuts” coverage, it this would include coverage for faulty workmanship claims.
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Brian Margolies, Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLPMr. Margolies may be contacted at
bmargolies@tlsslaw.com
New York Climate Mobilization Act Update: Reducing Carbon Emissions and Funding Solutions
August 30, 2021 —
Caroline A. Harcourt - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate BlogIn our June 16 CMA Update, we discussed how the New York City Climate Mobilization Act (CMA) will affect building owners and the market for CMBS mortgage loans (loans pooled and resold as commercial mortgage-backed securities). (For more information on C-PACE financing, see Sustainable Buildings and Development: Carbon Emissions and the Recent Climate Mobilization Act of New York City.) In this update, we will outline some of the funding solutions that are available to New York City building owners looking to retrofit their buildings in order to comply with the CMA’s requirements.
Funding Solutions for Covered Building Owners
The cost of retrofitting buildings to incorporate energy efficient features and to achieve compliance with the CMA can be daunting.
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Caroline A. Harcourt, PillsburyMs. Harcourt may be contacted at
caroline.harcourt@pillsburylaw.com
Fundamental Fairness Trumps Contract Language
September 24, 2014 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorThe Texas Supreme Court recently ruled that a “no-damages-for-delay” clause would not be enforced where the delay was caused by the owner. The court’s ruling flies squarely in the face of the contract language that attempted to insulate the owner from any delay claims, even those it caused.
In the case of Zachary Construction v. Port of Houston underlying contract, proposed by the Port of Houston, was heavy handed, to say the least. The contract provided:
“[Contractor] shall receive no financial compensation for delay or hindrance to the Work. In no event shall the Port Authority be liable to [Contractor] … for any damages arising out of or associated with any delay or hindrance to the Work, regardless of the source of the delay or hindrance, including events of Force Majeure, AND EVEN IF SUCH DELAY OR HINDRANCE RESULTS FROM, ARISES OUT OF OR IS DUE IN WHOLE OR IN PART, TO THE NEGLIGENCE, BREACH OF CONTRACT OR OTHER FAULT OF THE PORT AUTHORITY. [Contractor’s] sole remedy in any such case shall be an extension of time.”
Wow, that’s some one-sided language. If the contract was enforced, the contractor could not get any damages for delay, even those damages caused by the active interference of the Port of Houston.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
State Audit Questions College Construction Spending in LA
August 17, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFA state audit of the Los Angeles Community College District found many problems with their construction spending. Their report, as described in the Los Angeles Times, found construction money spent for other purposes, such as promotional photography and public relation tours, $28.3 million spent on projects that were later cancelled, and oversight committees that provided no oversight.
Earlier this year, the LA Times ran a series of articles detailing problems with the Los Angles Community College District’s construction program. The LA Times reported that the State Controller’s audit reached many of the same conclusions.
The Community College District disputed the findings.
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San Diego Developer Strikes Out on “Disguised Taking” Claim
October 26, 2017 —
Michael C. Parme – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Dryden Oaks, LLC v. San Diego County Regional Airport Authority et al.(D068161, filed 9/26/17, publication order 10/19/17), the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District held that the County of San Diego (County) and the San Diego Regional Airport Authority (Authority) were entitled to summary judgment on a developer’s “disguised taking” theory of inverse condemnation.
In 2001, the developer purchased two large lots (designated Lot 24 and Lot 25) adjacent to the end of a runway at the Palomar Airport in Carlsbad. Plaintiff obtained the necessary permits from the City of Carlsbad and successfully completed construction of an industrial building on Lot 24 in 2005. However, the plaintiff never began development of Lot 25 and the building permit for the property expired in 2012. The developer was then unable to renew the building permit because the Authority had adopted the Airport Land Use Compatibility Plan (ALUCP) in the interim period, which reclassified the Lots as part of a Runway Protection Zone (RPZ). The developer received a letter explaining that “despite the earlier approval the proposed development was no longer feasible because the ALUCP was more restrictive than the prior compatibility plan and the application's proposed use of ‘research and development’ was not permissible.”
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Michael C. Parme, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPMr. Parme may be contacted at
mparme@hbblaw.com