Amazon Feels the Heat From Hoverboard Fire Claims
January 20, 2020 —
William L. Doerler - The Subrogation StrategistIn State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:18CV166-M-P, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189053 (Oct. 31, 2019), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi considered a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by defendant Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon). Amazon argued that, because it was a “service provider” who cannot be held liable under Mississippi’s Product Liability Act (MPLA), Miss. Code § 11.1.63, the negligence and negligent failure to warn claims filed against it by plaintiff State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State Farm) failed as a matter of law. The court, looking beyond the MPLA, held that State Farm’s complaint stated a claim against Amazon.
In State Farm, Taylor and Laurel Boone (the Boones), State Farm’s subrogors, purchased two hoverboards from third parties in transactions facilitated by Amazon. They purchased the first hoverboard on October 31, 2015 and the second on November 10, 2015. The Boones started using the hoverboards on or about December 25, 2015. On March 16, 2016, the hoverboards caught fire and the fire spread to destroy the Boones’ home. As alleged in the amended complaint, the hoverboards were “manufactured by unknown manufacturers from China.” State Farm, as the Boones’ subrogee, filed suit asserting negligence and negligent failure to warn claims against Amazon.
Amazon filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, arguing that State Farm’s claims against it were governed by the MPLA and, as a service provider, it was not liable under the MPLA. In response, State Farm argued that Amazon was liable because it acted as a “marketplace” and that, rather than MPLA claims, Amazon is subject to common law negligence and failure to warn claims. The District Court agreed with State Farm.
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William L. Doerler, White and Williams LLPMr. Doerler may be contacted at
doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
Lewis Brisbois Appellate Team Scores Major Victory in Bad Faith Insurance Action
May 24, 2021 —
Raul Martinez & Elise Klein - Lewis Brisbois NewsroomAppellate Partner Raul L. Martinez and Los Angeles Partners Elise D. Klein and Celia Moutes-Lee recently secured a major win in an appeal of a bad faith insurance action. In Wexler v. California Fair Plan Association (Apr. 14, 2021, B303100) __Cal.App.5th__, Division Eight of the Second Appellate District (Los Angeles), the court held that the plaintiff, the daughter of insurance policy holders, had no standing to pursue bad faith allegations against her parents’ insurer for smoke damage to her personal possessions.
The daughter’s parents owned a home in the mountains where there was a heightened risk of fires. The parents insured their home with a California FAIR Plan Association (FAIR Plan) owner-occupied dwelling policy (the FAIR Plan Policy). The FAIR Plan Policy only insured the dwelling and its contents against damage from fire, lightning, and internal explosion with limited coverage for smoke damage. The FAIR Plan Policy also expressly disclaimed coverage for individuals not specifically named in the policy. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s name did not appear in any of her parents’ insurance documents.
Reprinted courtesy of
Raul Martinez, Lewis Brisbois and
Elise Klein, Lewis Brisbois
Mr. Martinez may be contacted at Raul.Martinez@lewisbrisbois.com
Ms. Klein may be contacted at Elise.Klein@lewisbrisbois.com
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In Supreme Court Showdown, California Appeals Courts Choose Sides Regarding Whether Right to Repair Act is Exclusive Remedy for Homeowners
August 10, 2017 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogEarlier, we wrote about an appellate court split concerning the Right to Repair Act (Civil Code sections 895 et seq.) which applies to construction defects in newly constructed residential properties including single-family homes and condominiums (but not condominium conversions) sold after January 1, 2003.
The California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District, in Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98, held that the Right to Repair Act does not provide the exclusive remedy when pursing claims for construction defects involving “actual” property damage (e.g., a defectively constructed roof causing actual physical damage due to water intrusion as opposed to a defectively constructed roof that while constructed improperly does not cause actual physical damage). However, the California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District, in McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, which is currently pending before the California Supreme Court, held that the Right to Repair Act does in fact provide the exclusive remedy when pursuing claims for construction defects whether they involve “actual” property damage or merely “economic” damages. For homeowners, they would prefer the option of pursuing remedies under either or both the Right to Repair Act (which includes detailed pre-litigation procedures and statutory construction standards) or under common law claims such as negligence (which do not include pre-litigation procedures and have more flexible standards of care).
The California Court of Appeals for the Third District has now thrown its hat into the ring . . . on the side of McMillan.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Huh? Action on Construction Lien “Relates Back” Despite Notice of Contest of Lien
May 01, 2023 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesNot every case law you read makes sense. This sentiment goes to the uncertainty and grey area of certain legal issues. It is, what you call, “the nature of the beast.” You will read cases that make you say “HUH?!?” This is why you want to work with construction counsel to discuss procedures and pros / cons relative to construction liens.
An example of a case that makes you say “HUH” can be found in Woolems, Inc. v. Catalina Capstone Creations, Inc., 2023 WL 2777506 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) dealing with a construction lien foreclosure dispute.
Here, a contractor filed a lawsuit against a subcontractor with a summons to show cause why the subcontractor’s construction lien should not be discharged. This is a specific complaint filed under
Florida Statute s. 713.21(4). This statute requires the lienor to essentially foreclose on its construction lien within 20 days after it was served with a “show cause” summons. The subcontractor filed its answer and counterclaim but did NOT assert a claim to foreclose its construction lien.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Construction Industry Survey Says Optimism Hits All-Time High
March 26, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Nashville Business Journal reported that “construction optimism has been growing exponentially since it hit an all-time low in 2009.” Furthermore, “Wells Fargo's 2014 Construction Industry Forecast saw the Optimism Quotient rise to an all-time high of 124 after a survey that was performed in January.”
Reasons for the rise, according to Wells Fargo National Sales Manager John Crum, include “more capital available from banks, more public jobs and state and local governments being able to shore up their money supplies,” as quoted by the Nashville Business Journal.
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Fifth Circuit Confirms: Insurer Must Defend Despite Your Work/Your Product Exclusion
February 14, 2022 —
Nathan A. Cazier & Scott S. Thomas - Payne & FearsThe United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently confirmed that liability insurers have a duty to defend their insureds in construction defect cases when the underlying complaint alleges damage to property beyond the product and work of the insured – even if the complaint merely implies that the insured seeks such damage, without explicitly alleging so. Siplast, Incorporated v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company, No. 20-11076, 2022 WL 99303 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2022).
The Archdiocese of New York replaced the roof over Cardinal Spellman High School in the Bronx, using a roofing membrane manufactured by Siplast, Inc. (“Siplast”). After a rainstorm a few years later, school officials reported water damage to the ceiling tiles throughout the school, and repair attempts only made the leaking worse. Siplast disputed that the leaks were its fault and refused to replace the roof, so the Archdiocese sued.
Reprinted courtesy of
Nathan A. Cazier, Payne & Fears and
Scott S. Thomas, Payne & Fears
Mr. Cazier may be contacted at nac@paynefears.com
Mr. Thomas may be contacted at sst@paynefears.com
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California Court Broadly Interprets Insurance Policy’s “Liability Arising Out of” Language
December 20, 2017 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIn McMillin Mgmt. Servs. v. Financial Pacific Ins. Co., Cal.Ct.App. (4th Dist.), Docket No. D069814 (filed 11/14/17), the California Court of Appeal held that the term “liability arising out of,” as used in an ongoing operations endorsement, does not require that the named insured’s liability arise while it is performing work on a construction project.
In the McMillin case, the general contractor and developer (McMillin) contracted with various subcontractors, including a concrete subcontractor and stucco subcontractor insured by Lexington Insurance Company. Both subcontractors performed their work at the project prior to the sale of the units.
The Lexington policies contained substantively identical additional insured endorsements that provided coverage to McMillin “for liability arising out of your [the named insured subcontractor’s] ongoing operations performed for [McMillin].” Several homeowners filed suit against McMillin, alleging that they had discovered various defective conditions arising out of the construction of their homes, including defects arising out of the work performed by Lexington’s insureds. Lexington argued that there was no potential for coverage in McMillin’s favor under the endorsements because there were no homeowners during the time that the subcontractors’ operations were performing work at the project (the homes closed escrow after the subcontractors had completed their work); thus, McMillin did not have any liability for property damage that took place while the subcontractors’ operations were ongoing.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rose Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Privacy In Pandemic: Senators Announce Covid-19 Data Privacy Bill
May 11, 2020 —
Kyle Janecek & Jeffrey Dennis – Newmeyer Dillion"Data! Data! Data!. . . I can't make bricks without clay." This classic statement from Sherlock Holmes in The Adventure of the Copper Beeches takes on a new meaning in the COVID-19 pandemic. With the plans to begin contact tracing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic slowly moving towards the forefront, a valid and important issue presents itself: how do we treat and protect the data we so desperately need to trace, track, and address the pandemic? U.S. Senators Wicker, Thune, Moran, and Blackburn introduced a possible solution to this problem with the COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act, as announced on April 30, 2020. So what does the Act entail? What information is protected? What action would businesses need to take towards individuals, such as consumers or even employees, in order to comply with this new legislation?
WHAT IS THE COVID-19 CONSUMER DATA PROTECTION ACT?
The Act is meant to address the concern regarding data collection and privacy due to large companies, like Google and Apple, adjusting the software within their devices to facilitate digital contact tracing. The Act can be broken up into three parts - the treatment of information; the privacy notice requirements; and the transparency requirements.
First, the Act prohibits the collection, processing, or transfer of certain categories of data without notice and the affirmative express consent of the individual, in order to:
- Track the spread of COVID-19,
- Trace the spread of COVID-19 through contact tracing, or
- Determine compliance with social distancing guidelines without the requisite notice to individuals and their express consent.
To accomplish this, the Act also restricts entities in their ability to collect excessive information, stating that an entity cannot collect information beyond what is reasonably necessary to conduct any of the three COVID-19 related purposes listed in the statute. The entity must also provide reasonable administrative, technical, and physical data security policies and practices to protect the information collected. Furthermore, in the event that the entity stops using the information for any of the three COVID-19 purposes, it must delete or de-identify the information it has collected.
Next, the Act describes the requirements for notice to individuals. In order to legally collect, process or transfer the information, the entity needs to provide the consumer with prior notice of the purpose, processing, and transfer of the data through their privacy policy within 14 days of the enactment of the law. This policy would have to:
- Disclose the consumer's rights in a clear and conspicuous manner prior to or at the point of collection,
- Be available in a clear and conspicuous manner to the public,
- Include whether the entity will transfer any of the information it collects in order to track or trace COVID-19 or determine compliance with social distancing,
- Describe its data retention policy, and
- Generally describe its data security measures.
Notably, many of these are already requirements common to many privacy policies, including the disclosure regarding the transfer of an individual's information.
In addition, an individual must give their affirmative express consent to such collection, processing and transfer. In other words, an individual must "opt-in" to having their information collected. This would be done through a checked box or electronic signature, as the law prohibits entities from inferring consent through a failure by the individual to take an action stopping the collection. Furthermore, the individual would also need the ability to expressly withdraw their consent, with the entity then having to cease collection, processing, or transfer of the information within 14 days of the revocation. In essence, due to the restriction on transferal, this may result in businesses opting to delete or de-identify data upon a revocation.
Finally, the entity would have to abide by certain reporting and transparency requirements, namely a monthly public report stating how many individuals had information collected, processed or transferred, and describing the categories of the data collected, processed or transferred by the entity and why. This is akin to the California Consumer Privacy Act's treatment of categories of information, though it would require this information to be released on an ongoing, monthly basis.
WHAT DATA IS COVERED?
Notably, the Act only affects a very limited scope of data. The Act covers geolocation data (exact real-time locations), proximity data (approximated location data), and Personal Health Information (any genetic/diagnosis information that can identify someone). This could cover information like Bluetooth communication or real-time tracking based on a cell phone's geolocation features. Notably, Personal Health Information does not include any information that may be covered under HIPAA or the broader categorization of "Biometric" data (i.e. retinal scans, finger prints, etc). Furthermore, and more generally, "publicly available information" is excluded, which includes information from telephone books or online directories, the news media, "video, internet, or audio content" as well as "websites available to the general public on an unrestricted basis." The latter of which potentially would push any and all information made available through social media (i.e. Facebook or Twitter) into the definition of "publicly available information."
HOW IS IT ENFORCED?
Generally, the law would be enforced by the FTC, under the provisions regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices, similar to other enforcement actions arising out of privacy policies. Notwithstanding, state attorney generals may also bring actions to enforce compliance and obtain damages, civil penalties, restitution, or other compensation on behalf of the residents of the state.
WHAT SHOULD MY COMPANY DO?
If your entity plans on collecting information for tracking COVID-19, measuring social distancing compliance, or contact tracing, it is advisable to include language in your privacy policy now. This could be as simple as adding an additional provision within your privacy policy stating that the entity will retain information to conduct one of the three COVID-19 purposes as laid out in the statute. In addition, this also means that should the entity collect and use employee information for contact tracing, tracking the spread of COVID-19 or ensuring compliance with social distancing measures, it will need to disclose some of the specifics of that process to the employees and have them opt-in for the process. Finally, for contact tracing purposes, any individual that shares their diagnosis will have to opt-in for the entity to legally collect, process, and transfer that information to others.
While the time to reach compliance is unknown, it is more important than ever to form a compliance plan for privacy legislation if you do not already have a plan in place. If you decide to prepare with us, our firm has created a 90 day California Consumer Privacy Act compliance program (which can be expedited) where our team will collaborate with you to determine a scalable, practical, and reasonable way for you to meet your needs, and we will provide a free initial consultation. For further inquiries or questions related to COVID-19, you can consult with a Task Force attorney by emailing NDCovid19Response@ndlf.com or contacting our office directly at 949-854-7000.
Kyle Janecek is an associate in the firm's Privacy & Data Security practice, and supports the team in advising clients on cyber related matters, including policies and procedures that can protect their day-to-day operations. For more information on how Kyle can help, contact him at kyle.janecek@ndlf.com.
Jeff Dennis (CIPP/US) is the Head of the firm's Privacy & Data Security practice. Jeff works with the firm's clients on cyber-related issues, including contractual and insurance opportunities to lessen their risk. For more information on how Jeff can help, contact him at jeff.dennis@ndlf.com.
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