California Supreme Court Finds that the Notice-Prejudice Rule Applicable to Insurance is a Fundamental Public Policy of the State
October 14, 2019 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Pitzer College v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. (No. S239510, filed 8/29/19), the California Supreme Court held that California’s notice-prejudice rule is a fundamental public policy in the insurance context, supporting the application of California law under a choice of laws analysis. In addition, the Court held that the rule generally applies to consent (aka “no voluntary payments”) provisions in first party insurance policies but not to consent provisions in third party liability policies.
Pitzer College discovered soils contamination while building a new dormitory. Under pressure to complete construction before the start of the school year, Pitzer proceeded to remediate the soils, incurring $2 million in expense. Pitzer submitted a claim to Indian Harbor, which provided Pitzer insurance covering legal and remediation expenses resulting from pollution conditions discovered during the policy period.
The policy contained a notice provision requiring Pitzer to provide oral or written notice of any pollution condition to Indian Harbor and, in the event of oral notice, to “furnish … a written report as soon as practicable.” In addition, a consent provision required Pitzer to obtain Indian Harbor’s written consent before incurring expenses, making payments, assuming obligations, and/or commencing remediation due to a pollution condition. The consent provision had an emergency exception for costs incurred “on an emergency basis where any delay … would cause injury to persons or damage to property or increase significantly the cost of responding to any [pollution condition],” in which case Pitzer was required to notify Indian Harbor “immediately thereafter.” Lastly, a choice of law provision stated that New York law governed all matters arising under the policy.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Not Everything is a Pollutant: A Summary of Recent Cases Supporting a Common Sense and Narrow Interpretation of the CGL's Pollution Exclusion
October 26, 2020 —
Philip B. Wilusz & Jeffrey J. Vita - Saxe Doernberger & VitaThose of us who suffered through law school are familiar with the argument that there are fundamental rules applicable to contract interpretation and that a certain contract language interpretation would “swallow the rule.” However, insurance companies have long advocated for an interpretation of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion that would “swallow the coverage” that the insureds thought they were purchasing. Insurers have successfully argued in several states that the pollution exclusion’s definition of “pollutant” should be read literally, and be applied to any “solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.” As anyone with children can attest to, the range of items and substances that can be considered an “irritant” is limitless. The logical extent of the insurer’s interpretation brings to mind the high school student who, for his science fair project, convinced his fellow students to ban “dihydrogen monoxide.”1 Citing evidence such as the fact that everyone who has ever died was found to have consumed “dihydrogen monoxide,” he convinced them of the dangers of . . . water. Similarly, an overly expansive reading of the definition of “pollutant” could lead to the absurd result of even applying it to ubiquitous harmless substances such as water. The pollution exclusion, therefore, has run amok in many states and has allowed insurers to avoid liability for otherwise covered claims.
Fortunately, insureds in many states have successfully argued that the pollution exclusion is subject to a more limited interpretation based on several different theories. For example, some courts have agreed that the pollution exclusion, as initially introduced by the insurance industry, should be limited to instances of traditional environmental pollution. Others have held that the exclusion is ambiguous as to its interpretation. The reasonable expectations of the insureds do not support a broad reading of the defined term “pollutant.” Below, this article addresses a number of recent decisions that have adopted a pro policyholder interpretation of the pollution exclusion. As with most insurance coverage issues, choice of law clearly matters.
Reprinted courtesy of
Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and
Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at pbw@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Vita may be contacted at jjv@sdvlaw.com
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What is an Alternative Dispute Resolution?
August 26, 2019 —
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPAlternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) is a term that refers to a number of processes that can be used to resolve a conflict, dispute, or claim. ADR processes are alternatives to having a court decide the dispute in trial.
ADR processes can be used to resolve any type of dispute including but not limited those related to families, neighborhoods, employment, businesses, housing, personal injury, consumers, and the environment. ADR is usually less formal, less expensive, and less time-consuming than a trial.
Most Common Types of Alternative Dispute Resolutions
Mediation
In mediation, an impartial person called a “mediator” helps the parties try to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the dispute. The mediator does not decide the dispute but helps the parties communicate so they can try to settle the dispute themselves. Mediation leaves control of the outcome with the parties.
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Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Las Vegas Student Housing Developer Will Name Replacement Contractor
February 15, 2018 —
John Guzzon – ENRMore than four months after construction abruptly stopped on a $76-million student housing project for the University of Nevada at Las Vegas, the developer is seeking a new contractor.
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John Guzzon, Engineering News- RecordMr. Guzzon may be contacted at
ENRSouthWestEditor@enr.com
Harmon Tower Case Settled Prior to Start of Trial
January 09, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to the Las Vegas Sun, MGM Resorts International settled with “six of seven contractors in a massive civil breach-of-contract lawsuit over a never-opened Las Vegas Strip tower called the Harmon.” Clark County District Court Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez announced the settlement agreement just before the trial was to begin.
The Las Vegas Sun reported that “just a list of exhibits — not the exhibits themselves — filled 100 banker's boxes.” Michael Infuso, Show Canada Inc.’s attorney, stated that “[b]ecause of the complexity of this case, it was going to be impossible to try it.”
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Commencing of the Statute of Repose for Construction Defects
November 08, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesFlorida has a ten-year statute of repose which applies predominantly to construction defect claims. This can be found in Florida Statute s. 95.11(3)(c). After ten years, any rights relative to a construction defect claim are time-barred. However, the statute of repose date has been watered down and can be made to be more of a factual question due to the lack of objectivity as to the date that starts the ten-year repose clock. The watering down of the statute of repose date benefits parties asserting construction defect claims provided they strategically appreciate the question of fact that can be created when up against the statute of repose. Stated differently, when up against the clock to assert a construction defect claim, strategically develop those facts, evidence, and arguments to maximize creating a question of fact as to when the statute of repose clock commenced. Conversely, as a defendant sued for construction defects, you want to maximize the facts, evidence, and arguments to fully establish the date the statute of repose clock had to commence for purposes of a statute of repose defense.
The recent opinion in Spring Isle Community Association, Inc. v. Herme Enterprises, Inc., 46 Fla. L. Weekly D2306b (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) demonstrates the factual question associated with the clock that starts the statute of repose date. This factual question is created by Florida Statute s. 95.11(3)(c) that provides:
[T]he action [founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property] must be commenced within 10 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest.
Spring Isle Community Association, supra. (Note, see also current s. 95.11(3)(c) version in effect per hyperlink above.)
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Carbon Sequestration Can Combat Global Warming, Sometimes in Unexpected Ways
April 02, 2024 —
Michael S. McDonough, Robert A. James & Amanda G. Halter - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogWhether by land, by sea or through human innovation, carbon sequestration is likely coming to (or already happening in) a destination near you. As our planet, overdosed on greenhouse gases, battles climate disasters, a logical solution is to simply stop pumping carbon dioxide into the air. Legislation worldwide is aimed at that target, but reducing output alone may not be enough. There are still billions of tons of extra CO2 already in the atmosphere—this crossroads is where sequestration comes into play.
Carbon sequestration is exactly what it sounds like—the storage of CO2. Once carbon is sucked out of the air, or in some cases pulled directly from industrial smokestacks, sequestration can be undertaken in a lot of different ways. Carbon storage happens naturally, when forests and oceans absorb and convert CO2 into organic matter, but carbon dioxide can also be artificially injected into deep underground rock formations (or wells), or in some cases technological approaches repurpose carbon into a resource like concrete, or as a catalyst in a closed-loop industrial system. However it’s accomplished, the point of sequestration is to stabilize carbon and ensure it doesn’t creep back into our atmosphere. Researchers, like those at the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, now say that CO2 removal is vital to keeping global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius (past that threshold, climate change could reach catastrophic levels). A 2023 University of Oxford study estimated that, currently, about two billion metric tons of carbon dioxide are being removed each year, primarily through land management (i.e., planting trees), and suggested that we need to double that amount to avoid dangerous global warming levels.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. McDonough, Pillsbury,
Robert A. James, Pillsbury and
Amanda G. Halter, Pillsbury
Mr. McDonough may be contacted at michael.mcdonough@pillsburylaw.com
Mr. James may be contacted at rob.james@pillsburylaw.com
Ms. Halter may be contacted at amanda.halter@pillsburylaw.com
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California Supreme Court Upholds Insurance Commissioner’s Authority to Regulate Replacement Cost Estimates
January 26, 2017 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPn Assn. of Cal. Insurance Companies v. Jones ( No. S226529, filed 1/23/17), the California Supreme Court reversed trial and appellate court decisions to hold that California’s Insurance Commissioner Dave Jones had the authority to promulgate California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2695.183, which sets out specific requirements for estimating replacement cost as part of any application for or renewal of homeowners insurance.
The regulation was promulgated in 2010 in response to complaints from homeowners who lost their homes in the Southern California wildfires of 2003, 2007, and 2008, and who discovered that they did not have enough insurance to cover the full cost of repairing or rebuilding their homes because the insurers’ estimates of replacement value were too low when they purchased the insurance.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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