Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

No Duty to Indemnify Where No Duty to Defend

February 08, 2021 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The Montana Supreme Court held that because there was no duty to defend the insureds' intentional acts, the insurer had no duty to defend. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Wessel, 2020 Mont. LEXIS 2617 (Mont. Dec. 22, 2020). The insureds' property was accessed by Turk Road. Turk Road was also used by the neighbors to access their land. The insureds asked for permission to snowmobile across the neighbors' property. Permission was denied because the property was in a conservation easement which prohibited motorised used. The insureds' thereafter retaliated by not allowing the neighbors to use Turk Road. The neighbors then purchased an easement from another landowners to construct a new driveway which did not traverse the insureds' property. The insureds built snow berms and gates, felled trees, and created other obstacles to prevent the neighbors from using the new driveway. Physical threats were also made by the insureds. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Quick Note: Mitigation of Damages in Contract Cases

October 02, 2018 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
In an earlier article, I discussed an owner’s measure of damages when a contractor breaches the construction contract. This article discussed a case where the contractor elected to walk off a residential renovation job due to a payment dispute when he demanded more money and the owners did not bite. This case also discussed the commonly asserted defense known as mitigation of damages, i.e., the other party failed to properly mitigate their own damages. In the breach of contract setting, mitigation of damages refers to those damages the other side could have reasonably avoided had he undertaken certain (reasonable) measures. This is known as the doctrine of avoidable consequences. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

Exceptions to Privette Doctrine Do Not Apply Where There is No Evidence a General Contractor Affirmatively Contributed to the Injuries of an Independent Contractor's Employee

November 17, 2016 — Renata L. Hoddinott & Lawrence S. Zucker II – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
The Court of Appeal of the State of California – Second Appellate District in Khosh v. Staples Construction Company, Inc. (10/26/16 – Case No. B268937) affirmed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendant under the Privette doctrine where plaintiff presented no evidence that the defendant affirmatively contributed to his injuries. Plaintiff Al Khosh (“Khosh”) was injured while performing electrical work on a project. He was employed by Myers Power Products, Inc. (“Myers”) a subcontractor for the project. Khosh sued the general contractor, Staples Construction Company, Inc. (“Staples”) to recover damages for his injuries. Reprinted courtesy of Renata L. Hoddinott, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Lawrence S. Zucker II, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Ms. Hoddinott may be contacted at rhoddinott@hbblaw.com Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Quick Note: Can a Party Disclaim Liability in their Contract to Fraud?

April 11, 2022 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
It is possible for a party to contractually disclaim or otherwise foreclose liability to a fraud claim. However, let’s be honest. It can be done, but rarely is and would require very specific language to EXPLICITLY disclaim or foreclose such liability to a fraud claim. A recent case, discussed here, exemplifies this point where as-is language in a purchase-and-sale agreement was NOT specific to contractually foreclose or disclaim liability to a fraud claim. For a party to contractually waive a fraud claim, there needs to be an express waiver of liability for fraud that might have been made and that any fraudulent misrepresentation, if such fraud was committed, was disclaimed and would not destroy the validity of the parties’ contract. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

SIGAR Report Finds +$15 Billion in “Waste, Fraud and Abuse” in Afghanistan

August 20, 2018 — Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team - Gravel2Gavel
Today, our colleagues Alex Ginsberg, Glenn Sweatt and Kevin Massoudi published their Client Alert on a recently issued Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Report that finds over $15 billion in waste, fraud and abuse. In New SIGAR Report Identifies “Waste, Fraud and Abuse” in Afghanistan, our colleagues identify key takeaways from the Report include:

The Report reviewed public spending for Afghanistan reconstruction efforts and identified at least $15.5 billion in waste, fraud and abuse.

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team

District Court of Missouri Limits Whining About the Scope of Waiver of Subrogation Clauses in Wine Storage Agreements

May 01, 2019 — Gus Sara - The Subrogation Strategist
In Netherlands Ins. Co. v. Cellar Advisors, LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10655 (E.D. Mo.), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri considered the scope of a waiver of subrogation clause in two wine storage agreements. The court held that the subrogation waivers were limited in scope and, potentially, did not apply to the damages alleged in the pleadings. This case establishes that, in Missouri, waivers of subrogation are narrowly construed and cannot be enforced beyond the scope of the specific context in which they appear. In 2005, Krista and Reid Buerger (the Buergers) contracted Marc Lazar (Lazar) to assist with purchasing, transporting and storing their wine. In 2006, the Buergers entered into a contract with Lazar’s company, Domaine StL, for the storage of their wine in St. Louis. In 2012, the Buergers contracted with Lazar’s other company, Domaine NY, for storage of their wine in New Jersey. The 2006 and 2012 contracts included subrogation waivers. Pursuant to the contracts, Lazar and the Domaine companies (collectively, Defendants) would buy wine for the Buergers by either using the Buergers’ credit card or invoicing them after a purchase. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Gus Sara, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Sara may be contacted at sarag@whiteandwilliams.com

Woodbridge II and the Nuanced Meaning of “Adverse Use” in Hostile Property Rights Cases in Colorado

November 23, 2020 — Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
Earlier this year, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued an opinion addressing at length “whether the requirement that the use be ‘adverse’ in the adverse possession context is coextensive with adverse use in the prescriptive easement context.” See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Woodbridge II), ¶ 2, cert. granted, No. 20SC292, 2020 WL 5405376 (Colo. Sept. 8, 2020). As detailed below, the Woodbridge II court concluded that the meanings of “adverse” in these two contexts are not coextensive—while “hostility” in the adverse possession context requires a claim of exclusive ownership of the property, a party claiming a prescriptive easement is only required to “show a nonpermissive or otherwise unauthorized use of property that interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Thus, the Woodbridge II court reasoned a claimants’ acknowledgement or recognition of an owner’s title alone is insufficient to defeat “adverse use” in the prescriptive easement context. This significant ruling is at odds with a prior division’s broad statement, while considering a prescriptive easement claim, that “[i]n general, when an adverse occupier acknowledges or recognizes the title of the owner during the occupant’s claimed prescriptive period, the occupant interrupts the prescriptive use.” See Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 553 (Colo. App. 2006). Perhaps for that reason, Woodbridge II is currently pending certiorari review before the Colorado Supreme Court in a case that should provide some much-needed clarity on what constitutes “adverse use” in the context of a prescriptive easement. As we await the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision, I thought it worthwhile to provide a brief analysis of the Woodbridge II court’s deep dive into the nuances of “adverse use” in this field of Colorado law. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at lmecklenburg@swlaw.com

COVID-19 Is Not Direct Physical Loss Or Damage

April 13, 2020 — Joseph Blyskal, Dennis Brown & Michelle Bernard - Gordon & Rees Insurance Coverage Law Blog
Is a cash register that is not being used damaged property? When you need to wash a table, a chair, or a section of flooring with readily available cleaning products to make them safe and useable, are you repairing damaged property? Is a spilled cup of coffee waiting to be wiped up actual damage to the premises? If your customers stay home to help stop the spread of a virus, has there been a physical loss inside your shuttered store or restaurant? The insuring agreements typically found in commercial property insurance policies require “direct physical loss of or damage to” covered property as the triggering event. Without establishing direct physical loss or damage a policyholder cannot meet its burden to trigger coverage for a purely economic loss of business income resulting from shuttering its business due to concerns over exposure to—or even the actual presence of—COVID-19. Despite this well-understood policy language, it is already beyond question that insurers will confront creative—albeit strained—arguments from policyholder firms attempting to trigger coverage for pure economic loss. The scope of the human and economic tragedy we all face will be matched by the scope of the effort to force the financial harm onto insurance companies. The plaintiffs in what appears to be the first-filed case seeking a declaratory judgment in the context of first-party insurance coverage rely on the assertion that “contamination of the insured premises by the Coronavirus would be a direct physical loss needing remediation to clean the surfaces” of its establishment, a New Orleans restaurant, to trigger coverage for business interruption.[1] See Cajun Conti, LLC, et. al. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, et. al. Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. The complaint alleges that the property is insured under an “all risk policy” defining “covered causes of loss” as “direct physical loss.” The plaintiffs rely on the alleged presence of the virus on “the surface of objects” in certain conditions and the need to clean those surfaces. They go so far as to claim that “[a]ny effort by [the insurer] to deny the reality that the virus causes physical damage and loss would constitute a false and potentially fraudulent misrepresentation. . . .” Reprinted courtesy of Gordon & Rees attorneys Joseph Blyskal, Dennis Brown and Michelle Bernard Mr. Blyskal may be contacted at tblatchley@grsm.com Mr. Brown may be contacted at dbrown@grsm.com Ms. Bernard may be contacted at mbernard@grsm.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES