Residential Contractors, Be Sure to Have these Clauses in Your Contracts
May 16, 2018 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsI have often “mused” on the need to have a good solid construction contract at the beginning of a project. While this is always true, it is particularly true in residential contracting where a homeowner may or may not know the construction process or have experience with large scale construction. Often you, as a construction general contractor, are providing the first large scale construction that the homeowner has experienced. For this reason, through meetings and the construction contract, setting expectations early and often is key.
As a side note to this need to set expectations, the Virginia Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation (DPOR) and the Virginia General Assembly require certain clauses to be in every residential construction contract. DPOR strictly enforces these contractual items and failure to put them in your contracts can lead to fines, penalties and possibly even revocation of a contractor’s license.
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Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
As Fracture Questions Remain, Team Raced to Save Mississippi River Bridge
September 06, 2021 —
Jim Parsons - Engineering News-Record"How is this bridge still standing?”
That was the initial reaction of Aaron Stover, Michael Baker International’s vice president and regional bridge practice lead, as he first studied images of a fractured tie beam that forced the May 11 emergency shutdown of the I-40/Hernando de Soto Bridge between Tennessee and Arkansas. Discovered by chance earlier in the day during MBI’s routine above-deck inspection, the fracture on the bridge’s eastbound span affected nearly half the cross-section of a 26-in. by 33-in. welded girder supporting one of the 50-year-old structure’s 900-ft-long, 100-ft-high arched navigation spans across the Mississippi River.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jim Parsons, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
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Ill-fated Complaint Fails to State Claims Against Broker and FEMA
September 10, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiA complaint lodged against the insureds' broker and FEMA was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Lopez v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109803 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 2014).
The insureds held a Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP) issued by FEMA, but sold by the broker. The insureds alleged that their property was totally destroyed by Hurricane Isaac. FEMA paid the insureds $234,513.02 for damage to their dwelling and $80,566.17 for its contents, for a total of $315,079.19. This was $34,920.81 below the policy limits. The insureds sued, claiming FEMA negligently miscalculated their damages, misvalued their property, and improperly adjusted their claim. The insureds also alleged that the broker failed to properly advise them regarding the nature of their coverage, the true value of their property, or to purchase the correct amount of insurance on their behalf.
The negligent procurement claim against the broker failed because the insureds did not allege any specific facts tending to establish that the broker failed to use reasonable diligence in procuring their insurance. Likewise, the negligent misrepresentation claim against the broker was dismissed. Insurance agents had a duty to supply their customers with correct information, and they could be liable for negligent misrepresentation if they provided incorrect information and an insured was damaged. Here, the insureds did not allege a breach of the duty to supply correct information.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Hunton Insurance Team Wins Summary Judgment on Firm’s Own Hurricane Harvey Business Income Loss
March 23, 2020 —
Michael S. Levine & Michelle M. Spatz - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogA Texas judge has ruled that Hunton Andrews Kurth is entitled to coverage from Great Northern Insurance Co., a unit of Chubb, Ltd. (“Chubb”), for losses its predecessor firm suffered when Hurricane Harvey closed its Houston office and disrupted business in 2017.
The court agreed with Hunton’s position that the policy, written specifically for a law firm, covered its business income loss until the firm’s operations were restored to their pre-loss levels. The court rejected in its entirety Chubb’s argument that coverage lasted only until the physical damage that closed the building had been repaired. Rather, siding with Hunton, the court found that the policy language affords, in addition to ordinary business income coverage during the damage period, “extended period” coverage that commences after the damaged property is repaired and after the firm’s operations resume.
From August 27 to August 31, 2017, the firm was forced to close its Houston office due to flooding and damage caused by Hurricane Harvey. While employees were permitted to return to the office on August 31, income did not return to its pre-loss level until September 14, 2017. The firm submitted a claim to Chubb for the loss sustained from August 27 to September 14, but Chubb paid only for income loss suffered during the 3-day closure period, and refused to cover the loss suffered after the building reopened.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Michelle M. Spatz, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Ms. Spatz may be contacted at mspatz@HuntonAK.com
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Not Everything is a Pollutant: A Summary of Recent Cases Supporting a Common Sense and Narrow Interpretation of the CGL's Pollution Exclusion
October 26, 2020 —
Philip B. Wilusz & Jeffrey J. Vita - Saxe Doernberger & VitaThose of us who suffered through law school are familiar with the argument that there are fundamental rules applicable to contract interpretation and that a certain contract language interpretation would “swallow the rule.” However, insurance companies have long advocated for an interpretation of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion that would “swallow the coverage” that the insureds thought they were purchasing. Insurers have successfully argued in several states that the pollution exclusion’s definition of “pollutant” should be read literally, and be applied to any “solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.” As anyone with children can attest to, the range of items and substances that can be considered an “irritant” is limitless. The logical extent of the insurer’s interpretation brings to mind the high school student who, for his science fair project, convinced his fellow students to ban “dihydrogen monoxide.”1 Citing evidence such as the fact that everyone who has ever died was found to have consumed “dihydrogen monoxide,” he convinced them of the dangers of . . . water. Similarly, an overly expansive reading of the definition of “pollutant” could lead to the absurd result of even applying it to ubiquitous harmless substances such as water. The pollution exclusion, therefore, has run amok in many states and has allowed insurers to avoid liability for otherwise covered claims.
Fortunately, insureds in many states have successfully argued that the pollution exclusion is subject to a more limited interpretation based on several different theories. For example, some courts have agreed that the pollution exclusion, as initially introduced by the insurance industry, should be limited to instances of traditional environmental pollution. Others have held that the exclusion is ambiguous as to its interpretation. The reasonable expectations of the insureds do not support a broad reading of the defined term “pollutant.” Below, this article addresses a number of recent decisions that have adopted a pro policyholder interpretation of the pollution exclusion. As with most insurance coverage issues, choice of law clearly matters.
Reprinted courtesy of
Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and
Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at pbw@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Vita may be contacted at jjv@sdvlaw.com
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Colorado SB 15-177 UPDATE: Senate Business, Labor, & Technology Committee Refers Construction Defect Reform Bill to Full Senate
April 01, 2015 —
Derek J. Lindenschmidt – Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCOn March 18th, following a lengthy hearing with testimony and questioning for and against Senate Bill 15-177, the Senate Business, Labor & Technology Committee voted 6 to 2 to refer the bill, with new amendments, to the full Senate.
While the main points of the bill remain strongly intact (check here for Senate Bill 177’s particulars), bill sponsors Senators Scheffler and Ulibarri offered four amendments, designed to bring additional compromise and clarity to the bill. The committee ultimately adopted these amendments, described below.
Amendment 16 removed a prior prohibition in the bill that would have prevented attorneys from assisting in the preparation of the notice required to be provided to all homeowners before the commencement of a construction defect claim. Amendment 19 complemented 16 by providing further clarification regarding the contents and specificities required in said notice, including a disclosure of projected attorneys’ fees, costs, duration, and financial impact of pursuing construction defect claims. Amendment 17 permitted homeowners to approve the pursuit of construction defect claims through written consent. Lastly, Amendment 18 provided clarification regarding the bill’s requirement that mediators and arbitrators be selected and approved through mutual agreement of the parties.
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Derek J. Lindenschmidt, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. Lindenschmidt may be contacted at
lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com
Do You Have an Innovation Strategy?
November 08, 2017 —
Aarni Heiskanen - AEC BusinessConstruction and engineering are among the top five industries ripe for disruption according to research by PwC. Will innovation come from tech companies and startups, or could established firms be proactive? For Granlund, founded in 1960, innovation is a strategic essential and a core competency.
Granlund is a Finnish design, consultancy, and software services firm specializing in energy efficiency. It employs more than 800 people in 20 locations in Finland and in its offices in Shanghai and Dubai. The company is known internationally for being in the vanguard of building information modeling and for real estate management software development.
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Aarni Heiskanen, AEC BusinessMr. Heiskanen may be contacted at
info@aepartners.fi
