Direct Contractors In California Should Take Steps Now To Reduce Exposure For Unpaid Wages By Subcontractors
February 07, 2018 —
Nora Stilestein, Candace Matson , and Mercedes Cook - Construction & Infrastructure Law BlogAs of January 1, 2018, direct contractors in California who make or take a contract “for the erection, construction, alteration, or repair of a building, structure, or other private work” are jointly and severally liable with their subcontractors for any unpaid wages, fringe benefits and other benefit payments or contributions owed to wage claimants. Governor Brown approved
AB 1701 on October 14, 2017. The new law puts the onus on direct contractors to not only monitor their own payroll practices, but to ensure that their subcontractors and lower tier subcontractors are engaging in proper payroll practices.
Reprinted courtesy of Sheppard Mullin attorneys
Nora Stilestein,
Candace Matson and
Mercedes Cook
Ms. Stilestein may be contacted at nstilestein@sheppardmullin.com
Ms. Matson may be contacted at cmatson@sheppardmullin.com
Ms. Cook may be contacted at mcook@sheppardmullin.com
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White and Williams Recognized by BTI Consulting Group for Client Service
April 12, 2021 —
White and Williams LLPWhite and Williams is proud to be included in BTI Consulting Group’s report of “The 70 Law Firms Improving Client Service Performance More Than All Others."
The pandemic forced law firms to navigate and respond instinctively as new client situations popped up daily and weekly. White and Williams was quick to establish a Covid-19 team and resource center to help clients navigate the rapidly developing business and legal issues brought on by the pandemic and provide timely and practical advice. This recognition is a testament to the firm’s commitment to provide clients with best-in-class service and the trust that clients have instilled in the firm.
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White and Williams LLP
Insured's Experts Excluded, But Insurer's Motion for Summary Judgment Denied
October 26, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiDespite barring the insured's expert witnesses from testifying as to the cause of the loss, lay witnesses were still available, making the district court's award of summary judgment to the insurer improper. Greater Hall Temple Church of God v. Southern Mut. Church Ins. Co., 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 21934 (11th Cir. July 15, 2020).
Hurricane Matthew damaged the Greater Hall Temple Church of God's (Church) roof. Leaks occurred, causing water damage to the Church's interior. A claim was submitted to Southern Mutual. The policy did not cover loss caused by water. Nor did it cover loss to the interior of buildings unless the rain entered through openings made by a specified peril. An independent adjuster found that the damage was caused not by wind, but by pre-exisiting structural issues. Southern Mutual denied the claim.
The Church filed suit. Southern Mutual moved for summary judgment and also moved to strike three of the Church's expert witnesses. The district court agreed that none of the witnesses could qualify as experts. Two of the witnesses did not have the requisite experience nor had they used a sufficiently reliable methodology formulating their opinions. A third expert was barred because his expert opinion had not been timely disclosed. Thereafter, Southern Mutual's motion for summary judgment was granted because the Church had not provided admissible evidence that damage to the Church's roof was caused by Hurricane Matthew.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
The Year 2010 In Review: Design And Construction Defects Litigation
February 25, 2011 —
Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen LauderdaleThis article is the first in a series summarizing construction law developments for 2010
1. Centex Homes v. Financial Pacific Life Insurance Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1995 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
After settling numerous homeowners’ construction defect claims — and more than ten years after the homes were substantially completed — a home developer brought suit against one of the concrete fabrication subcontractors for the development seeking indemnity for amounts paid to the homeowners, as well as for damages for breach of the subcontractor’s duties to procure specific insurance and to defend the developer against the homeowners’ claims. The subcontractor brought a motion for summary adjudication on the ground the developer’s claims were barred by the ten year statute of repose contained in Code of Civil Procedure Section 337.15.
The District Court agreed the developer’s claim for indemnity was barred by Section 337.15. And it held that because the damages recoverable for breach of the subcontractor’s duty to purchase insurance are identical to the damages recoverable through the developer’s indemnity claim, the breach of duty to procure insurance claim also was time-barred. The District Court, however, allowed the claim for breach of the duty to defend to proceed. The categories of losses associated with such a claim (attorneys’ fees and other defense costs) are distinct from the damages recoverable through claims governed by Section 337.15 (latent deficiency in the design and construction of the homes and injury to property arising out of the latent deficiencies).
2. UDC — Universal Development v. CH2M Hill, 181 Cal. App. 4th 10 (6th Dist. Jan. 2010)
Indemnification clauses in construction agreements often state that one party to the agreement — the “indemnitor” — will defend and indemnify the other party from particular types of claims. Of course, having a contract right to a defense is not the same as actually receiving a defense. Any indemnitor attempting to avoid paying for defense costs can simply deny the tender of defense with the hope that when the underlying claim is resolved the defense obligations will be forgotten. In the past, when parties entitled to a defense — the “indemnitees” — had long memories and pressed to recover defense costs, indemnitors attempted to justify denying the tender by claiming their defense obligations coincided with their indemnity obligations and neither arose until a final determination was made that the underlying claim was one for which indemnity was owed.
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Reprinted courtesy of Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen Lauderdale, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP. Ms. Matson can be contacted at cmatson@sheppardmullin.com, Mr. Hamersmith can be contacted at hhamersmith@sheppardmullin.com, and Ms. Lauderdale can be contacted at hlauderdale@sheppardmullin.com.
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Foundation Arbitration Doesn’t Preclude Suing Over Cracks
March 28, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Louisiana Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of a lower court, allowing a construction defect case to go through. In Greer v. Town Construction Company, the Greers hired Town Construction to build a home in Baton Rouge. The business relationship went sour, with disputes over “costs, change orders, workmanship, and timeliness issues.”
Town Construction filed an arbitration claim for the unpaid contract balance. In the counterclaim, the Greers made claims of mold and mildew problems, and wall cracks that they attributed to a “structural defect in the foundation.” In arbitration, Town Construction was awarded the full contract balance plus extra costs and interest, while the Greers were awarded for their structural claims.
Three years later, the Greers found additional cracks and filed a suit against Town Construction. Town Construction argued that the Greer’s lawsuit should be dismissed, as the claims had already been through the arbitration process. The district court agreed with Town Construction and dismissed the suit.
The appeals court noted that the Greers would have no ground for a suit if the arbitration was a “valid and final judgment,” and went on to note that there was no evidence in the trial record that the arbitration met this qualification. The court noted that although it was clear that both parties had agreed to the decisions of the arbiter, under Louisiana law, arbitration is not final until it has been “rendered by a court with jurisdiction over subject mater and over parties.”
The court remanded the case to the lower court, noting that “the district court is obligated to first determine whether a valid arbitration award is in existence and had been confirmed before considering the merits of the exception. The court noted that their decision “should not be read to express any opinion as to the merits of the claims or as to the propriety of damages sought in the Greer’s lawsuit.”
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No Choice between Homeowner Protection and Bankrupt Developers?
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFDonna DiMaggio Berger, writing in the Sun Sentinel argues those may be the only current choices in Florida. A recent court case, Lakeview Reserve HOA v. Maronda Homes has caused a swift response from the legislators. Ms. Berger notes that the construction defect bill, HB 1013, “would take away a homeowner’s rights to pursue a developer for defects to the driveways, roads, sidewalks, utilities, drainage areas and other so-called ‘off-site’ improvements.” The alternative? She notes that applying the Maronda decision would “bankrupt developers who don’t build defect-free roads and sidewalks.”
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Colorado Court of Appeals Defines “Substantial Completion” for Subcontractors’ Work so as to Shorten the Period of Time in Which They Can Be Sued
October 20, 2016 —
David M. McLain – Colorado Construction Litigation BlogOver the past few years, there has been a battle raging on in district courts and arbitration hearing rooms throughout Colorado regarding when a subcontractor’s work is to be deemed “substantially complete,” for purposes of triggering Colorado’s six-year statute of repose. C.R.S. § 13-80-104 states, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary, all actions against any architect, contractor, builder or builder vendor, engineer, or inspector performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of construction of any improvement to real property shall be brought within the time provided in section 13-80-102 after the claim for relief arises, and not thereafter, but in no case shall such an action be brought more than six years after the substantial completion of the improvement to the real property, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
* * *
(2) In case any such cause of action arises during the fifth or sixth year after substantial completion of the improvement to real property, said action shall be brought within two years after the date upon which said cause of action arises.
C.R.S. § 13-80-104 (emphasis added).
As the battle raged on at the trial court level, subcontractors and design professionals argued that their work should be deemed “substantially complete” when they finished their discrete scope of work within a project. Developers and general contractors, seeking to maintain third-party claims against the subcontractors and design professionals, typically argued either that the subcontractors’ and design professionals’ work should be deemed “substantially complete” upon the issuance of the final certificate of occupancy on the project, or upon the issuance of the final certificate of occupancy for the last building within a project on which the subcontractor or design professional worked. Trial court judges and arbitrators have been split on this issue, with perhaps a slight majority favoring one or the other approaches advocated by developers and general contractors, that the subcontractors’ and design professionals’ work is “substantially complete” upon the issuance of the last certificate of occupancy in a project (the minority view) or upon the issuance of the last certificate of occupancy for the last building within a project on which the subcontractor of design professional worked (the majority view).
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David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Disputes Over Arbitrator Qualifications: The Northern District of California Offers Some Guidance
August 10, 2021 —
Justin K. Fortescue - White and WilliamsThe selection of an arbitration panel can often lead to disputes between the parties regarding things like whether a particular candidate is qualified, whether a challenge to an arbitrator’s qualifications can be addressed pre-award and whether a party that names an unqualified arbitrator should lose the opportunity to name a replacement. In Public Risk Innovations v. Amtrust Financial Services, No. 21-cv-03573, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129464 (N.D. Ca. July 12, 2021), the court provided answers on all three of these issues.
In Amtrust, the parties filed cross-motions to compel arbitration. Although both parties agreed the dispute was arbitrable, they disagreed about whether Public Risk Innovations, Solutions and Management’s (PRISM) arbitrator was qualified under the terms of the applicable contract. In seeking to have PRISM’s arbitrator disqualified, Amtrust argued that he: (1) was not a “current or former official of an insurance or reinsurance company”; and (2) was not “disinterested.” Amtrust also argued that because PRISM named an unqualified arbitrator (and presumably the time to appoint had passed), PRISM should be deemed to have failed to select an arbitrator as required by the contract and that Amtrust had the right to select a second arbitrator of its choice.
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Justin K. Fortescue, White and WilliamsMr. Fortescue may be contacted at
fortescuej@whiteandwilliams.com
