CA Supreme Court Permits Insurers to Bring Direct Actions Seeking Reimbursement of Excessive Fees Against Cumis Counsel Under Limited Circumstances
August 19, 2015 —
David W. Evans & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPThe California Supreme Court held in Hartford Casualty Insurance Company v. J.R. Marketing, L.L.C. (Squire Sanders) (8/10/2015 - #S211645) that if Cumis counsel, operating under a court order which such counsel drafted and which expressly provided that the insurer would be able to recover excessive fees, sought and received fee payments from the insurer that were fraudulent or otherwise manifestly and objectively useless and wasteful when incurred, Cumis counsel have been unjustly enriched at the insurer’s expense and the insurer will be permitted under such limited circumstances to seek reimbursement directly from Cumis counsel.
Certain Hartford insureds who had been issued commercial general liability policies were sued in multiple proceedings for a variety of claims, including unfair competition, defamation and intentional misrepresentation. Hartford disclaimed a duty to defend or to indemnify the defendants on the grounds that the acts complained of occurred prior to Hartford’s policy, and that some of the defendants were not Hartford insureds. A coverage action was filed by some of the insureds against Hartford; they were represented by the Squire Sanders law firm. Although Hartford subsequently agreed to defend several of the defendants subject to a reservation of rights, it declined to pay defense expenses incurred prior to the date of such agreement. Some months later, the trial court entered a summary adjudication order, finding that Hartford had a duty to have defended the liability action on the date it was originally tendered; the order required Hartford to fund the insured’s defense with independent counsel (i.e., so-called “Cumis” counsel; see San Diego Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 358). The insureds retained Squire Sanders as their Cumis counsel.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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“Freelance Isn’t Free” New Regulations Adopted in New York City Requiring Written Contracts with Independent Contractors
June 15, 2017 —
Kevin J. O'Connor - Peckar & Abramson. P.C.Attacks on employers for alleged misclassification of workers—particularly independent contractors—are continuing unabated, and the risk of liability for employers operating in New York City just increased. New York City has just adopted sweeping regulations requiring written contracts with certain freelancers and independent contractors. Anyone doing business in that jurisdiction should take notice and take action to comply with the law.
New York City’s “Freelance Isn’t Free Act,” N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§ 20-927 et seq. (“FIFA”) went into effect on May 15, 2017. This new law substantially regulates the relationship between a business and an independent contractor or “freelancer” working in New York City.
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Kevin J. O'Connor, Peckar & Abramson. P.C.Mr. O'Connor may be contacted at
koconnor@pecklaw.com
Burlingame Construction Defect Case Heading to Trial
December 30, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFA condominium association in the Aspen, Colorado area will likely go to trial over its claims of construction defects, reports Aspen Daily News Online. According to the suit, siding and trim were improperly manufactured and installed. The homeowners engaged experts to determine the appropriate remedy, and then sought bids from contractors. Shaw Construction, which built the condos, responded with a counteroffer. Chris Rhody, the lawyer for the homeowners, said there was “a big difference” between the association’s request and the builder’s counteroffer.
According to Mr. Rhody, settlement is still possible, but seems unlikely. A date for the trial is yet to be set.
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Meet the Forum's In-House Counsel: KATE GOLDEN
February 19, 2024 —
Jessica Knox - The Dispute ResolverCompany: Mortenson
Email: kate.golden@mortenson.com
Website: www.mortenson.com
College: University of Iowa (Bachelor of Science in Engineering, 1991)
Graduate School: University of Minnesota (Master of Science in Civil Engineering, 1994)
Law School: William Mitchell College of Law (now Mitchell | Hamline School of Law) (JD 1999)
States Where Company Operates/Does Business: Mortenson is a national builder and developer with 13 regional office locations.
Q: Describe your background and the path you took to becoming in-house counsel.
A: In high school, I loved math and science, so I attended the University of Iowa College of Engineering and studied civil engineering, with a focus on environmental engineering. To practice environmental engineering at that time, you generally needed a master’s degree, so I attended the University of Minnesota, where my thesis for my degree program was “Organochlorines in Lake Michigan.” I then worked as an environmental engineer for a consulting firm called Montgomery Watson (now MWH) assisting clients with various environmental issues from air permitting to watershed reports to risk assessments of contaminated sites.
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Jessica Knox, Stinson LLPMs. Knox may be contacted at
jessica.knox@stinson.com
Understand and Define Key Substantive Contract Provisions
March 23, 2020 —
Phillip L. Sampson Jr. & Richard F. Whiteley, Construction ExecutiveThe following contract provisions should be clearly understood before undertaking any construction project commences.
Force Majeure
Often referred to as an “Act of God,” a force majeure is an event, typically beyond the parties’ control, that prevents performance under a contract. To determine if a contractor need a force majeure clause in its contract, it should ask whether there may be instances where events beyond the contractor’s control could impact its contractual performance? If so, it will want this clause.
Courts currently treat force majeure as an issue of contractual interpretation, focusing on the express language in the contract. Consequently, the scope and applicability of a force majeure clause depends on the contract’s terms. Using broad language in a force majeure clause may help protect against unforeseen events. But to the extent possible, parties should describe with particularity the circumstances intended to constitute a force majeure.
The law relating to force majeure also fairly consistently provides that parties cannot avoid contractual obligations because performance has become economically burdensome. Courts have refused to apply force majeure clauses where an event only affects profitability. Recent attempts to categorize tariffs on construction materials as a force majeure have failed. Unless a tariff or tax is specifically listed as a force majeure event, it is unlikely to constitute a force majeure because it only affects profitability.
Reprinted courtesy of
Phillip L. Sampson Jr. & Richard F. Whiteley, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Court Finds That $400 Million Paid Into Abatement Fund Qualifies as “Damages” Under the Insured’s Policies
November 21, 2022 —
Lorelie S. Masters & Yaniel Abreu - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogIn
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, et al., the Court of Appeals for Ohio’s Eighth District reversed the lower court, finding that money paid by the insured into an abatement fund was “damages” as that undefined term was used in the policyholder’s insurance policies. 2022-Ohio-3031, ¶ 1. Sherwin-Williams is a cautionary tale about how insurers may try to narrow the meaning of undefined terms in their insurance policies.
The dispute in Sherwin-Williams focused on coverage for $400 million that the policyholder and other defendants were ordered to pay into an abatement fund to be used by California cities and counties to mitigate the hazards caused by lead paint in homes. Id. ¶ 1. Although the underlying litigation proceeded in California, Ohio law governed coverage, which raised issues of first impression in Ohio. Id. Among other things, the insurers argued that the money paid into the abatement fund did not qualify as “damages” under the policies. Id. ¶ 57. The insured argued that, because the insurers did not define “damages” in the policies, the term had to be given its ordinary meaning. Id. ¶ 56.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lorelie S. Masters, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Yaniel Abreu, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Ms. Masters may be contacted at lmasters@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Abreu may be contacted at yabreu@HuntonAK.com
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Fifth Circuit Concludes Government’s CAA Legal Claims are Time-Barred But Injunctive-Relief Claims are Not
November 28, 2018 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelIn another recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision, on October 1, 2018, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, in part, the District Court’s ruling that the general federal statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462, required the dismissal of the government’s civil enforcement action in the case of U.S., et al., v. Luminant Generation Co., LLC, et al.
The Fifth Circuit agreed that the statute barred the imposition of any civil fine for the alleged unlawful construction operations regarding the modification of major emitting facilities contrary to Section 7475(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA). But, the Fifth Circuit remanded the injunctive-relief claims to the District Court for further consideration.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Traub Lieberman Partner Colleen Hastie and Associate Jeffrey George Successfully Oppose Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Dismissal
September 11, 2023 —
Colleen E. Hastie & Jeffrey George - Traub LiebermanTraub Lieberman Partner Colleen Hastie and Associate Jeffrey George successfully opposed Plaintiff’s motion to vacate a prior dismissal of plaintiff’s medical malpractice action brought before the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County.
The lawsuit, commenced by Plaintiff in 2015, alleged medical malpractice stemming from treatment Plaintiff received at a New York medical facility after falling out of a window at a rental property owned by Traub Lieberman’s client (“Property Owner”). Property Owner moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint or preclude Plaintiff from offering evidence in support of its claims, or in the alternative, compel plaintiff to produce all outstanding discovery. The Medical Facility cross-moved for the same relief. Defendants agreed to adjourn the motion until after plaintiff’s deposition, but plaintiff made no effort to secure an adjournment with the court and plaintiff filed no opposition to the motion, allowing the motion to be granted on default. Plaintiff waited nearly a year to file a motion to vacate the default judgment, despite receiving notification of the default from defense counsel. Property Owner, in opposing plaintiff’s motion, pointed to plaintiff’s long history of dilatory conduct and failure to comply with discovery orders in support of its position that plaintiff failed to show any good cause for its default on the motion to dismiss.
Reprinted courtesy of
Colleen E. Hastie, Traub Lieberman and
Jeffrey George, Traub Lieberman
Ms. Hastie may be contacted at chastie@tlsslaw.com
Mr. George may be contacted at jgeorge@tlsslaw.com
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