Allegations That COVID-19 Was Physically Present and Altered Property are Sufficient to Sustain COVID-19 Business Interruption Suit
May 24, 2021 —
Michael S. Levine & Joseph T. Niczky - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogOn Wednesday, a federal judge in Texas denied Factory Mutual’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that the presence of COVID-19 on their property caused covered physical loss or damage in the case of Cinemark Holdings, Inc. v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co., No. 4:21-CV-00011 (E.D. Tex. May 5, 2021). This is the third COVID-19-related business interruption decision from Judge Amos Mazzant since March, but the first in favor of a policyholder. Taken together, the three decisions have two key takeaways and provide a roadmap for policyholders in all jurisdictions.
First, the Cinemark decision recognizes that the alleged presence of COVID-19 viral particles that physically altered the policyholder’s property is sufficient under federal pleading standards and controlling state law. In its motion, FM relied on Judge Mazzant’s recent decision in Selery Fulfillment, Inc. v. Colony Insurance Co., No. 4:20-CV-853, 2021 WL 963742 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2021), which dismissed a lawsuit alleging that the policyholder’s losses were caused by government orders that closed its business, rather than from the actual presence of the virus on its property. The Court held that government orders alone do not constitute physical loss or damage, and declined to rule on whether the physical presence of the virus does. Judge Mazzant reached the same conclusion weeks later in Aggie Investments, L.L.C. v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 4:21-CV-0013, 2021 WL 1550479 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2021).
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Joseph T. Niczky, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Niczky may be contacted at jniczky@HuntonAK.com
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Foreclosure Deficiency: Construction Loan vs. Home Improvement Loan
November 12, 2019 —
Kevin J. Parker - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn a recent Arizona Court of Appeals case, Helvetica Servicing, Inc., v. Pasquan, 2019 WL 3820015, (8/15/19), the Court of Appeals addressed the distinction between (1) a construction loan (or refinance of same) and (2) a home improvement loan (or refinance of same), as it relates to Arizona’s anti-deficiency statute, A.R.S. §33-729(A).
In general, an anti-deficiency statute provides that although a purchase-money lender or a construction lender can – in appropriate circumstances – foreclose on their loan and cause a sale of the property to pay the loan, the lender cannot (if the statutory criteria are met) force the homeowner/borrower to pay the remaining balance still owed on the loan following the foreclosure (known as the deficiency). In other words, if the anti-deficiency rule applies, the lender’s sole remedy to collect on the loan is a foreclosure sale of the property; and the homeowner/borrower’s downside risk is loss of the property in foreclosure; the homeowner/borrower does not have any personal liability to pay the remaining unpaid balance of the loan post-foreclosure. In effect, the homeowner/borrower can simply walk away and not have to repay the loan.
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Kevin J. Parker, Snell & WilmerMr. Parker may be contacted at
kparker@swlaw.com
Federal Court Denies Summary Judgment in Leaky Condo Conversion
August 04, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the US District Court for Illinois, Judge William Hibber has rejected the request for summary judgment sought by the developers of a condominium building in the case of Nautilus Ins. Co. v. 1735 W. Diversey, LLC (the insureds). The insureds renovated a building at 1735 W. Diversey, Chicago, converting it into condominiums. After the project was completed and all units sold, and a condominium association form, one of the owners found that unit suffered leaks during rainstorms. The condo board hired a firm, CRI, to investigate the cause of the leakage. CRI found “water infiltration through the exterior brick masonry walls, build-up of efflorescence on the interior surfaces of the masonry, and periodic spalling of portions of the brick masonry.”
The redevelopment firm had purchased coverage from Nautilus. “Shortly after the Board filed its first complaint, the Insureds tendered the mater to Nautilus and requested that it indemnify and defend them from the Board's underlying claims. Nautilus, however, rejected the Insureds’ tender and denied coverage under both insurance policies.” Nautilus stated that the water leakage did not constitute an occurrence under the policies. The court cited these policies in which an occurrence is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” The Illinois courts have determined that construction defects are not accidents.
The court concluded that the insured did not bring forth claims within the coverage of the policies and denied the motion for summary judgment.
Read the court’s decision…
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Good-To-Know Points Regarding (I) Miller Act Payment Bonds And (Ii) Payment Bond Surety Compelling Arbitration
December 22, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesEvery now and then I come across an opinion that addresses good-to-know legal issues as a corollary of strategic litigation decisions that are questionable and/or creative. An opinion out of the United States District Court of New Mexico, Rock Roofing, LLC v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, 2019 WL 4418918 (D. New Mexico 2019), is such an opinion.
In Rock Roofing, an owner hired a contractor to construct apartments. The contractor furnished a payment bond. The contractor, in the performance of its work, hired a roofing subcontractor. A dispute arose under the subcontract and the roofer recorded a construction lien against the project. The contractor, per New Mexico law, obtained a bond to release the roofer’s construction lien from the project (real property). The roofer then filed a lawsuit in federal court against the payment bond surety claiming it is entitled to: (1) collect on the contractor’s Miller Act payment bond (?!?) and (2) foreclose its construction lien against the lien release bond furnished per New Mexico law.
Count I – Miller Act Payment Bond
Claiming the payment bond issued by the contractor is a Miller Act payment bond is a head scratcher. This claim was dismissed with prejudice upon the surety’s motion to dismiss. This was an easy call.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
New York Court of Appeals Finds a Proximate Cause Standard in Additional Insured Endorsements
June 15, 2017 —
Geoffrey Miller - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.In The Burlington Insurance Company v. NYC Transit Authority, et al., No. 2016-00096, the New York Court of Appeals issued a landmark decision with regard to the meaning of “caused, in whole or in part, by” in the additional insured context. In a split decision, the court rejected Burlington Insurance Company’s argument that the language implied a “negligence” standard, but held that coverage was provided to the additional insured only where the named insured’s acts or omissions were the proximate cause of the injury:
While we [the majority] agree with the dissent that interpreting the phrases differently does not compel the conclusion that the endorsement incorporates a negligence requirement, it does compel us to interpret ‘caused, in whole or in part’ to mean more than ‘but for’ causation. That interpretation, coupled with the endorsement’s application to acts or omissions that result in liability, supports our conclusion that proximate cause is required here.[1]
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Geoffrey Miller, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Miller may be contacted at
gjm@sdvlaw.com
Warranty Reform Legislation for Condominiums – Unfair Practices used by Developers and Builders to avoid Warranty Responsibility for Construction Defects in Newly Constructed Condominiums
June 09, 2016 —
Nicholas D. Cowie – Maryland Condo Construction Defect Law BlogThis article pertains to needed condominium construction defect warranty reform legislation that the Maryland Legislature has been reluctant to enact into law. Below is an explanation of the legislation and a list of practical steps CAI members can take to support the legislation during the upcoming 2017 legislative session.
Background
The warranty reform legislation was unsuccessfully introduced during the 2016 legislative session as “Senate Bill 250” (“SB 250”) and “House Bill 1170” (“HB 1170”). Both bills were identical, one being filed in the Senate and the other in the House of Delegates.
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Nicholas D. Cowie, Cowie & Mott, P.A.Mr. Cowie may be contacted at
ndc@cowiemott.com
Aarow Equipment v. Travelers- An Update
January 16, 2024 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsPreviously here at Musings, I discussed the application of pay if paid clauses and the Miller Act. The case that prompted the discussion was the Aarow Equipment & Services, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. case in which the Eastern District of Virginia Federal Court determined that a “pay if paid” clause coupled with a proper termination could defeat a Miller Act bond claim. However, as I found out a couple of weeks ago at the VSB’s Construction Law and Public Contracts section meeting, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded this case in an unpublished opinion (Aarow Equipment & Services, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Co.)
In it’s opinion, the 4th Circuit looked at some of the more “interesting” aspects of this case. One of these circumstances was that Syska (the general contractor) directed Aarow to construct sedimentary ponds and other water management measures around the project (the “pond work”), which both agreed was outside of the scope of the work defined in their subcontract. Syska asked that the government agree to a modification of the prime contract and asked Aarow to wait to submit its invoice for the pond work until after the government issued a modification to the prime contract and Syska issued a change order to the subcontract.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Subcontractors Must be Careful Providing Bonds when General Contractor Does Not
April 05, 2017 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsAfter I wrote the title to this post, I thought, “Well, that says it all, doesn’t it?” I also considered the fact that for those that read this construction law blog on a regular basis, I am likely stating the obvious. I then thought about the fact that there can be confusion regarding the purpose of bonds versus insurance. Couple this with the fact that Murphy was an optimist, and I thought this would be a good reminder.
Bonds and insurance have one fundamental difference between them. When your construction company buys insurance, that insurance is meant to protect your company. When your company provides a payment and/or performance bond, that bond is there not to protect your company but to protect everyone else on the job and the project itself. Where insurance will pay for your company’s qualifying errors so that that money does not come out of the bottom line, a bond contract will have an indemnification agreement whereby anything paid by the surety will then be reimbursed by you and your company dollar for dollar (as opposed to just the premium).
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Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
