Heavy Rains Cause Flooding, Mudslides in Japan
July 31, 2023 —
Associated Press - BloombergTOKYO (AP) — Torrential rain pounded southwestern Japan, triggering floods and mudslides and leaving two people dead and at least six others missing, officials said Monday.
Rain falling in the regions of Kyushu and Chugoku since the weekend caused flooding along many rivers, triggered mudslides, closed roads, disrupted trains and cut the water supply in some areas.
The Japan Meteorological Agency issued an emergency heavy rain warning for Fukuoka and Oita prefectures on the southern main island of Kyushu, urging residents in riverside and hillside areas to take maximum caution. More than 1.7 million residents in vulnerable areas were urged to take shelter. The emergency warning was downgraded later Monday to a regular warning.
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ACEC Statement on Negotiated Bipartisan Debt Limit Compromise
June 05, 2023 —
The American Council of Engineering CompaniesWashington, D.C. – The American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC) released the following statement applauding the negotiated bipartisan compromise to raise the debt limit ahead of the scheduled House vote tonight:
"The American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC) applauds President Biden and Speaker McCarthy for negotiating a bipartisan compromise to raise the debt limit and avoid a catastrophic default. We are particularly pleased that the bipartisan deal protects the critical funds provided under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and does not include any changes to the Inflation Reduction Act's (IRA) climate and clean energy provisions, which the engineering industry is working hard to deliver successfully. ACEC also strongly supports the provisions in the deal to reform the federal permitting process. These commonsense measures to modernize the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), particularly through the use of digital technologies, will improve interagency collaboration and allow engineering firms to help their clients deliver project benefits more efficiently while ensuring strong environmental protections and opportunities for community and stakeholder engagement."
The American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC) is the business association of the nation's engineering industry. Founded in 1909, ACEC is a national federation of 51 state and regional organizations representing more than 5,500 engineering firms and 600,000+ engineers, surveyors, architects, and other specialists nationwide. ACEC member firms drive the design of America's infrastructure and the built environment.
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Texas City Pulls Plug on Fossil Fuels With Shift to Solar
March 19, 2015 —
Christopher Martin – Bloomberg(Bloomberg) -- A city in the heart of the oil state of Texas is set to become one of the first communities in the U.S. to wean its residents off fossil fuels.
The municipal utility in Georgetown, with about 50,000 residents, will get all of its power from renewable resources when SunEdison Inc. completes 150 megawatts of solar farms in West Texas next year. The change was announced Wednesday.
It will be the first city to completely embrace clean power in the state, which is the biggest U.S. producer and user of natural gas. More will follow as municipalities seek to insulate themselves from unpredictable prices for fossil fuels, said Paul Gaynor, SunEdison’s executive vice president of North America. Burlington, Vermont, made a similar move with its purchase of a hydroelectric plant last year.
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Christopher Martin, BloombergMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin11@bloomberg.net
Insured Fails to Provide Adequate Proof of Water Damage Through Roof
December 10, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment due on the insured's claims for water damage to a church. Unity Church of God in Christ of York v. Church Mutual Ins. Co., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163204 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2024).
Unity Church alleged that it suffered a sudden and accidental direct physical loss to its church. Wind damage to the roof of the church allowed rainwater to leak into the sanctuary of the church. Notice was given to Church Mutual Insurance Company, but coverage was denied.
Unity Church filed suit alleging breach of contract. Church Mutual answered and asserted a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the water damage to the church was outside the policy's coverage because the damage was caused by rain. Church Mutual filed for summary judgment.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
That’s Common Knowledge! Failure to Designate an Expert Witness in a Professional Negligence Case is Not Fatal Where “Common Knowledge” Exception Applies
June 03, 2019 —
Lyndsey Torp - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn reversing summary judgment for defendants, the California Fourth District Court of Appeal recently held that homeowners suing their real estate broker for negligence did not need an expert witness to establish the elements of their causes of action. Ryan v. Real Estate of the Pacific, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal. App. 5th 637. Typically, expert witnesses are required to establish the standard of care in professional negligence cases. But in Ryan, the court of appeal held that the “common knowledge” exception applied despite this general rule, because the conduct required by the particular circumstance of the case was within the common knowledge of a layman. The conduct in question here? The broker’s failure to disclose to his client that the client’s neighbor told him that she planned extensive renovations that would obstruct the client’s property’s ocean views.
Ryan and Patricia Ryan (the Ryans) hired defendant Real Estate of the Pacific, Inc., doing business as Pacific Sotheby’s International Realty (Sotheby’s) and defendant real estate broker to sell their residence in La Jolla, California. During an open house at the residence, a neighbor informed the Ryan’s real estate broker that she planned extensive renovations at her home that would, among other things, permanently obstruct the Ryan’s westerly ocean views and take several years to complete. The real estate broker never informed the Ryans of this, nor the subsequent buyer. The subsequent buyer purchased the property for $3.86 million, and defendants received $96,500 as commission for the sale. The day after escrow closed, the buyers learned of the renovations, and sought to rescind the purchase. Based on advice of defendants, the Ryans refused, and the dispute proceeded to arbitration. The buyer obtained a rescission of the purchase, with the Ryans order to pay damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs in excess of $1 million. The Ryans then sued Sotheby’s and the real estate broker to recover these amounts and damages caused by defendants’ alleged negligence.
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Lyndsey Torp, Snell & WilmerMs. Torp may be contacted at
ltorp@swlaw.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Insurer Obligated to Cover Preventative Remediation of Construction Defects
November 06, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFA recent Texas construction defect case gets covered on a blog post on the web site of Manatt, Phelphs & Phillps, LLC. In the case, the home builder built homes using EIFS which later had problems with mold, mildew, and structural damage. The home builder remediated all of the homes in the project, not just those that had experienced problems with the EIFS.The home builder’s insurers refused to cooperate. Various insurers settled with the home builder, leaving only Markel America Insurance Company.
Markel refused coverage on the grounds that proactively replacing the EIFS to preclude damage meant that there was no damage for their policy to cover. The policy also read that “no insured, except at their own cost, [may] voluntary make any payment, assume any obligation, or incur any expense,” unless Markel agreed to it. But the Texas Supreme Court ruled that “Markel failed to prove that it was prejudiced in any way by the home builder’s settlements,” which was a necessary condition for the cited clause. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that Markel was obligated to indemnify the home builder.
The court also concluded that the damage occurred during the coverage period and that “all 465 houses at issue suffered property damage during the policy period.”
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SCOTUS, Having Received Views of Solicitor General, Will Decide Whether CWA Regulates Indirect Discharge of Pollutants Into Navigable Water Via Groundwater
April 17, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelPrior to deciding whether to review an important February 1, 2018, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision involving the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act (CWA), Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, et al., v. County of Maui, the Supreme Court asked the Solicitor General for the views of the U.S. on the holdings of this case and the April 12, 2018 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision, Upstate Forever, et al., v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., et al.
On February 19, the Supreme Court confirmed that certiorari was granted to Question 1 presented by the Petition,
Whether the CWA requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater. (33 U.S.C. § 1362 (12)
In County of Maui , the Ninth Circuit held that indirect discharges to navigable waters through groundwater may be subject to the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) CWA the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting authority, and in Kinder Morgan, the Fourth Circuit held that such an indirect discharge may be subject to regulation under the CWA when there is a direct hydrological connection between the discharge into groundwater and the direct discharge into navigable, surface waters.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
