Construction Insurance Rates Up in the United States
November 20, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFA new report says that construction firms paid from three to seven percent more on average during the first six months of 2013 than they had in the last half of 2012. Firms with poor loss histories paid even more, reaching double-digit increases.
Michael Anderson, of Marsh’s U.S. Construction Practice said that “U.S. construction firms are grappling with a firming insurance market, especially when it comes to liability insurance where underwriters continue to tighten coverage terms and seek rate increases to make up for reduced investment income.” He did note that “the good news for well-managed construction firms is they can still generally find competitive pricing and terms.”
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Court Provides Guidance on ‘Pay-When-Paid’ Provisions in Construction Subcontracts
July 13, 2020 —
Ted R. Gropman & Cindy J. Lee - ConsensusDocsOn April 17, the California Court of Appeal decided Crosno Construction, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America,1 effectively narrowing the scope of enforceable “pay-when-paid” provisions in construction subcontracts to the extent the subcontractor seeks recovery against a general contractor’s payment bond surety. Although the Crosno case involved a public works project, the rationale and holding should apply with equal force to private works projects. Basing the bulk of its decision on the Wm. R. Clarke Corp. v. Safeco Insurance Co.2 case, the court found that an open-ended “pay-when-paid” provision in a subcontract is not enforceable against a subcontractor that seeks to recover on a public works payment bond claim. This article discusses the Crosno decision and the implications for contractors on both sides of the contract moving forward.
Brief Case Summary
In Crosno, general contractor Clark Bros., Inc. contracted with the North Edwards Water District (the District) to build an arsenic removal water treatment plant. Clark hired steel storage tank subcontractor Crosno Construction, Inc. to build and coat two steel reservoir tanks. Clark and Crosno’s subcontract included a “pay-when-paid” provision, which stated that Clark would pay Crosno within a “reasonable time” of receiving payments from the owner, but “in no event less than the time Contractor and Subcontractor require to pursue to conclusion their legal remedies against Owner or other responsible party to obtain payment.” After Crosno completed its work, a dispute arose between Clark and the District, and the District withheld payment from Clark (including the monies earmarked for Clark’s subcontractors). Clark sued the District for payment, and Crosno filed its own action against Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, the surety on Clark’s statutory public works payment bond, for recovery of the unpaid subcontract balance. Travelers rejected Crosno’s bond claim as premature, invoking the “pay-when-paid” subcontract language and pointing to Clark’s pending payment action against the District. The issue on appeal was whether the “pay-when-paid” provision in the subcontract blocked Crosno from recovering under the payment bond from Travelers while Clark’s lawsuit against the District was still pending.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ted R. Gropman, Pepper Hamilton LLP and
Cindy J. Lee, Pepper Hamilton LLP
Mr. Gropman may be contacted at ted.gropman@troutman.com
Ms. Lee may be contacted at cindy.lee@troutman.com
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NJ Supreme Court Declines to Review Decision that Exxon Has No Duty to Indemnify Insurers for Environmental Liability Under Prior Settlement Agreement
November 29, 2021 —
Patricia B. Santelle & Laura Rossi - White and WilliamsOn November 1, 2021, in a single-sentence Order, the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied a request for review of a decision that ExxonMobil Corporation (Exxon) did not have to indemnify certain of its insurers over environmental liabilities as required by a previous settlement agreement. The case, entitled Home Insurance Company v. Cornell-Dubilier Electronics Incorporated, et al., has a unique and convoluted procedural history but, in short, the denial of review leaves standing a holding by the intermediate appellate court that the insurers’ “untimely notice actually prejudiced Exxon, violated the no-prejudice rule, and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” The court declined to consider the question framed by the insurers: whether the importance of enforcing settlement agreements outweighs New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine.
The matter dated back almost thirty years, when the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection notified the Appearing London Market Insurers (ALMI) of the potential liability of Cornell-Dublier Electronics (CDE), a former indirect subsidiary of Exxon, for pollution at a site in New Jersey. Coverage litigation followed in New Jersey, which ALMI defended under policies issued to CDE. Exxon was not named in the CDE suit nor were the policies which ALMI issued to Exxon at issue in that case; Exxon instead had its own pollution coverage case pending in New York. In June 2000, Exxon and its insurers, including ALMI, entered into a settlement agreement which (a) required Exxon to indemnify the insurers for any environmental liability claims involving its subsidiaries, and (b) provided for application of New York substantive law and litigation in New York City court for any dispute between the parties under it.
Reprinted courtesy of
Patricia B. Santelle, White and Williams and
Laura Rossi, White and Williams
Ms. Santelle may be contacted at santellep@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Rossi may be contacted at rossil@whiteandwilliams.com
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Prospective Additional Insureds May Be Obligated to Arbitrate Coverage Disputes
September 07, 2020 —
Danielle S. Ward - Balestreri Potocki & HolmesThe Court of Appeal closed out 2019 by ruling that an additional insured can be bound to the arbitration clause in a policy when a coverage dispute arises between that additional insured and the carrier. (Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. SMG Holdings, Inc. (2019) 44 Cal. App. 5th 834, 837.)
In 2009, Future Farmers of America (“Future Farmers”) entered into a license agreement with SMG Holdings Incorporated (“SMG”) to use the Fresno Convention Center. As part of the agreement, Future Farmers was required to secure comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) coverage and name SMG and the City of Fresno as additional insureds (“AI”) on its policies.
Future Farmers purchased a general liability policy from Plaintiff Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (“Philadelphia”). Neither SMG nor the City of Fresno were added as AIs, but the policy contained a “deluxe endorsement” which extended coverage to lessors of premises for “liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased or rented” to the named insured. The policy also contained an endorsement that extended coverage where required by a written contract for liability due to the negligence of the named insured. Philadelphia’s policy also stated that if the insurance company and insured “do not agree whether coverage is provided . . . for a claim made against the insured, then either party may make a written demand for arbitration.”
A patron to Future Farmer’s event at the Fresno Convention Center was seriously injured after he tripped over a pothole in the parking lot and hit his head. He sued both Fresno and SMG. In turn, Fresno and SMG tendered their defense to Philadelphia. Philadelphia denied coverage finding that the incident did not arise out of Future Farmer’s negligence, and that SMG had the sole responsibility for maintaining the parking lot. Consequently, Philadelphia concluded that neither Fresno nor SMG qualified “as an additional insured under the policy” for the injury in the parking lot.
The coverage dispute continued, and in 2016, Philadelphia issued a demand for arbitration which was rejected by SMG. Philadelphia then petitioned the state court to compel arbitration arguing that SMG could not avoid the burdens of the policy while seeking to obtain policy benefits. SMG used Philadelphia’s conclusion that it did not qualify as an AI under the policy to argue that Philadelphia was “estopped from demanding arbitration”. In other words, SMG argued that it could not be held to the burdens of the policy without being provided with the benefits of the policy.
The trial court sided with SMG finding that there was no arbitration agreement between the parties. The court noted that while third party beneficiaries can be compelled to arbitration there was no evidence that applied here, and Philadelphia could not maintain its inconsistent positions on the policy as its respects SMG.
Disagreeing with the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded that SMG was a third-party beneficiary of the policy. The AI obligations in the license agreement and the deluxe endorsement in the Philadelphia policy collectively establish an intended beneficiary status. The Court saw SMG’s tender to Philadelphia as an acknowledgement of that status.
Relatedly, the Court found that SMG’s tender to Philadelphia – its demand for policy benefits – equitably estopped them from avoiding the burdens of the policy. The Court stated it defied logic to require a named insured to arbitrate coverage disputes but free an unnamed insured demanding policy coverage from the same requirement. Conversely, the Court found no inconsistency in Philadelphia’s denial of coverage to SMG and its subsequent demand for arbitration. Philadelphia did not outright reject SMG’s status as a potential insured, but rather concluded that there was no coverage because the injury occurred in the parking lot. In other words, the coverage determination turned on the circumstances of the injury not SMG’s status under the policy.
In short, the Court concluded that the potential insured takes the good with the bad. If one seeks to claim coverage as an additional insured, they can be subject to the restrictions of the policy including arbitration clauses even if they did not purchase the policy.
Securing additional insurance has become increasingly more difficult and limited over the years, and this holding presents yet another hurdle to attaining AI coverage. For those seeking coverage, it is important to note that the Court’s ruling may have turned out differently had the carrier outright denied SMG’s AI status, rather than concluding that the injury was not covered.
Your insurance scenario may vary from the case discussed above. Please contact legal counsel before making any decisions. BPH’s attorneys can be reached via email to answer your questions.
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Danielle S. Ward, Balestreri Potocki & HolmesMs. Ward may be contacted at
dward@bph-law.com
New Evidence Code Requires Attorney to Obtain Written Acknowledgement that the Confidential Nature of Mediation has been Disclosed to the Client
January 02, 2019 —
Steven J. Pearse, Esq. & David A. Napper, Esq. – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & BargerSenate Bill 954: MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY DISCLOSURES.
California regards mediation as a beneficial process for parties to resolve disputes in an expeditious and economical fashion. To assure open and candid participation, there is a longstanding policy in California to maintain confidentiality during the mediation process. However, the mediation confidentiality statutes have prevented some clients from suing their·attorneys for alleged malpractice that occurred during the mediation process. (see Cassel v. Superior Court, (2011) 51 Cal.4th 113). Senate Bill ("SB") 954, was recently passed and thereafter approved by the Governor on September 11, 2018 to address this concern.
SB 954, which will amend California Evidence Code section 1122 and add California Evidence Code section 1129, requires that an attorney representing a client participating in a mediation or a mediation consultation provide that client with a written disclosure and acknowledgement containing the mediation confidentiality restrictions as set forth in the California Evidence Code.
This written disclosure and acknowledgement requirement does not apply to class or representative actions. Additionally, the failure of an attorney to follow the new requirement will not be a basis to set aside an agreement prepared in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation. Any communication, document, or writing related to an attorney's compliance with the disclosure requirement will not be considered confidential and may be used in a disciplinary proceeding if the communication, document, or writing does not disclose anything said or done or any admission made in the course of the mediation.
California Evidence Code section 1129 sets forth the exact language that must be used in the disclosure. It even informs the client that all communications between the client and the attorney made in preparation for a mediation, or during a mediation, are confidential and cannot be disclosed or used (except in extremely limited circumstances), even if the client later decides to sue the attorney for malpractice because of something that happens during the mediation.
The new disclosure requirement will allow mediation to maintain the confidentiality that encourages open and candid communications during the process while ensuring that before clients agree to mediation that the clients are made aware of how that confidentiality can potentially impact them. SB 954, will take effect on January 1,2019.
Reprinted courtesy of
Stephen J. Pearce, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
David A. Napper, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Pearce may be contacted at dnapper@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Napper may be contacted at jpaster@HuntonAK.com
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White and Williams Lawyers Recognized by Best Lawyers
August 26, 2015 —
White and Williams LLPTwelve White and Williams lawyers have been listed in The Best Lawyers in America 2016. Inclusion in Best Lawyers is based entirely on peer-review. The methodology is designed to capture the consensus opinion of leading lawyers about the professional abilities of their colleagues within the same geographical area and legal practice area. Best Lawyers employs a sophisticated, conscientious, rational, and transparent survey process designed to elicit meaningful and substantive evaluations of the quality of legal services.
2016 Best Lawyers
Attorney / Practice Area
Frank Bruno / Patent Law
James Coffey / Mergers and Acquisitions Law
Timothy Davis / Real Estate Law
Joseph Foster / Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants
William Hussey / Tax Law; Trusts and Estates
Michael Kraemer / Employment Law - Management; Labor Law; Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment
Randy Maniloff / Insurance Law
John Orlando / Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants
Thomas Rogers / Real Estate Law
Joan Rosoff / Real Estate Law
Craig Stewart / Insurance Law; Product Liability - Defendants
William Taylor / Construction Law
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You may contact White and Williams LLP attorneys at www.whiteandwilliams.com
Update Regarding McMillin Albany LLC v. Super Ct.
April 28, 2016 —
Richard H. Glucksman and David A. Napper – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger In FocusThe construction industry continues to await the California Supreme Court's highly anticipated decision regarding McMillin Albany LLC v. Super Ct. 2015 F069370 (Cal.App.5 Dist.). The Supreme Court will attempt to resolve the conflict presented by the Fourth Appellate District Court's holding in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98 and rejection of the same by the Fifth Appellate District Court in McMillin Albany. The issue is whether the Right to Repair Act (SB800) is the exclusive remedy for all defect claims arising out of new residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2013. CGDRB has been closely monitoring the progress of the case and understands that the real parties in interest have submitted their opening brief on the merits. The Court granted Petitioners a further and final extension to file the answer brief on the merits. The answer deadline is Monday April 25, 2016. Stay tuned.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
David A. Napper, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Napper may be contacted at dnapper@cgdrblaw.com
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Utah’s Highest Court Holds That Plaintiffs Must Properly Commence an Action to Rely on the Relation-Back Doctrine to Overcome the Statute of Repose
August 20, 2018 —
Shannon M. Warren - The Subrogation StrategistEarlier this summer, in Gables & Villas at River Oaks Homeowners Ass’n v. Castlewood Builders LLC, 2018 UT 28, the Supreme Court of Utah addressed the question of whether the plaintiff’s construction defects claims against the general contractor for a construction project were timely-filed, or barred by the statute of repose. In Utah, the statute of repose requires that an action be “commenced within six years of the date of completion.” The plaintiff alleged that its 2014 amended complaint naming the general contractor as a defendant was timely-commenced because, before the date on which Utah’s statute of repose ran, a defendant filed a motion to amend its third-party complaint to name the general contractor as a defendant, and the defendant subsequently assigned its claims to the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that the filing of its 2014 amended complaint related back[1] to the date of its original complaint. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an action is “commenced” by filing a complaint and that a motion for leave to amend does not count as “commencing” an action.
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Shannon M. Warren, White and Williams LLPMs. Warren may be contacted at
warrens@whiteandwilliams.com
