Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

New York: The "Loss Transfer" Opportunity to Recover Otherwise Non-Recoverable First-Party Benefits

May 13, 2014 — Robert M. Caplan – White and Williams LLP
New York’s “no-fault” legislation reflects a public policy designed to make the insurer of first-party benefits absorb the economic impact of loss without resort to reimbursement from its insured or, by subrogation, from the tortfeasor. Country Wide Ins. Co. v. Osathanugrah, 94 A.D.2d 513, 515 (N.Y. 1st Dept. 1983). The no-fault concept embodied in New York’s Insurance Law modifies the common law system of reparation for personal injuries under tort law. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jamaica Water Supply Co., 83 A.D.2d 427, 431 (N.Y. 2nd Dept. 1981). “[F]irst party benefits are a form of compensation unknown at common law, resting on predicates independent of the fault or negligence of the injured party.” Id. at 431. The purpose of New York’s no-fault scheme is “to promote prompt resolution of injury claims, limit cost to consumers and alleviate unnecessary burdens on the courts.” Byrne v. Oester Trucking, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 386, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). New York’s no-fault scheme—contained in Article 51 of its Consolidated Laws (“Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Reparations”)—requires owners of vehicles to carry insurance with $50,000 minimum limits which covers basic economic loss, i.e., first-party benefits, on account of personal injury arising from the use or operation of a motor vehicle. Basic economic loss includes, among other things: (1) medical expenses; (2) lost earnings up to $2,000 per month for three years; and (3) out-of-pocket expenses up to $25 per day for one year. N.Y. INS. LAW § 5102(a). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Robert M. Caplan, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Caplan may be contacted at caplanr@whiteandwilliams.com

Not a Waiver for All: Maryland Declines to Apply Subrogation Waiver to Subcontractors

September 23, 2024 — Gus Sara - The Subrogation Strategist
In Lithko Contr., LLC v. XL Ins. Am. Inc., No. 31, Sept. Term, 2023, 2024 Md. LEXIS 256, the Supreme Court of Maryland considered whether a tenant who contracted for the construction of a large warehouse facility waived its insurer’s rights to subrogation against subcontractors when it agreed to waive subrogation against the general contractor. The court ultimately decided that the unambiguous language of the subrogation waiver in the development agreement between the parties did not extend to subcontractors. The court also held that the tenant’s requirement that subcontracts include a subrogation waiver did not, in this case, impose a project-wide waiver on all parties. The court, however, found that the requirement that the subcontracts include a similar, but not identical, waiver provision rendered the subcontract’s waiver clauses ambiguous and remanded the case to the lower court to determine if the parties to the development agreement – i.e., Duke Baltimore LLC (“Duke”) and Amazon.com.dedc, LLC (“Amazon”) – intended that the waiver clause in the subcontracts covered claims against subcontractors. This case involved roof and structural damage to a warehouse in Baltimore, Maryland that Duke owned. In March 2014, Amazon entered into a development agreement with Duke for the construction of the warehouse. Amazon also agreed to subsequently lease the warehouse from Duke. Although Amazon essentially owned and/or developed the project, the development agreement identified Duke as “Landlord” and Amazon as “Tenant.” Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Gus Sara, White and Williams
Mr. Sara may be contacted at sarag@whiteandwilliams.com

Sierra Pacific v. Bradbury Goes Unchallenged: Colorado’s Six-Year Statute of Repose Begins When a Subcontractor’s Scope of Work Ends

November 03, 2016 — Luke Mecklenburg – Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
It’s official: the October 20, 2016 deadline to petition for certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals on its decision in Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc. v. Bradbury has passed, so it appears that decision will stand. In Sierra Pacific, the Court of Appeals held as a matter of first impression that the statute of repose for a general contractor to sue a subcontractor begins to run when a subcontractor’s scope of work is substantially complete, regardless of the status of the overall project. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc. v. Bradbury, 2016 COA 132, ¶ 28, ___ P.3d ___. The Court of Appeals interpreted the statute of repose in C.R.S. section 13-80-104, which requires that “all actions against any architect, contractor, builder or builder vendor, engineer, or inspector performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of any improvement to real property” must be brought within six years of substantial completion of that improvement. C.R.S. § 13-80-104(1)(a). Recognizing that “an improvement may be [to] a discrete component of an entire project” under Shaw Construction, LLC v. United Builder Services, Inc., 296 P.3d 145 (Colo. App. 2012), the Court of Appeals determined that “a subcontractor has substantially completed its role in the improvement at issue when it finishes working on the improvement.” Sierra Pac., 2016 COA at ¶¶ 20, 28. In doing so, it rejected Sierra Pacific’s argument that the statute could be tolled under the repair doctrine “while others worked to repair [the subcontractor’s] ‘improper installation work and flawed repair work.’” Id. at ¶ 29. Because six years had undisputedly passed since the subcontractor completed its scope of work when Sierra Pacific filed suit against it, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting the subcontractor’s motion for summary judgment under Section 13-80-104(1)(a). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
Mr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at lmecklenburg@swlaw.com

JD Supra’s 2017 Reader’s Choice Awards

March 22, 2017 — Garret Murai – California Construction Law Blog
JD Supra, one of the world’s leading content distribution companies for the legal industry, announced its Readers’ Choice Awards for 2017 earlier this week. We were honored to be among a group of 200 authors selected from over 40,000 who published legal news, commentary and analysis on legal issues of importance to the clients we serve. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

Ownership is Not a Conclusive Factor for Ongoing Operations Additional Insured Coverage

November 15, 2017 — Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In McMillin Management Services v. Financial Pacific Ins. Co. (No. D069814, filed 11/14/17), a California appeals court held that an insurer had a duty to defend a general contractor under an “ongoing operations” additional insured (AI) endorsement for damage occurring after the named insured subcontractor completed its work, because the endorsement did not limit coverage solely to liability during the subcontractors’ ongoing operations, but rather, broadly provided coverage for liability “arising out of” such operations. Reprinted courtesy of Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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Arizona Supreme Court Confirms a Prevailing Homeowner Can Recover Fees on Implied Warranty Claims

August 30, 2017 — Rick Erickson - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
On August 9th, in Sirrah Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Wunderlich, the Arizona Supreme Court settled the question about recovery of attorneys’ fees after prevailing on implied warranty claims against a residential contractor. The simple answer is, yes, a homeowner who prevails on the merits can recover the fees they spent to prove that shoddy construction breached the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability. Why? Because, as Justice Timmer articulated, “[t]he implied warranty is a contract term.” Although implied, the warranty is legally part of the written agreement in which “a residential builder warrants that its work is performed in a workmanlike manner and that the structure is habitable.” In other words, a claim based on the implied warranty not only arises out of the contract, the claim is actually based on a contract term. Since, in A.R.S. § 12-341.01, Arizona law provides for prevailing parties to recover their fees on claims “arising out of contract” and because the implied warranty is now viewed by the courts as a contract term, homeowners can recover their fees after successfully proving breach of the implied warranty. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Rick Erickson, Snell & Wilmer
Mr Erickson may be contacted at rerickson@swlaw.com

The Contractor’s Contingency: What Contractors and Construction Managers Need to Know and Be Wary Of

December 04, 2023 — Skyler L. Santomartino - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Contractors and construction managers who enter into cost reimbursable contracts subject to a guaranteed maximum price (GMP) are responsible for all project costs exceeding the GMP. For this reason, it is imperative that contractors negotiate and incorporate into the GMP a financial buffer that accounts for the unanticipated project costs that are not reimbursable as change orders or costs of the work. This is where the contractor’s contingency comes into play.[1] The contractor’s contingency is a vehicle that allows contractors to mitigate some of the risks inherent in GMP contracts. When drafted properly, a contingency clause allows the contractor and only the contractor to access funds set aside by the owner to address unpredictable or unknown project costs. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Skyler L. Santomartino, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Mr. Santomartino may be contacted at ssantomartino@pecklaw.com

No Additional Insured Coverage for Subcontractor's Work Outside Policy Period

August 19, 2015 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
In a dispute between two insurers, the district court determined that the contractor was not an additional insured under the subcontractor's policy. Navigators Spec. Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79338 (N. D. Cal. June 17, 2015). McDevitt & McDevitt Construction Corporation was the general contractor for construction of a condominium complex. McDevitt was insured by Navigators Specialty Insurance Company. F&M was a subcontractor for the project for providing structural steel components. F&M's subcontract required it to obtain liability insurance and name McDevitt as an additional insured under a policy that was to be primary. F&M secured a policy with North American Capacity Insurance Company (NAC) which included an endorsement for additional insureds. The endorsement provided that an entity could be an additional insured only with respect to "occurrences resulting from work performed by you during the policy period, or occurrences resulting from the conduct of your business during the policy period." McDevitt and F&M were sued for construct defect claims. Navigators defended McDevitt and NAC defended F&M. Navigators tendered McDevitt's defense to NAC because McDevitt was an additional insured under NAC's policy. NAC disclaimed coverage. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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