Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Termination for Convenience Clauses: Maybe More Than Just Convenience
June 06, 2022 —
Robert C. Shaia - ConsensusDocsA contractor begins work on a project and everything is going well, until one day the owner informs the contractor that it is being terminated for convenience. Possibly, there is no discussion about alleged defects, reasons for the termination, or any damages the owner might seek against the contractor. In that moment, the contractor may be unaware of any perceived wrongdoing or problems with its work.
The industry has typically accepted that, in this scenario, the owner implicitly waives the right to any remedies against the contractor, except those expressly set forth in the contract. Reasonable minds might assume that, if the owner believed it needed to seek further remedies, it would terminate the contractor for cause instead of convenience. And often overlooked during contract negotiations are the benefits of including an express “waiver of remedies” in the termination for convenience section.
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Robert C. Shaia, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar, & Fitzgerald, LLP (ConsensusDocs)Mr. Shaia may be contacted at
rshaia@watttieder.com
So You Want to Arbitrate? Better Make Sure Your Contract Covers All Bases
August 16, 2021 —
Stephanie Nolan Deviney - ConsensusDocsAs a General Contractor, you may prefer to arbitrate any contractual disputes rather than engage in protracted litigation. Many Courts favor arbitration clauses and will enforce them if there is a sufficient reason to do so. However, there are several issues that a General Contractor should consider when including an arbitration clause in its construction agreement with its client. When an arbitration clause is not properly crafted, questions can arise as to who must arbitrate? Who decides whether to arbitrate? Who selects the arbitrator? What will the subject matter of the arbitration be? A look at a recent case in Pennsylvania highlights the need for properly crafted arbitration clauses.
A Recent Case Highlights The Importance Of Arbitration Clauses
In TEC Construction, LLC v. Greg Rich and Lora Rich filed in the Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, TEC Construction, LLC (“TEC”) and Greg and Lora Rich (the “Riches”), entered into a Construction Agreement with an arbitration clause. Specifically, the parties to the Construction Agreement, TEC and the Riches, agreed to arbitrate any disputes with the American Arbitration Association. Five subcontractors completed the work under the Construction Agreement but none of the subcontractors agreed to arbitrate.
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Stephanie Nolan Deviney, Fox Rothschild LLP (ConsensusDocs)Ms. Deviney may be contacted at
sdeviney@foxrothschild.com
Recent Developments Involving Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington
September 05, 2022 —
Donald Verfurth, Sally Kim, Stephanie Ries & Kyle Silk-Eglit - Gordon & Rees Insurance Coverage Law BlogEver since the Washington Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington, 176 Wn.2d 686, 295 P.3d 239 (2013), insurance coverage attorneys have been struggling to define the exact parameters of the Cedell ruling in order to safeguard the attorney-client privilege as to the communications between the insurer and its counsel. As a brief background, the Washington Supreme Court held in Cedell that there is a presumption of no attorney-client privilege in a lawsuit involving bad faith claims handling. However, an insurer can overcome the presumption of no attorney-client privilege by showing that its counsel provided legal advice regarding the insurer’s potential liability under the policy and law, and did not engage in any quasi-fiduciary activities, i.e. claims handling activities, such as investigating, evaluating, adjusting or processing the insured’s claim.
Since Cedell, various trial courts have held that the following activities by an insurer’s counsel constitute quasi-fiduciary conduct that do not overcome the presumption of no attorney-client privilege, resulting in an order to produce documents and/or to permit the deposition of the insurer’s counsel:
- Insurer’s attorney being the primary or sole point of contact with the insured for the insurer;
- Insurer’s attorney requesting documents from the insured that are relevant to the investigation of the claim;
- Insurer’s attorney communicating directly with the insured or the insured’s counsel regarding claims handling issues or payments;
- Insurer’s attorney interviewing witnesses for purposes of the investigation of the claim;
- Insurer’s attorney conducting an examination under oath of the insured;
- Insurer’s attorney drafting proposed or final reservation of rights letter or denial letter to the insured; and
- Insurer’s attorney conducting settlement negotiations in an underlying litigation.
Reprinted courtesy of
Donald Verfurth, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani,
Sally Kim, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani,
Stephanie Ries, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani and
Kyle Silk-Eglit, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani
Mr. Verfurth may be contacted at dverfurth@grsm.com
Ms. Kim may be contacted at sallykim@grsm.com
Ms. Ries may be contacted at sries@grsm.com
Mr. Silk-Eglit may be contacted at ksilkeglit@grsm.com
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Engineer Pauses Fix of 'Sinking' Millennium Tower in San Francisco
September 13, 2021 —
Richard Korman - Engineering News-RecordEngineers paused work for at least two weeks on the $100-million foundation upgrade for San Francisco's 645-ft-tall Millennium Tower high-rise residential condominium after measurements showed increased settlement during the installation of pile casings for the new piles.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard Korman, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Korman may be contacted at kormanr@enr.com
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U.K. Broadens Crackdown on Archaic Property Leasehold System
October 23, 2018 —
Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam - BloombergThe U.K. government is cracking down on what it called “unfair” leasehold practices as part of sweeping reforms to its housing system, in a move that would modernize the property market to bring it more in line with nations such as the U.S.
Initially prompted by a malpractice scandal, the proposed scope of the focus by the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government has become far broader. A consultation will seek views not only on the practice of charging buyers an annual fee for owning leasehold properties -- known as ground rents -- it will review the whole process of buying, selling and property management of leasehold homes.
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Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam, Bloomberg
French Government Fines National Architects' Group $1.6M Over Fee-Fixing
December 09, 2019 —
Debra K. Rubin - Engineering News-RecordThe French government’s anti-trust agency has fined the national architects’ registration group and four regional councils $1.64 million (€1.5 million) for price-fixing design fees on public works.
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Debra K. Rubin, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Rubin may be contacted at rubind@enr.com
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Luxury Homes Push City’s Building Permits Past $7.5 Million
December 30, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe city of Ardmore, Oklahoma is seeing a building boom with the total value of building permits issued by the city in November slightly exceeded $7.5 million, reports Ardmoreite.com. Most of that total comes from residential construction, with the bulk of it coming from just three homes. While Lance Windel Construction plans on building 46 homes, the top value of those homes will be $153,000. The total value for the homes being built by three other firms is more $6.4 million, and those contractors are building just one home each.
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