Trial Victory in San Mateo County!
February 24, 2020 —
Wilke FleuryWilke Fleury attorneys
Adriana Cervantes and
Matt Powell recently prevailed at trial in a case involving a real property dispute in San Mateo County.
Wilke Fleury represented the owner of an apartment building in an action against an individual who recently acquired the duplex on the adjoining property. As set forth in the pleadings, the Apartment’s owner, tenants, and invitees, used the property in many ways including access, parking, and recreational purposes for over five years, and the new owner had actual notice of that use before the purchase. Nonetheless, the new owner insisted the Apartment had no right to use the property, and filed an action to quiet title.
Wilke Fleury filed a cross-complaint on behalf of the Apartment alleging that it had a prescriptive easement over the property.
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Wilke Fleury
Construction Contract Terms Matter. Be Careful When You Draft Them.
February 01, 2022 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsIn a prior post, I discussed the case of Fluor Fed. Sols., LLC v. Bae Sys. Ordinance Sys in the context of the interplay between fraud, contract, and statutes of limitation. Some cases just keep on giving. This time the case illustrates the need for careful drafting of those
pesky, and highly important, clauses in your construction documents.
In the
current iteration of this ongoing saga, the Court considered the contractual aspects of the matter. As a reminder, the facts are as follows: In May 2011, the United States Army (“Army) awarded BAE Systems Ordnance Systems, Inc. (“BAE”) a contract to design and construct a natural gas-fired combined heating and power plant for the Radford Army Ammunition Plant (“RAAP”). On October 7, 2015, BAE issued a request for a proposal from Fluor Federal Solutions, LLC (“Fluor”) to design and build a temporary boiler facility at a specific location on the RAAP property. On October 13, 2015, the Army modified the prime contract to change the location of the boiler facility. On December 10, 2015, the Army modified the prime contract to require BAE to design and construct a permanent boiler facility. On December 30, 2015, Fluor and BAE executed a fixed-price subcontract for Fluor to design and construct the temporary boiler. Throughout 2016, BAE issued several modifications to Fluor’s subcontract to reflect the modifications BAE received from the Army on the prime contract. On March 23, 2016, BAE directed Fluor to build a permanent – rather than temporary – boiler facility. On March 28, 2016, Fluor began construction of the permanent facility and began negotiations with BAE about the cost of the permanent facility. On September 1, 2016, the parties reached an agreement on the cost for the design of the permanent facility, but not on the cost to construct the permanent facility. On November 29, 2016, the parties executed a modification to the subcontract, officially replacing the requirement to construct a temporary facility with a requirement to construct a permanent facility and agreeing to “negotiate and definitize the price to construct by December 15, 2016.” The parties were unable to reach an agreement on the construction price.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Atlanta Hawks Billionaire Owner Plans $5 Billion Downtown Transformation
May 01, 2023 —
Brett Pulley & Eliza Ronalds-Hannon - BloombergTony Ressler, the billionaire co-founder of Ares Management and Atlanta Hawks owner, said he’s undeterred by the recent property downturn and is moving forward with his partners to transform downtown Atlanta by turning a vacant railyard into a $5 billion mix of hotels, restaurants and offices.
Fears about the stability of commercial real estate aren’t affecting development of Centennial Yards, a 50-acre, gritty subterranean swath of land now under development by CIM Group, in which Ressler is an investor, he said in an interview.
“We’re not worried about any of that,” Ressler said. “Higher or lower interest rates may change your rate of return but will not determine the success or failure of a project. For us, the project is funded and we’re full steam ahead.”
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Brett Pulley, Bloomberg and
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Miller Act Statute of Limitations and Equitable Tolling
July 11, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesWhen it comes to a Miller Act payment bond claim, there is a one-year statute of limitations—“The Miller Act contains a statute of limitations provision that requires actions to ‘be brought no later than one year after the day on which the last of the labor was performed or material was supplied by the person bringing the claim.’” U.S. f/u/b/o Techniquex Specialty Flooring, Inc., v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co., 2022 WL 169070, *3 (M.D.Penn. 2022) (citing the Miller Act).
There is an argument, albeit a difficult one, to support an equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. This would be an argument filed when the one-year statute of limitations expires, but there is reason for missing the statute of limitations caused typically by the overt misleading of the defendant (surety/bond-principal):
“Equitable tolling functions to stop the statute of limitations from running where the claim’s accrual date has passed.” “Equitable tolling is appropriate in three situations: (1) when the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the facts which comprise the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) when the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his rights; and (3) when the plaintiff has timely asserted his rights in the wrong forum.” The first ground for equitable tolling“appears to be the same, in all important respects” to equitable estoppel, which “excuses late filing where such tardiness results from active deception on the part of the defendant” and “what courts describe as ‘equitable tolling’ is encompassed by the latter two parts of our Circuit’s doctrine.” The extraordinary circumstances standard may be met “where the defendant misleads the plaintiff, allowing the statutory period to lapse; or when the plaintiff has no reasonable way of discovering the wrong perpetrated against her …”
Tehniquex, supra, at *5 (internal citations omitted).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Insurer's Judgment on the Pleadings Based Upon Expected Injury Exclusion Reversed
October 30, 2018 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe appellate court reversed the trial court's granting of a judgment on the pleadings based upon the expected injury exclusion in a homeowner's policy. Allstate Indemn. Co. v. Contreras, 2018 Ill. App. LEXIS 170964 (Ill. Ct. App. July 20, 2018).
Alejandra Contreras owned Jasmine's Day Care. Her husband, Adan Contreras, was not an employee of the Day Care. Alejandra and Adan had a homeowner's policy which provided day care liability coverage through an endorsement.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
A Relatively Small Exception to Fraud and Contract Don’t Mix
April 01, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsRemember all of my posts about how fraud and contract claims don’t usually play well in litigation? Well, as always with the law, there are exceptions. For instance, a well plead Virginia Consumer Protection Act claim will survive a dismissal challenge.
A recent opinion out of the Alexandria division of the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sets out another exception, namely so called fraudulent inducement. In XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Truland et al, the Court considered the question of whether both a tort and contract claim can coexist in the same lawsuit when the tort claim is based upon the information provided to the plaintiff when that information proves false.
As the courts of Virginia have held for years, only certain information and statements made pre-contract can be the basis for a fraud claim in the face of a contractual duty to perform. One type of statement that is not properly the subject of a fraud in the inducement type claim is sales talk or opinion. Such sales talk (for example claiming that your company is the best for the job) is not the subject of a fraud claim because it is not meant to be relied upon and that such talk is an opinion about future performance, not a false statement of present fact or intent.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
Read the court’s decision…
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Mortgagors Seek Coverage Under Mortgagee's Policy
July 19, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe mortgagor homeowners survived a motion to dismiss their claim for coverageunder the lender's property policy after their home suffered hurricane damage. Gary v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100010 (W.D. La. May 26, 2021).
Plaintiffs' home was mortgaged by Pennymac Loan Services, LLC. Pennymac held a property policy with American Security to insure its interest in the home. Plaintiffs were not named as insureds or additional insureds under the policy. Plaintiffs were identified as the borrowers under the policy on the Declarations page.
After hurricane damage to their home, plaintiffs sued American Security for coverage for the losses. American Security moved to dismiss, arguing plaintiffs were neither additional insureds nor third party beneficiaries. Lender-placed policies were designed to insure the lender's collateral whenever the borrower failed to maintain adequate insurance. The Loss Payment provisions in the policy stated that "Loss will be made payable to the named insured [Pennymac]. No coverage will be available to any mortgagee other than that shown as the named insured on the Declarations."
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
