No Coverage For Damage Caused by Chinese Drywall
December 02, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Florida Court of Appeals determined that there was no coverage for damage to the insured's home caused by the installation of Chinese drywall. Peek v. Am. Integrity Ins. Co., 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 14147 (Fla. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2015).
Chinese drywall was installed in the Peek's new home. After moving in, the Peeks reported to American Integrity a sulfur odor caused by the Chinese drywall. The odor caused the Peeks to vacate their home. The Peeks also claimed corrosion and deterioration of copper coils in the air conditioning system were caused by the Chinese drywall.
American Integrity denied coverage based upon policy exclusions for latent defects, corrosion, pollutants, and faulty, inadequate or defective constrution materials. The Peeks sued American Integrity.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Contractor Entitled to Continued Defense Against Allegations of Faulty Construction
November 01, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe U.S. District Court found that the contractor was entitled to a defense in the underlying state court action. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Zonko Builders, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168855 (D. Del. Sept. 7, 2021).
Zonko was the general contractor for building the Salt Meadows Townhomes Condominium. This included supervising subcontractors in the installation of siding, house wrap, and flashing in five buildings between 2005 and 2007. In 2016, Salt Meadows and its individual members ("Association") found property damage in the condominiums.
The Association sued Zonko in state court, alleged that resulting damages included drywall damage in ceilings or walls, flooring and carpet, water damage around window trim, rot on window frames, incorrect flashing around roofs and windows, possible ridge vent leaks, and possible foundation issues.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Hold on Just One Second: Texas Clarifies Starting Point for Negligence Statute of Limitations
July 11, 2022 —
Lian Skaf - The Subrogation StrategistIn construction or similar ongoing projects, problems often pop up. Sometimes they can pop up again and again. Making things even more complicated, one problem may affect another, seemingly new problem. When these construction problems result in property damage, timelines tend to overlap and determining when a statute of limitation begins to run for a particular claim can be difficult. Especially in states with short statute of limitations for tort claims like Texas, knowing when a statute begins to run is crucial for a subrogation professional.
In Hussion St. Bldgs., LLC v. TRW Eng’rs, Inc., No. 14-20-00641-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 2193, 2022 WL 1010313, the Court of Appeals of Texas provided clarity on when the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims begins to run. Reversing the judgment from the lower court, the appellate court denied summary judgment to the defendant, holding that, despite there being existing issues with the ongoing construction project, the negligence cause of action for Hussion Street Buildings, LLC (Hussion) did not begin to run more than two years prior to filing suit.
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Lian Skaf, White and Williams LLPMr. Skaf may be contacted at
skafl@whiteandwilliams.com
Margins May Shrink for Home Builders
November 06, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFHome builders are worried that the rising prices of new homes might not rise enough and be caught by the rising costs of building them, cutting into the profit margin. “If builders say the trajectory of margins is beginning to peak, then in a cyclical business, people tend to go from thinking the best to thinking the worst,” Stephen Kim, a Barclays analyst told the Wall Street Journal. As of the end of October, the U.S. Home Construction Index was 21% below its highest point in 2013, set back in May.
Margins are still over those of last year. Meritage Homes saw a gross margin of 22.8% in 2013’s third quarter, when the same quarter in 2012 had a gross margin of 18.6%. Steven Hilton, the firm’s Chairman and CEO, predicted little or no growth and a decline toward 20% or 21%. On the other hand, with margins at 20.6%, Ryland Homes sees itself at a normal point. Larry Nicholson, the President and CEO of Ryland, said “there’s not a lot of room for it to grow.”
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Termination for Convenience Clauses: Maybe More Than Just Convenience
June 06, 2022 —
Robert C. Shaia - ConsensusDocsA contractor begins work on a project and everything is going well, until one day the owner informs the contractor that it is being terminated for convenience. Possibly, there is no discussion about alleged defects, reasons for the termination, or any damages the owner might seek against the contractor. In that moment, the contractor may be unaware of any perceived wrongdoing or problems with its work.
The industry has typically accepted that, in this scenario, the owner implicitly waives the right to any remedies against the contractor, except those expressly set forth in the contract. Reasonable minds might assume that, if the owner believed it needed to seek further remedies, it would terminate the contractor for cause instead of convenience. And often overlooked during contract negotiations are the benefits of including an express “waiver of remedies” in the termination for convenience section.
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Robert C. Shaia, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar, & Fitzgerald, LLP (ConsensusDocs)Mr. Shaia may be contacted at
rshaia@watttieder.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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A DC Office Building Offers a Lesson in Glass and Sculpture
May 08, 2023 —
Kriston Capps - BloombergFrom the outside, the facade of 2050 M Street, an office building in Washington, DC, looks like it’s made with liquid soap. Standing inside and looking out, its structure is almost invisible. The building, which was finished in 2020, boasts an ethereal curtain wall, created from hundreds of fluted planes of glass treated with a special industrial coating. The result is a multifaceted surface that pushes the limits of transparency, enhanced with a silver opal shine.
According to Joshua Ramus, founding principal of the architecture firm REX, the 12-story structure’s design reflects Washington’s building history, while its construction required a rather novel procurement process. The building, he says, is very much a DC story.
Each of its 978 glass panels is concave, shaped using an innovative machine called a bending tempering furnace. Curving glass makes it stronger as a material, and this building’s panes are strong enough to stand up with minimal infrastructure. The building doesn’t employ mullions, window components that hold glass in place. Even a few years ago, achieving such an effect by shaping pieces of glass would have been prohibitively expensive.
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Kriston Capps, Bloomberg
Performing Work with a Suspended CSLB License Costs Big: Subcontractor Faces $18,000,000 Disgorgement
September 17, 2015 —
Steven M. Cvitanovic & David A. Harris – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn what could lead to a draconian result, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District held that a contractor who performs work without a valid license can be required to disgorge all payments received, even if the contractor perfectly performed its work. The case, Judicial Council of California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc. (Ct. of Appeal, 1st App. Dis., Div. One, A140890, A141393), involved an $18,000,000 contract between Jacobs Facilities, Inc. (“Jacobs Facilities”) and the Judicial Council of California (“Judicial Council”). In April 2006, Jacobs Facilities, a wholly owned subsidiary of Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. (“Jacobs Engineering”) entered into a three year contract with the Judicial Counsel to maintain 121 courthouses and other judicial branch buildings throughout Southern California (the “Contract”). Jacobs Facilities contracted to provide maintenance and oversight services, while retaining subcontractors to perform the actual maintenance and repair work.
In December 2006, as part of a corporate reorganization, Jacobs Engineering started winding up Jacobs Facilities and transferred its employees to Jacobs Engineering and then subsequently to another wholly owned subsidiary called Jacobs Project Management Co. (“Jacobs Management”). The work that was performed by Jacobs Facilities was taken over by Jacobs Management. As part of the windup, Jacobs Facilities’ Contractor’s State License Board license was allowed to lapse and the license expired by operation of law in November 2008. Although Jacobs Management was now performing the work, it was not added as a party to the contract. Although it appears Judicial Council was aware of the corporate changes, it was not until November 2009 that the parties assigned the contract to Jacobs Management.
Reprinted courtesy of
Steven M. Cvitanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
David A. Harris, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com
Mr. Harris may be contacted at dharris@hbblaw.com
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