Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

OSHA Issues New Rules on Injury Record Keeping

August 19, 2015 — Craig Martin – Construction Contractor Advisor
On July 28, 2015, OSHA issued proposed rules seeking to clarify an employer’s ongoing obligation to make and maintain accurate records of work-related injuries and illness. The new rules were drafted in response to the U.S. Court of Appeals decision in AKM LLC, d/b/a Volks Constructors v. Secretary of Labor, in which a contractor successfully argued that OSHA’s citation was issued well beyond the six month limitation period. OSHA’s Injury Record Keeping Obligations The Occupational Safety and Health Act requires each employer to make, keep and preserve records of workplace injuries and illnesses. 29 U.S.C. § 658(c). OSHA has promulgated a set of regulations which require employers to record information about work-related injuries and illnesses in three ways. Employers must prepare an incident report and a separate injury log “within seven (7) calendar days of receiving information that a recordable injury or illness has occurred,” 29 C.F.R. § 1904.29(b)(3), and must also prepare a year-end summary report of all recordable injuries during the calendar year, id. § 1904.32(a)(2). An employer “must save” all of these documents for five years from the end of the calendar year those records cover. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.33(a). Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLP
Mr. Martin may be contacted at cmartin@ldmlaw.com

New Jersey Courts Sign "Death Knell" for 1979 Weedo Decision

October 21, 2015 — Jesse Howard Witt – Acerbic Witt
A new blog post from Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton discusses two recent decisions limiting the holding of Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979), a New Jersey case that has generated decades of commentary and debate, in my own writing as well as that of many others (at least 1880 citations, according to the blog). Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Jesse Howard Witt, Acerbic Witt
Mr. Witt welcomes comments at www.wittlawfirm.net

Apprentices on Public Works Projects: Sometimes it’s Not What You Do But Who You Do the Work For That Counts

September 17, 2015 — Garret Murai – California Construction Law Blog
If you’re a public works contractor in California you’re familiar with prevailing wages. The Prevailing Wage Law, a Depression era law designed to encourage the hiring of local labor, sets a minimum wage that employers must pay to workers on public works projects. But because the Prevailing Wage Law sets a floor on wages it also limits the opportunity for lesser-skilled workers to gain experience. To address this, the Prevailing Wage Law permits contractors to pay apprentices a lower “apprentice wage” if the apprentice is enrolled in a state-approved apprenticeship program and requires contractors who hire workers in an “apprenticeable craft or trade” to hire a certain number of apprentices. But are particular apprentices required to be hired depending on the type of work being performed? In Henson v. C. Overaa & Company, Case No A139966 (June 29, 2015), the California Court of Appeals for the First District held that apprentices are required to be hired based on the craft or trade of the journeymen performing work not based on the type of work being performed. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

Pennsylvania Superior Court Tightens Requirements for Co-Worker Affidavits in Asbestos Cases

November 26, 2014 — Jerrold P. Anders & Tonya M. Harris – White and Williams LLP
In Krauss v. Trane US Inc., 2014 Pa. Super. 241, --- A.3d --- (October 22, 2014), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that a witness affidavit does not create a genuine issue of fact to defeat summary judgment when it reflects only a presumption and belief that certain products contained asbestos. Moreover, when an affidavit fails to demonstrate plaintiff’s frequent, regular, and proximate exposure to a specific defendant’s asbestos-containing product, summary judgment will be granted. The Executor of the Estate of Henry M. Krauss filed two lawsuits against forty-nine defendants in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff alleged that Mr. Krauss, a bricklayer from 1978 to 1983, was occupationally exposed to asbestos and developed mesothelioma. Various defendants moved for summary judgment based on insufficient product identification. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants because the co-worker affidavits failed to show that: (1) Mr. Krauss worked in proximity to the defendants’ products; (2) the products contained asbestos during the relevant period; or (3) Mr. Krauss inhaled asbestos fibers from the products. Reprinted courtesy of Jerrold P. Anders, White and Williams LLP and Tonya M. Harris, White and Williams LLP Mr. Anders may be contacted at andersj@whiteandwilliams.com; Ms. Harris may be contacted at harrist@whiteandwilliams.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

California Supreme Court Finds that the Notice-Prejudice Rule Applicable to Insurance is a Fundamental Public Policy of the State

October 14, 2019 — Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In Pitzer College v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. (No. S239510, filed 8/29/19), the California Supreme Court held that California’s notice-prejudice rule is a fundamental public policy in the insurance context, supporting the application of California law under a choice of laws analysis. In addition, the Court held that the rule generally applies to consent (aka “no voluntary payments”) provisions in first party insurance policies but not to consent provisions in third party liability policies. Pitzer College discovered soils contamination while building a new dormitory. Under pressure to complete construction before the start of the school year, Pitzer proceeded to remediate the soils, incurring $2 million in expense. Pitzer submitted a claim to Indian Harbor, which provided Pitzer insurance covering legal and remediation expenses resulting from pollution conditions discovered during the policy period. The policy contained a notice provision requiring Pitzer to provide oral or written notice of any pollution condition to Indian Harbor and, in the event of oral notice, to “furnish … a written report as soon as practicable.” In addition, a consent provision required Pitzer to obtain Indian Harbor’s written consent before incurring expenses, making payments, assuming obligations, and/or commencing remediation due to a pollution condition. The consent provision had an emergency exception for costs incurred “on an emergency basis where any delay … would cause injury to persons or damage to property or increase significantly the cost of responding to any [pollution condition],” in which case Pitzer was required to notify Indian Harbor “immediately thereafter.” Lastly, a choice of law provision stated that New York law governed all matters arising under the policy. Reprinted courtesy of Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Louisiana Court Holds That Application of Pollution Exclusion Would Lead to Absurd Results

October 21, 2019 — Sergio F. Oehninger & Daniel Hentschel - Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
A Louisiana court recently denied an excess insurer’s bid for summary judgment, finding that the insurer’s interpretation of a pollution exclusion would lead to “absurd results.” Central Crude, Inc., a crude oil transporter company, experienced an oil pipeline leak, allegedly causing damage to property belonging to Columbia Gas Transmission Company. Columbia Gas sued Central Crude seeking compensatory damages and injunctive relief to compel remediation of the site. Central Crude sought coverage under a CGL primary insurance policy issued by Liberty Mutual. The insurer initially agreed to cover Central Crude’s “reasonable and necessary costs” relating to the incident, but later refused to defend or indemnify Central Crude for any costs incurred from the incident. As a result, Central Crude brought suit against Liberty Mutual and its excess insurer, Great American, to enforce coverage. Great American moved for summary judgment arguing coverage was excluded by the excess policy’s pollution exclusion, which precludes coverage for injury “arising out of a discharge of pollutants.” Central Crude responded arguing that the exclusion’s applicability was invalidated or at least rendered ambiguous by the Following Form Endorsements, which reflect an intent to mirror the coverage afforded under the primary Liberty Mutual policy, and because coverage appears to be specifically authorized through the Premises Operations Liability Endorsement. Reprinted courtesy of Sergio F. Oehninger, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Daniel Hentschel, Hunton Andrews Kurth Mr. Oehninger may be contacted at soehninger@HuntonAK.com Mr. Hentschel may be contacted at dhentschel@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Nevada Supreme Court Clarifies the Litigation Waiver of the One-Action Rule

September 07, 2017 — Bob L. Olson - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
Nevada has a one-action rule which, with limited exceptions, requires a creditor seeking to recover a debt secured by real property to proceed against the security first prior to seeking recovery from the debtor personally. In the event that a law suit is filed in violation of the one-action rule, final judgment may be entered in favor of the creditor but that judgment “releases and discharges the mortgage or other lien.” NRS 40.455(3). Nevada law further provides that, with the exception of certain guaranties, any provision in an agreement relating to the sale of real property which contains a waiver of Nevada’s anti-deficiency laws may not be enforced by a court because doing so violates Nevada’s public policy. NRS 40.453. Nevada law also addresses when the one-action rule may be waived in litigation. In the author’s view, the governing statute, NRS 40.435 is ambiguous. Section 2 of that statute states that if the one-action rule is timely interposed as an affirmative defense, the action must either be dismissed without prejudice or continued to allow the creditor to file amended pleadings to convert the action into one which does not violate the one-action rule. This suggests that the one-action rule must be asserted as an affirmative defense in the debtor’s answer to the complaint or it is waived by the debtor. The first sentence of section 3 of the statute, however, seems to suggest that the debtor has up until the entry of a final judgment to waive the one-action rule by stating: “[t]he failure to interpose, before the entry of a final judgment, the provisions of NRS 40.430 [the one-action rule] as an affirmative defense in such a proceeding waives the defense in that proceeding.” Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Bob L. Olson, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Olson may be contacted at bolson@swlaw.com

How I Prevailed on a Remote Jury Trial

March 04, 2024 — Samuel Yu - Kahana Feld
Are you crazy? That is what I asked my client when he asked me to conduct a jury trial remotely. At the time, I did not even know if it was feasible. While I figured that most courtrooms had remote capabilities, I was not sure whether anyone was crazy enough to do a jury trial remotely and whether a courtroom would accommodate it. Would I be able to truly connect with the jurors? Would the jurors hold it against me that I am appearing remotely while they have to be there in person? I told my client that this was a terrible idea but that I would at least see if it was an option. At the Final Status Conference, the Court confirmed that it could accommodate a remote appearance for both the party and the party’s counsel and gave its permission to do so. It was also clear that I would be the only attorney exercising this option, and the judge remarked that this would be a first for him. Appearing remotely while other attorneys appear in person is not something I would normally consider. However, this case presented a unique set of circumstances. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Samuel Yu, Kahana Feld
Ms. Yu may be contacted at syu@kahanafeld.com

SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES