U.S. Supreme Court Limits the Powers of the Nation’s Bankruptcy Courts
June 11, 2014 —
Earl Forte – White and Williams LLPOn June 9, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its much-awaited decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, Chapter 7 Trustee of Estate of Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc., Case No. 12-1200, in which the court confirmed that the power of the nation’s bankruptcy courts to hear and decide cases involving state-created private rights in which the bankruptcy proof of claim process has not been directly invoked, is severely limited by Article III of the Constitution of the United States.
The decision in Executive Benefits, while providing some clarity to practitioners and the public following the Court’s June 2011 decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), nevertheless will make a substantial portion of bankruptcy litigation matters more cumbersome and potentially more expensive to guide through the bankruptcy system. Clients and practitioners are best advised to hire knowledgeable counsel to help navigate the more complex procedural waters created by this decision.
Although the Court in Executive Benefits did resolve a pending procedural question that had dogged practitioners since Stern was decided in 2011, the Court’s decision in Executive Benefits now makes it abundantly clear that many disputes that were previously heard and decided in the nation’s bankruptcy courts can no longer be decided there and must be submitted to the district courts for full de novo review and entry of a final judgment or order. It is difficult to see how this decision will not make bankruptcy litigation more cumbersome and expensive by adding an additional layer of judicial involvement to many matters, notably to fraudulent transfer and other avoidance “claw back” actions that historically have been decided in the bankruptcy courts and used famously in Madoff and other cases as an efficient device for creating value for creditors.
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Earl Forte, White and Williams LLPMr. Forte may be contacted at
fortee@whiteandwilliams.com
UK Construction Defect Suit Lost over One Word
October 16, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFIn the UK, be careful what you tell your insurer; the Court of Appeal has upheld the legality of basis clauses. As Paul Lewis and Janetta Gibbs of Herbert Smith Freehills LLP explain, “a basis clause is a provision set out in the proposal form or in the insurance contract itself, to the effect that all or any of the answers to the questions in the proposal shall form the basis of the contract of insurance.” The catch, as they point out, is that “should any of those answers — whether material to the risk or not — prove to be untrue, the insurer may repudiate the policy and treat itself as never having been on risk.” There is a move in the UK to abolish the use of basis clauses in business insurance, but currently they are still legal.
This came up in a construction defect case covering latent defects in a public housing project. The contract between the owner, Genesis Housing Association Limited, and the contractor, Time and Tide (Bedford) Ltd, required TT Bedford to indemnify Genesis if it became insolvent. In the contract with the insurer, representatives of Bedford and Genesis referred to the contractor as “TT Construction.”
While the courts concluded that Bedford and Genesis were not guilty of misrepresentation or intent to defraud, they did note that neither party thought the firm’s name was “TT Construction.” Therefore, over the failure to name the builder correctly, the court found that the insurance contract was invalid.
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A Retrospective As-Built Schedule Analysis Can Be Used to Support Delay
May 23, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesDelay claims are part of construction. There should be no surprise why. Time is money. A delay claim should be accompanied by expert opinions that bolster evidence that gets introduced. The party against whom the delay claim is made will also have an expert – a rebuttal expert. Not surprisingly, each of the experts will rely on a different critical path as to relates to the same project. The party claiming delay will rely on a critical path that shows the actions of the other party impacted their critical path and proximately caused the delay. This will be refuted by the opposing expert that will challenge the critical path and the actions claimed had no impact on the critical path (i.e., did not proximately cause the delay). Quintessential finger pointing!
This was the situation in CTA I, LLC v. Department of Veteran Affairs, CBCA 5826, 2022 WL 884710 (CBCA 2022), where the government terminated the contractor for convenience and the contractor claimed equitable adjustments for, among other things, delay. The contractor’s expert relied on an as-built critical path analysis by “retrospectively creating updates to insert between the contemporaneous updates.” Id., supra, n.3. The government’s expert did not do a retrospective as-built analysis and relied on only contemporaneous schedule updates. Id.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Making Construction Innovation Stick
February 22, 2018 —
Tom Sawyer, Jeff Rubenstone, and Scott Lewis – ENRIntegrating innovations into construction workflows—rather than serially testing, piloting and discarding them—is a definition of success. Yet few innovations—even ones that shine in trials—are absorbed into practice. Many just quietly go away, sending the work of vetting and testing them down the drain. That leaves some firms wondering if most construction technology innovation efforts are a waste of time.
Reprinted courtesy of Engineering News-Record authors
Tom Sawyer,
Jeff Rubenstone and
Scott Lewis
Mr. Sawyer may be contacted at sawyert@enr.com
Mr. Rubenstone may be contacted at rubenstonej@enr.com
Mr. Lewis may be contacted at lewisw@enr.com
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Case Remanded for Application of Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine
November 06, 2013 —
Tred Eyerly — Insurance Law HawaiiThe Florida Court of Appeals remanded the case after the insured was awarded an $8 million dollar judgment against its property insurer for hurricane and other damage to a home. Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Sebo, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 14799 (Fla. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2013).
Sebo purchased his home in April 2005, when it was four years old. It was insured under a manuscript policy issued by AHAC for $8 million. The all-risk policy covered rain, but excluded damage caused by faulty, inadequate or defective planning.
After Sebo bought the home, water leaks were noticed. Sebo believed that the house suffered from major design and construction defects. In October 2005, Hurricane Wilma struck and further damaged the home.
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
“Other Insurance” and Indemnity Provisions Determine Which Insurer Must Cover
September 01, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiA policy’s “other insurance” clause and a contractual indemnity provision were at the root for determining which of two insurers had to cover for injuries at a construction site. Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 76061 (N.D. Calif. July 14, 2011).
Hathaway was the general contractor at a demolition and construction project. Hathaway was insured by Zurich. Reinhardt Roofing was the roofing subcontractor. Reinhardt was insured by Valley Forge under a policy which named Hathaway as an additional insured. The subcontract also required Reinhardt to indemnify Hathaway for acts or omissions arising from Reinhardt’s work unless Hathaway was solely negligent.
Four of Reinhardt’s workers were injured when a canopy roof on which they were working collapsed. At the time of the accident, Hathaway’s on-site supervisor was inspecting a gap in the canopy roof, but did not order Reinhardt’s workers to stop working.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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California Supreme Court Shifts Gears on “Reverse CEQA”
February 23, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogThe California Supreme Court has shifted gears on so-called “reverse CEQA” under the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).
The Supreme Court, in a much-anticipated decision, in California Building Industry Association v. Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Case No. S213478 (December 17, 2015), held that public agencies subject to CEQA are not required to analyze whether existing environmental conditions may impact a proposed project’s future users or residents – also known as “reverse CEQA” or “CEQA in reverse” – as opposed to the more traditional analysis of a proposed project’s impact on the environment, unless:
1. The proposed project risks exacerbating existing environmental hazards – in which case, it is the proposed project’s impact on the environment not the environment’s impact on the proposed project, which compels the evaluation; or
2. A reverse CEQA analysis is already required under statute, for example, on certain airport, school and housing projects.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Expansion of Statutes of Limitations and Repose in K-12 and Municipal Construction Contracts
March 27, 2019 —
Henry Bangert - Colorado Construction LitigationThe purpose of this whitepaper is to bring attention to a trend in K-12 and municipal construction contracts, which expands the time periods for law suits against construction professionals.
Introduction and Background
Under Colorado statute, the period of time within which a legal action for construction defects may be brought against a construction professional in Colorado is two years from when the claimant (or its predecessor in interest) discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the physical manifestations of a defect (the “Statute of Limitations”), but in no case may an action be brought more than six years after substantial completion of the improvement, unless the claim arises in the fifth or sixth year after substantial completion, in which event the action may be brought within two years of such date, i.e., up to eight years after substantial completion (the “Statute of Repose”). See C.R.S. § 13-80-104. While the triggering events differ for the Statute of Limitations and Statue of Repose, the periods are intended to run concurrently to limit the period of time an action may be brought against construction professionals for construction defects to, at most, eight years after substantial completion. Importantly, these limitations periods may be expanded by agreement.
Prior to 1986, Colorado law provided for a 10-year Statute of Repose. However, in 1986, Colorado’s legislature shortened the Statute of Repose time limit to the current six (or up to eight) year period. In 1986, Colorado also redefined the date the claim arises from the date the defect was discovered or should have been discovered to the date the physical manifestation of a defect was discovered or should have been discovered. Therefore, after 1986, the two-year limitations period could begin to run when a claimant should have discovered the manifestation of a defect, even if the claimant did not recognize that a defect existed.
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David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com