Insured Under Property Insurance Policy Should Comply With Post-Loss Policy Conditions
June 10, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesYour property insurance policy will contain post-loss policy conditions. Examples include submitting a sworn statement in proof of loss, providing documentation to your insurer, and sitting for an examination under oath. Insurers will require you, as the insured, to comply with post-loss policy conditions unless they elect to promptly deny coverage. If you do not comply with such post-loss policy conditions you can forfeit coverage under the policy and/or give the insurer the argument that any lawsuit you filed against the property insurer is premature. Thus, there really is no upside in refusing to comply with the post-loss policy conditions, which should be done in consult with an attorney or, as the case may be, a public adjuster.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Terminator’s Trench Rehab Drives L.A. Land Prices Crazy
June 26, 2014 —
John Gittelsohn and Alan Ohnsman – BloombergBen Stapleton frames the shot with his hands like a movie director, sharing his vision of a junkyard he’s trying to sell for $3.5 million. He sees artist workspaces, retail shops and apartments with Los Angeles skyline views, steps from a riverfront oasis.
Right now the river of his dreams is the concrete flood channel where an 18-wheeler chased Arnold Schwarzenegger on a Harley in “Terminator 2: Judgment Day,” one of the movies that used the 200-foot-wide (60-meter) ditch to depict industrial bleakness. A U.S. Army Corps of Engineers plan to return the Los Angeles River to a more natural state would cost $1 billion and has speculators circling even before the funding’s in place.
“The private money is already moving,” said Stapleton, a vice president at commercial real-estate brokerage Jones Lang LaSalle Inc. (JLL) “They’re looking for opportunities. It’s the private money that’s going to make the vision happen.”
Mr. Gittelsohn may be contacted at johngitt@bloomberg.net; Mr. Ohnsman may be contacted at aohnsman@bloomberg.net
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John Gittelsohn and Alan Ohnsman, Bloomberg
Florida Duty to Defend a Chapter 558 Right to Repair Notice
July 30, 2015 —
Scott Patterson – CD CoverageIn Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Co., 2015 WL 3539755 (S.D. Fla. 2015), Altman was the general contractor for a residential condominium project. The condominium association served Altman with Chapter 558 notices. A Chapter 558 notice is a statutory prerequisite to a property owner’s construction defect lawsuit and provides the contractor with an opportunity to respond and avoid litigation. Altman demanded that its CGL insurer, Crum & Forster, provide a defense to the Chapter 558 notices by hiring counsel to represent Altman’s interests. While not disputing that the claimed defects may be covered under the policy, Crum & Forster denied any duty to defend against the notices on the basis that they did not constitute a “suit.” Altman filed suit.
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Scott Patterson, CD Coverage
U.S. Supreme Court Limits the Powers of the Nation’s Bankruptcy Courts
June 11, 2014 —
Earl Forte – White and Williams LLPOn June 9, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its much-awaited decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, Chapter 7 Trustee of Estate of Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc., Case No. 12-1200, in which the court confirmed that the power of the nation’s bankruptcy courts to hear and decide cases involving state-created private rights in which the bankruptcy proof of claim process has not been directly invoked, is severely limited by Article III of the Constitution of the United States.
The decision in Executive Benefits, while providing some clarity to practitioners and the public following the Court’s June 2011 decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), nevertheless will make a substantial portion of bankruptcy litigation matters more cumbersome and potentially more expensive to guide through the bankruptcy system. Clients and practitioners are best advised to hire knowledgeable counsel to help navigate the more complex procedural waters created by this decision.
Although the Court in Executive Benefits did resolve a pending procedural question that had dogged practitioners since Stern was decided in 2011, the Court’s decision in Executive Benefits now makes it abundantly clear that many disputes that were previously heard and decided in the nation’s bankruptcy courts can no longer be decided there and must be submitted to the district courts for full de novo review and entry of a final judgment or order. It is difficult to see how this decision will not make bankruptcy litigation more cumbersome and expensive by adding an additional layer of judicial involvement to many matters, notably to fraudulent transfer and other avoidance “claw back” actions that historically have been decided in the bankruptcy courts and used famously in Madoff and other cases as an efficient device for creating value for creditors.
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Earl Forte, White and Williams LLPMr. Forte may be contacted at
fortee@whiteandwilliams.com
New York’s Highest Court Reverses Lower Court Ruling That Imposed Erroneous Timeliness Requirement For Disclaimers of Coverage
June 18, 2014 —
Robert F. Walsh and Paul A. Briganti – White and Williams LLPOn June 10, 2014, the New York Court of Appeals (the state’s highest court) issued a unanimous decision in KeySpan Gas East Corp. v. Munich Reinsurance America, Inc. (No. 110, June 10, 2014), reversing a lower court decision which had erroneously imposed on insurers a duty to disclaim coverage for property damage claims as soon as possible or risk waiving their coverage defenses. White and Williams represented one of the insurance company defendants in the action.
The case involved an action against three excess insurers for insurance coverage for underlying environmental claims arising from Manufactured Gas Plant sites. Upon receiving notice of the underlying claims, the three insurers reserved their rights to deny coverage on various grounds, including late notice of an occurrence, pending an investigation. The insurers ultimately denied coverage on the basis of late notice several years later based on information developed in discovery in the litigation. The policyholder/plaintiff KeySpan argued that the insurers had unreasonably delayed in issuing their disclaimers and that there was a triable issue of fact on whether such a delay amounted to a waiver of the late notice defense.
Reprinted courtesy of
Robert F. Walsh, White and Williams LLP and
Paul A. Briganti, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Walsh may be contacted at walshr@whiteandwilliams.com; Mr. Briganti may be contacted at brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com
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North Carolina Supreme Court Addresses “Trigger of Coverage,” Allocation and Exhaustion-Related Issues Arising Out of Benzene-Related Claims
January 04, 2023 —
White and Williams LLPOn December 16, 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 2022 N.C. LEXIS 1122 (Dec. 16, 2022), in which it addressed coverage issues arising out of claims by individuals alleging injury from exposure to benzene contained in the insured’s products. Affirming in part and reversing in part the intermediate appellate court’s decision, the court held: (1) an “exposure trigger” applied; (2) defense and indemnity costs were subject to pro-rata allocation; and (3) vertical exhaustion applied to the duty to defend under certain umbrella policies. Two justices concurred in part and dissented in part.
I. Background
In Radiator Specialty, the insured (RSC) was named in hundreds of underlying suits arising from individual plaintiffs’ alleged exposure to benzene contained in its products. Between 1971 and 2012, RSC was insured under primary, umbrella and excess liability policies issued by various insurers. In 2013, RSC sued the insurers in North Carolina state court, seeking coverage for approximately $45 million in defense and indemnity costs incurred for the underlying claims. In 2016, the trial court decided motions for summary judgment on a number of coverage issues. Following a bench trial in 2018, the trial court entered final judgment, which required the insurers to reimburse $1.8 million of RSC’s past costs. The rulings were appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which issued a decision in 2020. In 2021, the North Carolina Supreme Court granted RSC’s and certain insurers’ petitions for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ decision.
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White and Williams LLP
Arizona Supreme Court Clarifies Area Variance Standard; Property Owners May Obtain an Area Variance When Special Circumstances Existed at Purchase
October 19, 2017 —
Nick Wood, Adam Lang, Noel Griemsmann, & Brianna Long – Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn Pawn 1st v. City of Phoenix, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected a Court of Appeals rule that would have unduly restrained alienation of property in Arizona. The Court of Appeals found that the City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment acted beyond its authority when it granted an area variance to a pawn shop where the special circumstances causing a need for the variance existed before the pawn shop purchased the property. Under Arizona law, boards of adjustment cannot grant an area variance where the special circumstances requiring the variance are self-imposed. The Court of Appeals adopted a rule that knowledge of special circumstances at the time of purchase made the special circumstances self-imposed, foreclosing the purchaser’s ability to obtain a variance. This rule would have severely restricted property purchasers’ ability to obtain area variances in Arizona and by extension likely strained property transactions.
The underlying case involved a pawn shop that was proposed in southeast Phoenix. After the property purchaser obtained approval for a required use permit (for a pawn shop) and a variance (for a 500 foot residential setback) from the City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment, a competing pawn shop filed a special action arguing that the variance was a use variance, not an area variance, beyond the board of adjustment’s authority.
Reprinted courtesy of Snell & Wilmer attorneys
Nick Wood,
Adam Lang,
Noel Griemsmann and
Brianna Long
Mr. Wood may be contacted at nwood@swlaw.com
Mr. Lang may be contacted at alang@swlaw.com
Mr. Noel may be contacted at ngriemsmann@swlaw.com
Ms. Brianna may be contacted at bllong@swlaw.com
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