A Deep Dive Into an Undervalued Urban Marvel
December 26, 2022 —
Linda Poon - BloombergDeep beneath the city, an intricate network of pipes and pumps carries our waste to treatment facilities. Ideally, the entire process is hidden from the eyes — and nose — of the urban dweller who, from the moment the toilet flushes, remains blissfully unaware of what it takes to direct billions of gallons of wastewater out of a city.
The development of sewer infrastructure is one of the perks of modern urban living, rendering the consequences of our daily habits out of sight, out of mind — until it doesn’t.
In the US and beyond, many sanitation systems date back to the early 20th century or earlier, and they’re showing their age: Increasingly heavy downpours as a result of climate change often overwhelm antiquated combined sewers that collect stormwater as well as wastewater, while leaky pipes and trash-laden clogs bring stinky backups that can poison local waterways. But as cities scramble to repair and update their networks, another challenge lurks: Getting people to stop taking for granted a public good that’s essential but invisible.
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Linda Poon, Bloomberg
Flood Policy Does Not Cover Debris Removal from Property
May 07, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Third Circuit affirmed the granting summary judgment to the insurer over a dispute as to debris removal under a Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP). Torre v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4902 (3rd Cir. March 26, 2015).
The Torres' property sustained substantial damage from Hurricane Sandy. Claims for flood damage were submitted to Liberty. Liberty paid a total of $235,751.68, which included the cost of removing debris from the house. An additional $15,520 for the cost of removing sand and other debris deposited on their land in front of and behind the Torres' home was denied on the grounds that the SFIP did not cover such removal.
The Torres filed suit and cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The district court denied the Torres' motion and granted Liberty's motion.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Claims for Bad Faith and Punitive Damages Survive Insurer's Motion for Summary Judgment
August 02, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court denied the insurer's motion for partial summary judgment seeking to dismiss claims for bad faith and for punitive damages. Van Der Weide v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101735 (N.D. Iowa June 30, 2017).
The homeowner sued the insured general contractor after water was found leaking into the home, causing significant water damage. Cincinnati rejected the general contractor's tender and denied any duty to defend, contending that the alleged defects were discovered after Cincinnati's policy period had ended. Cincinnati was advised that two experts for the insured would testify that the property damage occurred due to construction defects and that the damage began shortly after completion of the home. Cincinnati still refused to defend.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Rancosky Adopts Terletsky: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Sets Standard for Statutory Bad Faith Claims
September 28, 2017 —
John Anooshian & Sean Mahoney - White & Williams LLPEarlier today, in a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the Terletsky two-part test for proving a statutory “bad faith” claim under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, which requires that a plaintiff present “clear and convincing evidence (1) that the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and (2) that the insurer knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis.” Rancosky v. Washington National Insurance Company, No. 28 WAP 2016 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2017). The court further ruled that proof of an insurer’s “subjective motive of self-interest or ill-will,” while potentially probative of the second prong of the test, is not a requirement to prevail under § 8371. Evidence of an insurer’s “knowledge or reckless disregard for its lack of a reasonable basis” for denying a claim alone, according to the court, is sufficient even in cases seeking punitive damages.
Reprinted courtesy of
John Anooshian, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
Sean Mahoney, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Anooshian may be contacted at anooshianj@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Mahoney may be contacted at majoneys@whiteandwilliams.com
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Power & Energy - Emerging Insurance Coverage Cases of Interest
November 30, 2020 —
David G. Jordan & Tiffany Casanova - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.The Power & Energy sector faces a multitude of risks that impact output and profitability, requiring sound risk management and robust insurance programs. As of recent, like most industries, there have been significant challenges facing the industry in light of COVID-19. These issues, including decreased product demand as well as supply- side issues, have been well documented. However, other issues continue to impact Power & Energy providers, with significant insurance coverage implications that are worthy of note. Below is a summary of three open cases of interest, where declaratory relief has been sought by energy providers’ insurance carriers, seeking an avoidance of coverage.
1. Fracking Dispute and “Intentional Acts”
In the Texas case of The James River Insurance Co. v. Clearpoint Chemicals LLC et al., No. 4:20-cv-0076 (N.D.Tex), James River Insurance Company (“James River”) is asking a federal district court to declare that it does not owe defense or indemnity to its insured for acts it defines as both intentional and/or malicious acts.
Reprinted courtesy of
David G. Jordan, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
Tiffany Casanova, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Jordan may be contacted at DJordan@sdvlaw.com
Ms. Casanova may be contacted at TCasanova@sdvlaw.com
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Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 —
Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLPThere has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
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DOD Contractors Receive Reprieve on Implementation of Chinese Telecommunications Ban
September 14, 2020 —
Lori Ann Lange & Sabah Petrov - Peckar & AbramsonIn our previous
alert, we discussed the expansion on the Section 889(a)(1)(B) ban on certain Chinese telecommunications equipment and services to contractors and subcontractors who use the equipment and services in their internal operations. Effective August 13, 2020, federal agencies were prohibited from procuring, obtaining, extending, or renewing a contract with a contractor that uses equipment, systems, or services that use covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component or as critical technology, unless an exception applies or a waiver is granted. Since then we have received feedback from contractors, complaining about the difficulties in determining whether their internal operations use covered telecommunications equipment and services and the need for additional time to become compliant or even obtain enough information to submit a waiver request.
Now it seems that Department of Defense (DoD) contractors and subcontractors may be getting a temporary reprieve. The DoD Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment requested a waiver that would allow DoD to continue to execute procurement actions providing supplies, equipment, services, food, clothing, transportation, care, and support necessary to execute the DoD mission. The Director of National Intelligence granted the temporary waiver until September 30, 2020 pending a further review of waiver request. Depending upon the outcome of this additional review, the temporary waiver may be continued beyond September 30, 2020 if it is in the national security interests of the United States.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lori Ann Lange, Peckar & Abramson and
Sabah Petrov, Peckar & Abramson
Ms. Lange may be contacted at llange@pecklaw.com
Ms. Petrov may be contacted at spetrov@pecklaw.com
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FHFA’s Watt Says Debt Cuts Possible for Underwater Homeowners
February 05, 2015 —
Clea Benson – Bloomberg(Bloomberg) -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s overseer wants to allow debt cuts for a narrow group of borrowers who owe more than their homes are worth. The trick is figuring out a way to do it without incurring costs for taxpayers.
Federal Housing Finance Agency Director Melvin L. Watt told reporters Wednesday that he is still studying the idea of reducing principal on properties with depressed values, a step backed by housing advocates and Democratic lawmakers.
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Clea Benson, Bloomberg
