New York Appellate Court Addresses “Trigger of Coverage” for Asbestos Claims and Other Coverage Issues
November 30, 2020 —
Paul A. Briganti - Complex Insurance Coverage ReporterOn October 9, 2020, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, decided an appeal from a trial court’s 2018 summary judgment ruling on a number of coverage issues arising out of asbestos-related bodily injury claims against plaintiffs Carrier Corporation (Carrier) and Elliott Company (Elliott). See Carrier Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 396 CA 18-02292, Mem. & Order (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 4th Dep’t Oct. 9, 2020).
The Fourth Department reversed the trial court’s ruling that, under New York’s “injury in fact trigger of coverage,” injury occurs from the first date of exposure to asbestos through death or the filing of suit as a matter of law. The parties agreed that, because the policy language at issue required personal injury to take place “during the policy period,” “the applicable test in determining what event constitutes personal injury sufficient to trigger coverage is injury-in-fact, ‘which rests on when the injury, sickness, disease or disability actually began.’” Id. at 3 (quoting Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 511 (N.Y. 1993)). The Fourth Department concluded that, in resolving the issue, the trial court erred by relying on inapposite decisions in other cases where: (1) the parties had stipulated or otherwise not disputed that first exposure triggered coverage[1]; or (2) the issue had not been resolved on summary judgment, but rather at trial based on expert medical evidence[2]. The Fourth Department further explained that, even if plaintiffs here had met their initial burden on summary judgment by submitting admissible evidence that asbestos-related injury actually begins upon first exposure, the defendant-insurer’s opposition – which included affidavits of medical experts contradicting that evidence and averring instead that “harm occurs only when a threshold level of asbestos fiber or particle burden is reached that overtakes the body’s defense mechanisms” – raised a triable issue of fact. Id. at 4. The Fourth Department also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant-insurer was collaterally estopped on the “trigger” issue by a California appellate court’s decision in Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The Fourth Department reasoned that the issues litigated in the two cases were not identical because, among other things, California and New York “apply different substantive law in determining when asbestos-related injury occurs.” Carrier, Mem. & Order at 4.
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Paul A. Briganti, White and Williams LLPMr. Briganti may be contacted at
brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com
Newmeyer & Dillion Attorney Alan Packer Selected to the 2017 Northern California Super Lawyers List
July 13, 2017 —
Newmeyer & Dillion LLPWALNUT CREEK, Cali. – JULY 7, 2017 – Prominent business and real estate law firm Newmeyer & Dillion LLP is pleased to announce that litigation attorney
Alan Packer has been selected to the 2017 Northern California Super Lawyers list. Each year, no more than 2.5 percent of lawyers are selected to receive this honor. Packer will be recognized in the August 2017 issue of
Northern California Super Lawyers Magazine.
Packer is a partner in the firm’s expanding Walnut Creek office. He has practiced law in California for over 30 years, mostly representing parties involved in real estate, home building, commercial construction, and insurance matters. He represents homebuilders, property owners, and business clients on a broad range of legal matters.
Packer is a frequent speaker at seminars and in-house training sessions for clients on issues relating to mechanic’s liens, construction litigation, insurance issues, and related matters.
Super Lawyers is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high-degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The patented selection process includes independent research, peer nominations and peer evaluations.
About Newmeyer & Dillion
For more than 30 years, Newmeyer & Dillion has delivered creative and outstanding legal solutions and trial results for a wide array of clients. With over 70 attorneys practicing in all aspects of business, employment, real estate, construction and insurance law, Newmeyer & Dillion delivers legal services tailored to meet each client’s needs. Headquartered in Newport Beach, California, with offices in Walnut Creek, California and Las Vegas, Nevada, Newmeyer & Dillion attorneys are recognized by The Best Lawyers in America©, and Super Lawyers as top tier and some of the best lawyers in California, and have been given Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review's AV Preeminent® highest rating. For additional information, call 949-854-7000 or visit www.ndlf.com.
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Potential Pitfalls Under the Contract Disputes Act for Federal Government Contractors
February 28, 2018 —
Sarah K. Carpenter – Smith Currie PublicationsThe Contract Disputes Act (CDA) governs monetary and non-monetary disputes arising out of contracts or implied-in-fact contracts between the federal government and contractors. Because the CDA is an exclusive remedy, it is important that contractors be wary of the many pitfalls that may be encountered by a contractor seeking to assert a claim against the government under the CDA.
The pitfalls faced by a contractor under the CDA can arise before a contractor becomes aware of a potential claim. Pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 43.204(c), a contracting officer should include in any supplemental agreement, including any change order, a Contractor’s Statement of Release which requires a contractor to execute a broad release of the government from any and all liability under the contract. As a result of this FAR provision, in executing a routine change order, a contractor may inadvertently release its right to pursue a potential claim under the CDA. A contractor should always review any release language prior to executing a supplemental agreement or change order with the government.
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Sarah K. Carpenter, Smith CurrieMs. Carpenter may be contacted at
skcarpenter@smithcurrie.com
Illinois Court Assesses Factual Nature of Term “Reside” in Determining Duty to Defend
October 30, 2023 —
James M. Eastham - Traub LiebermanIn State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Guevara, 2023 IL App (1st) 221425-U, P2, the Illinois First District Court of Appeals addressed an insurance carrier’s duty to defend under a homeowners insurance policy. The underlying suit stemmed from an alleged injury suffered at a residence located in Berwyn, Illinois and owned by named insured Luz Melina Guevara, a defendant in the suit. After Guevara tendered the suit, State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Guevara because Guevara did not “reside” at the insured premises.
The policy defined the "insured location" as the "residence premises," and residence premises was defined as "the one, two, three or four-family dwelling, other structures, and grounds or that part of any other building; where you reside and which is shown in the Declarations." In response to the underlying lawsuit, Guevara had filed an answer and affirmative defenses in which Guevara denied the allegation that "At all relevant times, [Guevara] resided in Berwyn, Cook County, Illinois." Guevara admitted that she owned the Berwyn property but denied that she "resided in, maintained and controlled the property". The declaratory judgment complaint alleged (among other things) that, based on admissions by Guevara in her answer, the Berwyn residence was not an "insured location" under the State Farm policy. State Farm moved for summary judgment at the trial court level on this ground and summary judgment was granted in State Farm’s favor. An appeal ensued wherein the parties disagreed as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that, under the language of the policy, State Farm had no duty to defend because the Berwyn property was not an "insured location" because she did not "reside" there.
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James M. Eastham, Traub LiebermanMr. Eastham may be contacted at
jeastham@tlsslaw.com
Can I Record a Lis Pendens in Arizona if the Lawsuit is filed Another Jurisdiction?
September 26, 2022 —
Ben Reeves - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogRecent research I did on a case led me to the conclusion that Arizona law recognizes foreign litigation (i.e., a lawsuit filed outside of Arizona) as a justification for the recording of a lis pendens against real property located within Arizona. See
TWE Retirement Fund Trust v. Ream, 198 Ariz. 268 (Ct. App. 2000). Apparently, there’s some debate about whether foreign litigation can support a local lis pendens. See
Boca Petroco, Inc. v. Petroleum Realty II, 285 Ga. 487 (Ga. 2009). As noted in the TWE case, Arizona’s lis pendens statute
(A.R.S. 12-1191) does not discriminate between local or foreign “actions.” As such, if litigation is pending anywhere that affects Arizona real property, a lis pendens can (and probably should) be filed.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ben Reeves, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Reeves may be contacted at breeves@swlaw.com
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It Has Started: Supply-Chain, Warehouse and Retail Workers of Essential Businesses Are Filing Suit
June 22, 2020 —
Robert G. Devine, James Burger & Douglas Weck - White and Williams LLPSupply-chain businesses that are appropriately characterized as “essential” have remained open for the delivery of critical supplies while everyone else has been told to close up shop and stay home. Now essential-business employees are contracting COVID-19 and filing suit. Following up on our earlier piece — “Is a Violation of a COVID-19 Order the Basis For Civil Liability?” — it is important to recognize that government directives, oftentimes couched as “recommendations,” can come to define what it means to provide a reasonably safe workplace that protects employees from COVID-19. While common law negligence defenses consider the reasonableness of conduct, these directives will likely become the standard.
The cases that have been filed are overwhelmingly premised upon the timeless negligence construct. The negligence construct, simply put, imposes a duty to act as a reasonable person would under the circumstances. Nonetheless, while the negligence construct lives in the ordinary world of “reasonableness,” infection-control guidance lives in the rapidly developing world of the science of COVID-19. Guidance on seemingly basic questions, such as the methods of transmission (e.g., personal contact, mucus membrane only, airborne transmission) or even the virus’s shelf life on different surfaces, of particular interest packaging and material handling equipment, can change by the day. All of this provides challenges for the supply-side business looking to protect its workforce.
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams LLP attorneys
James Burger,
Robert Devine and
Douglas Weck
Mr. Burger may be contacted at burgerj@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Devine may be contacted at deviner@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Weck may be contacted at weckd@whiteandwilliams.com
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60-Mile-Long Drone Inspection Flight Points to the Future
January 15, 2019 —
Tom Sawyer - Engineering News-RecordBlack & Veatch announced in December the successful conclusion of a 60-mile-log, non-stop, proof-of-concept drone-based inspection flight conducted by a remote pilot in a command center miles away in rural Illinois.
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Tom Sawyer, ENRMr. Sawyer may be contacted at
sawyert@enr.com
Does a No-Damage-for-Delay Clause Also Preclude Acceleration Damages?
January 27, 2020 —
Ted R. Gropman & Christine Z. Fan - ConsensusDocsConstruction contracts often include a “no damage for delay” clause that denies a contractor the right to recover delay-related costs and limits the contractor’s remedy to an extension of time for noncontractor-caused delays to a project’s completion date. Depending on the nature of the delay and the jurisdiction where the project is located, the contractual prohibition against delay damages may well be enforceable. This article will explore whether an enforceable no-damage-for-delay clause is also a bar to recovery of “acceleration” damages, i.e., the costs incurred by the contractor in its attempt to overcome delays to the project’s completion date.
Courts are split as to whether damages for a contractor’s “acceleration” efforts are distinguishable from “delay” damages such that they may be recovered under an enforceable no-damage-for-delay clause. See, e.g., Siefford v. Hous. Auth. of Humboldt, 223 N.W.2d 816 (Neb. 1974) (disallowing the recovery of acceleration damages under a no-damage-for-delay clause); but see Watson Elec. Constr. Co. v. Winston-Salem, 109 N.C. App. 194 (1993) (allowing the recovery of acceleration damages despite a no-damage-for-delay clause). The scope and effect of a no-damage-for-delay clause depend on the specific laws of the jurisdiction and the factual circumstances involved.
There are a few ways for a contractor to circumvent an enforceable no-damage-for-delay clause to recover acceleration damages. First, the contractor may invoke one of the state’s enumerated exceptions to the enforceability of the clause. It is helpful to keep in mind that most jurisdictions strictly construe a no-damage-for-delay clause to limit its application. This means that, regardless of delay or acceleration, courts will nonetheless permit the contractor to recover damages if the delay is, for example, of a kind not contemplated by the parties, due to an unreasonable delay, or a result of the owner’s fraud, bad faith, gross negligence, active interference or abandonment of the contract. See Tricon Kent Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 186 P.3d 155, 160 (Colo. App. 2008); United States Steel Corp. v. Mo. P. R. Co., 668 F.2d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 1982); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376, 396 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
Reprinted courtesy of
Ted R. Gropman, Pepper Hamilton LLP and Christine Z. Fan, Pepper Hamilton LLP
Mr. Gropman may be contacted at gropmant@pepperlaw.com
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