The Word “Estimate” in a Contract Matters as to a Completion Date
February 12, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesLanguage in a contract matters. The word “estimates” or “estimated” matters particularly when it comes to a date certain such as a substantial completion or completion date. Remember this.
Here is an example.
In Parque Towers Developers, LLC v. Pilac Management, Ltd., 49 Fla.L.Weekly D190a (Fla. 3d DCA 2024), a trial court held that the developer did not complete the construction of five condominium units by the date in the purchase agreements. The developer appealed because “[t]he agreements contain no date certain for the completion of the units, but rather include a clause that ‘Seller estimates it will substantially complete construction of the Unit, in the manner specified in this Agreement, by December 31, 2017, subject to extensions resulting from ‘Force Majeure (the ‘Outside Date’).’” Parque Towers, supra. Another provision in the purchase agreements stated, “[w]henver this Agreement requires Seller to complete or substantially complete any item of construction, that item will be understood to be complete or substantially complete when so completed or substantially completed in Seller’s opinion. Id.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Anatomy of a Data Center
October 28, 2024 —
Robert A. James & Matt Olhausen - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogTraditional and social media are thick with reports and predictions of the remarkable increase in size, power consumption and significance of data centers. Not only technology companies but real estate and energy developers, investment funds, lenders, and professionals of all stripes are in or determined to enter this sector. Our inboxes are full—it’s data center this, data center that.
But what exactly is a data center? What infrastructure, technology and human resources come together to create and sustain one of these localized points of computation? By understanding their components, we can glean some understanding of the business, public policy and (our focus) legal issues that arise before and during their operation.
In this article, we cite key characteristics of a reference Blackacre Data Center, with occasional glances at other (real) structures that offer variations on themes. Blackacre is a composite of several centers we have encountered in our law practice. These facilities differ widely in size, location and functions, so your mileage will vary.
Reprinted courtesy of
Robert A. James, Pillsbury and
Matt Olhausen, Pillsbury
Mr. James may be contacted at rob.james@pillsburylaw.com
Mr. Olhausen may be contacted at matt.olhausen@pillsburylaw.com
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Traub Lieberman Partner Lisa M. Rolle Obtains Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss in Favor of Defendant
August 16, 2021 —
Lisa M. Rolle - Traub LiebermanTraub Lieberman Partner Lisa M. Rolle obtained a motion to dismiss in favor of an international hotel chain. In the case brought before the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, the Plaintiff sustained a slip and fall injury in a Portuguese hotel (“Hotel”), which was allegedly caused by violations of building codes and New York and Portuguese negligence laws. The Plaintiff notes that the Hotel utilized the branding affiliated with the international hotel chain, and the named corporate entities are subsidiaries of the parent company of the international hotel chain. Further, Plaintiff alleged that the named corporate entities “owned, operated, maintained, and controlled” the Hotel where the accident occurred, as the international hotel had previously acquired the entity which owned the spa branding utilized.
In moving for pre-answer dismissal, Traub Lieberman acknowledged purchase of the managing agent of the Hotel, which became a subsidiary of their operations. However, Traub Lieberman asserted that the international hotel chain had not owned, operated, maintained, or managed the Hotel. Under New York law, parent corporations cannot be held liable for the actions of their subsidiaries, except in cases that support piercing the corporate veil. Traub Lieberman argued that the motion should be granted as a parent company cannot be held liable for acts committed by its subsidiary and further claimed that the parent company has never owned or operated the Hotel.
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Lisa M. Rolle, Traub LiebermanMs. Rolle may be contacted at
lrolle@tlsslaw.com
Maryland Contractor Documents its Illegal Deal and Pays $2.15 Million to Settle Fraud Claims
January 07, 2015 —
Craig Martin- Construction Contractor Advisor BlogWhy would a contractor create a contract for illegal work? I really don’t know.
Late last year, the FBI announced that a Maryland contractor, Forrester Construction Company, agreed to pay $2.15 million dollars to resolve a criminal investigation into alleged fraud in connection with the use of disadvantaged business enterprises involving more than $145 million of District of Columbia government contracts.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Coronavirus and Contract Obligations
March 30, 2020 —
David R. Cook - AHC Construction and Procurement BlogThe Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has caused a global disruption to businesses, causing many to temporarily close and lay off employees. As businesses assess the short– and long–term economic impact of COVID-19, they should also evaluate what contractual obligations and remedies are available under various agreements (e.g., leases, vendor agreements, and supply agreements). When performance may be delayed or may not occur altogether, businesses should consider their force majeure clauses, if any, and the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose.
Force Majeure
Generally, unless a contract provides that performance will be suspended or relieved when certain events occur (e.g., “acts of God,” government regulation, acts of war or terror, strikes), each party is obligated to perform. However, when there is an express force majeure provision, certain events or acts may excuse non-performance or delayed performance. But depending on the jurisdiction, courts may construe force majeure provisions narrowly and excuse performance only for those events expressly listed in the clause. Nonetheless, if the force majeure provision includes pandemic, epidemic, quarantine, government act, disease, or similar terms, then the COVID-19 pandemic may excuse performance or allow delayed performance.
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David R. Cook, Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Blueprint for Change: How the Construction Industry Should Respond to the FTC’s Ban on Noncompetes
May 13, 2024 —
Matthew DeVries - Best Practices Construction LawIn a groundbreaking move aimed at fostering fair competition and empowering workers, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a final rule last week to ban noncompete agreements nationwide. This ruling may carry profound implications for the construction industry, prompting construction businesses to reassess their practices and ensure compliance while maintaining competitiveness. Let’s explore how construction companies, large and small, can navigate this regulatory shift effectively.
Noncompete clauses have long been a staple in employment contracts within the construction sector, often used to protect proprietary information and retain skilled talent. However, the FTC’s ban on noncompetes demands a reevaluation of these practices. Employers must recognize the potential consequences of noncompliance, including legal repercussions and reputational damage, and take proactive steps to adapt to the new regulatory landscape.
Communications with Employees
The FTC rule requires employers to provide a form notice of non-enforcement to all present and former employees subject to an unexpired noncompete provisions. However, given the immediate legal challenges to the FTC’s rule and the fact that the 120-day compliance window has not yet begun, there is no reason to take immediate action or begin notifying employees. Instead, business owners should wait for at least 60 days before taking concrete action in response to the rule to see if any court temporarily enjoins the effectiveness of the rule.
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Matthew DeVries, Burr & Forman LLPMr. DeVries may be contacted at
mdevries@burr.com
Real Estate Trends: Looking Ahead to 2021
November 09, 2020 —
Adam Weaver - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law Blog2020 has been an unprecedented year, and, while there are likely more twists and turns to come before December 31, it is essential to look at how the real estate markets have changed this year and which trends are likely to continue into 2021. The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted nearly every industry, including commercial real estate, and its impact will continue to influence the market and commercial real estate long after the virus has been eradicated.
Commercial Real Estate Loan Modifications
As the United States’ economy stalled, shut down and slowly started to recover throughout 2020, many businesses were negatively impacted, and most property owners found themselves negotiating with both their lenders and tenants. As tenants were unable to pay rent, property owners were unable to service their debt, which led to a surge of loan modifications this year. This trend certainly will continue through the first half of 2021, as the economy continues to recover.
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Adam Weaver, PillsburyMr. Weaver may be contacted at
adam.weaver@pillsburylaw.com
