Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Recent Supreme Court Decision Could Have Substantial Impact on Builders
January 23, 2023 —
Cassidy Ingram - Ahlers Cressman & SleightOn October 27, 2022, the Washington State Supreme Court issued a decision which could have a substantial impact on the enforceability of contract clauses that require litigation to be commenced within a stated period of time from project completion. In Tadych v. Noble Ridge Construction, Inc.,the Supreme Court held that the contractual one-year statute of limitations for bringing claims against the contractor was substantively unconscionable and reversed the Court of Appeals.
In Tadych, plaintiff owners (the Tadychs) contracted with defendant contractor (Noble Ridge Construction, Inc., or NRC) for the construction of a custom home in 2012. The contract included a one-year claim limitations clause that required claims to be raised within a one year period from project completion and that any claims not raised during the one-year period would be waived. In December 2013, as the project neared completion, the Tadychs met with NRC to identify any outstanding project issues. The Tadychs noted several, including rainwater pools at the landing at the bottom of the stairs and several nicks and cracks on the stucco exterior walls.
The Tadychs moved into the home on April 8, 2014, and the City of Seattle Department of Planning and Development conducted its final site inspection on April 15 and approved the residence for occupancy on April 23. In January or February of 2015, the Tadychs began to notice a shift in their home. In February of 2015, the Tadychs engaged the Construction Dispute Resolution (CDR) to review NRC’s work. CDR raised concerns about the adequacy of the home’s construction and prepared a written report in March 2015 indicating several deviations from the architectural plans and building codes. The Tadychs sent this report to NRC, who assured the Tadychs that NRC’s work followed all requirements and rejected any claims that there were deviations from the plans. The Tadychs continued to notice issues with the home through October 2016.
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Cassidy Ingram, Ahlers Cressman & SleightMs. Ingram may be contacted at
cassidy.ingram@acslawyers.com
Insurers Need only Prove that Other Coverage Exists for Construction Defect Claims
August 27, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFWriting on the Sheppard Mullin web site, Scott Hennigh looks at the implications of the 2012 California case Axis Surplus Insurance. A condominium complex was covered by two insurance policies, covering different time periods. During a construction defect claim, one insurer argued that the claim was not covered. The other insurer settled and sued that both needed to contribute to the settlement. The court held that when multiple insurers are in conflict, the burden to prove that coverage does not exist lies solely on the party claiming it.
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Travelers’ 3rd Circ. Win Curbs Insurers’ Asbestos Exposure
May 03, 2017 —
Gregory D. Podolak - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.In breaking news this week, LAW360.com posted that the Third Circuit ruled Friday that “a common exclusion found in a Travelers policy bars coverage for claims arising out of asbestos in any form, limiting insurers’ potential exposure to asbestos injury claims by precluding policyholders from arguing that the exclusionary language is ambiguous and doesn’t extend to products containing the carcinogen.”
In its detailed analysis of the decision, LAW360 turned to Greg Podolak for his analysis.
Gregory D. Podolak, managing partner of Saxe Doernberger & Vita PC’s Southeast office, said the ruling is a cautionary tale that should galvanize policyholders and their insurance brokers to take a closer look at policies to delete or curtail broad “arising out of” language in exclusions. Otherwise, insureds could find themselves without any coverage for claims even remotely related to a certain product, he said.
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Gregory D. Podolak, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Podolak may be contacted at
gdp@sdvlaw.com
Good Ole Duty to Defend
August 02, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThe good ole duty to defend. Certainly, a duty that should not be overlooked.
A commercial general liability insurer has two duties to its insured when it comes to third-party claims: 1) the duty to defend its insured and 2) the duty to indemnify its insured.
The insurer’s duty to defend its insured will always be broader than its duty to indemnify because this duty is triggered by the allegations in the lawsuit. (For this precise reason, insurers will oftentimes defend their insured under a reservation of rights.) The duty to defend is a very important duty as it is the first duty that typically comes into play when a third-party claim / action is initiated against the insured. Getting the insurer on board to provide a defense is an initial focus. One that cannot be neglected or overlooked.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
Dadelstein@gmail.com
Hanover, Germany Apple Store Delayed by Construction Defects
July 23, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFA new Apple store in Hanover, Germany is scheduled to finally open in September after construction problems created delays, according to AppAdvice. Rumor has it that the store may open on September 19th, the same day of the iPhone 6 is expected to go on sale globally.
Construction issues included “physical defects, mold, and ventilation issues,” according to AppAdvice. “Black barricades appeared around the Hanover store location in April 2013.”
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Neighbors Fight to Halt Construction after Asbestos found on Property
October 15, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFSI Live reported that residents spoke out at the Staten Island, New York community board meeting to try to halt “construction taking place at former Mount Manresa Jesuit Retreat House property in Fort Wadsworth.” Barbara Sanchez, secretary of the Committee to Save Mount Manresa, stated that halting the construction is urgent now that asbestos has been discovered on the property.
"We want a full stop-work order ... Everything being done around those buildings is being blown into our homes,” Sanchez said in the meeting, according to SI Live. “So I want testing for ... everything touched by the asbestos -- and our homes, before the work continues at Mount Manresa!"
Jeanna Massimi, a resident of Fort Wadsworth, stated that people in the community are already dealing with health problems due to the construction work: “A lot of people where I live [are having] X-rays and are being tested for asbestos exposure. They can't have their bedroom windows open anymore. The dust is like soot -- it's thick. It's everywhere in the home. People are coughing, wheezing and hoarse. You end up feeling lethargic.”
Mike Gilsenan, assistant deputy commissioner at the Department of Environmental Protection, said it was “highly unlikely any dust or fibers migrated off that site. That is the best I can tell you.” But SI Live reported that he added “that the process is ‘not foolproof.’”
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KY Mining Accident Not a Covered Occurrence Under Commercial General Liability Policy
December 04, 2018 —
Phillip A. Perez - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.In Am. Mining Ins. Co. v. Peters Farms, LLC,1 the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that a mining error was not a covered accident under a commercial general liability insurance policy. The central issue was whether an insured mining company’s unauthorized removal of minerals from a neighboring property was an “occurrence” that unintentionally caused “property damage” as defined by the mining company’s commercial general liability policy (“CGL Policy”).
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Phillip A. Perez, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Perez may be contacted at
pap@sdvlaw.com
