“Based On”… What Exactly? NJ Appellate Division Examines Phrase and Estops Insurer From Disclaiming Coverage for 20-Month Delay
August 20, 2019 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia and Timothy A. Carroll - White and Williams LLPOn May 28, 2019, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division examined the phrase “based on” in an assault-and-battery exclusion, finding that the phrase means “to make, form, or serve as the foundation of any claim, demand or suit.” C.M.S. Investment Ventures, Inc. v. American European Insurance Company, No. A-2056-17T3, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1215, at *8-9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 28, 2019) (CMS). The CMS case is also notable because the Appellate Division held that a 20-month delay in disclaiming coverage was unreasonable and therefore warranted estoppel.
In CMS, the insured was allegedly warned by its tenant about a faulty ground-floor window that failed to lock properly. Afterward, an intruder broke into the tenant’s apartment and sexually assaulted the tenant, who sued the insured on a premises liability claim. Before she filed suit, the tenant sought payment from the insured’s CGL insurer directly. The insurer denied coverage based on the assault-and-battery exclusion and closed the file, but never informed the insured. Later, the tenant sued the insured, which sought a defense and indemnity from its insurer, which again denied coverage based on the exclusion. The insured then sought a declaration of coverage on grounds that the exclusion was ambiguous, and the insurer “was estopped from denying coverage, because it waited [20] months to inform CMS of its coverage decision.” The trial court ruled in the insured’s favor which led to the appeal in CMS.
Reprinted courtesy of
Timothy Carroll, White and Williams LLP and
Anthony Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Carroll may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com
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Illinois Federal Court Applies Insurer-Friendly “Mutual Exclusive Theories” Test To Independent Counsel Analysis
November 09, 2020 —
Jeremy S. Macklin - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogInsureds often request independent counsel when insurers agree to provide a defense subject to a reservation of rights, pursuant to which an insurer takes the position that certain damages may not be indemnifiable. Requests for independent counsel are often rooted in fear that a defense attorney who has a relationship with the insurer may be incentivized to defend the insured in a way that maximizes the potential for the insurer to succeed on its coverage defenses. As explained by the Illinois Supreme Court in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 355 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. 1976), when a conflict of interest arises between an insurer and its insured, the attorney appointed by the insurer is faced with serious ethical questions and the insured is entitled to its own attorney.
Illinois courts generally follow the rule that an insured is entitled to independent counsel upon a showing of an actual conflict. In Builders Concrete Servs., LLC v. Westfield Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 19 C 7792, 2020 WL 5518474 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2020), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently addressed a dispute between an insurer and its insured about independent counsel.
Westfield insured Builders Concrete Services (BCS). Focus Construction hired BCS as a subcontractor to perform concrete work on a new apartment building. BCS’ work included pouring concrete for structural columns, one of which buckled and failed. BCS sued Focus Construction for withholding payment, and Focus Construction counter-sued for breach of contract and negligence relating to BCS’ alleged faulty work that caused the column to fall. Focus Construction’s counterclaim alleged that the column failure damaged other parts of the building on which Builders did not perform work.
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Jeremy S. Macklin, Traub LiebermanMr. Macklin may be contacted at
jmacklin@tlsslaw.com
Nondelegable Duties
June 04, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesHave you heard the expression “nondelegable duty”? The issue of a nondelegable duty comes into play when a party hires an independent contractor and the independent contractor commits negligence, primarily in the personal injury context. In other words, a plaintiff wants to hold a defendant liable for the injuries caused by the defendant’s independent contractor.
A nondelegable duty is one that “may be imposed by statute, contract, or the common law. In determining whether a duty is nondelegable, the question is whether the responsibility at issue is so important to the community that an employer should not be allowed to transfer it to a third party.” Garcia v. Southern Cleaning Service, Inc., 360 So.3d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (internal citation omitted).
When it comes to CONTRACTUAL duties:
[S]pecifically the principle that one who undertakes by contract to do for another a given thing cannot excuse himself to the other for a faulty performance by showing that he hired someone else to perform the task and that other person was the one at fault. In other words, where the contracting party makes it her or his duty to perform a task, that party cannot escape liability for the damage caused to the other contracting party by the negligence of independent contractors hired to carry out the task.
Gordon v. Sanders, 692 So.2d 939, 941 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Colorado Supreme Court Issues Decisions on Statute of Limitations for Statutory Bad Faith Claims and the Implied Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
July 11, 2018 —
Jennifer Arnett-Roehrich - Gordon & Rees Insurance Coverage Law BlogThe Colorado Supreme Court has been busy the past two weeks, issuing a couple rulings that should be of interest to the insurance industry:
Statute of Limitations for Bad Faith Statute: In Rooftop Restoration, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 2018 CO 44 (May 29, 2018), the Colorado Supreme Court held that the one-year statute of limitations that applies to penalties, does not apply to claims brought under C.R.S. 10-3-1116, Colorado’s statutory cause of action for unreasonable delay or denial of benefits. Section 10-3-1116 provides that a first-party claimant whose claim for payment of benefits has been unreasonably delayed or denied may seek to recover attorney fees, costs, and two times the covered benefit, in addition to the covered benefit. A separate Colorado statute, CRS 13-80-103(1)(d) provides a one-year statute of limitations for “any penalty or forfeiture of any penal statutes.” To arrive at the conclusion that the double damages available under section 10-3-1116 is not a penalty, the Court looked at yet another statutory provision, governing accrual of causes of action for penalties, which provides that a penalty cause of action accrues when “the determination of overpayment or delinquency . . . is no longer subject to appeal.” The Court stated that because a cause of action under 10-3-1116 “never leads to a determination of overpayment or delinquency . . . the claim would never accrue, and the statute of limitations would be rendered meaningless.” Para. 15. Presumably, the default two-year statute of limitations, provided by CRS 13-80-102(1)(i), will now be found to apply to causes of action seeking damages for undue delay or denial of insurance benefits.
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Jennifer Arnett-Roehrich, Gordon & Rees Scully MansukhaniMs. Arnett-Roehrich may be contacted at
jarnett-roehrich@grsm.com
Equitable Lien Designed to Prevent Unjust Enrichment
November 09, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThere are instances where a party does not have construction lien rights but, nevertheless, feels the need to pursue an equitable lien against the real property.
No different than a construction lien, an action to enforce an equitable lien has a one-year limitations period if it arises from the “furnishing of labor, services, or material for the improvement of real property.” Fla. Stat. s. 95.11(5)(b). In other words, an equitable lien–not nearly as powerful as a construction lien because a construction lien is recorded in the official public records whereas an equitable lien is not–is tied to an analogous one-year limitations period for those liening for construction improvements. (Notably, if the equitable lien arises outside of the construction improvement context, the one-year statute of limitations would not apply. See Gabriji, LLC v. Hollywood East, LLC, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2251a (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (one-year statute of limitations period does not apply to all equitable liens such as those that do not arise from furnishing labor, services, or material for the improvement of real property)).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
How One Squirrel Taught us a Surprising Amount about Insurance Investigation Lessons Learned from the Iowa Supreme Court
April 03, 2019 —
Graham C. Mills - Newmeyer & DillionA recent decision issued by the Iowa Supreme Court, City of West Liberty, Iowa v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company, highlights the importance for a policyholder to investigate a loss fully so that a wide range of evidence can be gathered and presented to show why there is coverage. The facts of City of West Liberty are a little unusual, but its lesson is not limited to Iowa insurance law; the issues litigated in this case show the value of investigating what caused a loss regardless of whether the loss occurred in California, Iowa, or elsewhere.
Background on the Case
City of West Liberty involved an insurance coverage dispute between a municipality owned electrical power plant and its insurance company. The dispute arose from a single adventurous squirrel who climbed onto an outdoor electrical transformer, touching two different parts of the power plant: a portion of the steel frame and a bare cable clamp. In doing so, the squirrel created a “conductive path,” in the words of the Iowa Supreme Court, between the high voltage clamp and the grounded frame. The path, once created, caused significant damage to the transformer and other electrical equipment at the city’s power plant.
The city submitted a claim for the resulting damage, but the insurance company denied it. The insurer denied based on an exclusion in the insurance policy for property damage “caused by arcing or by electrical currents other than lightning.” According to the insurance company, the squirrel had no role in causing the damage; all of the damage resulted from arcing, which was excluded from coverage. The ensuing lawsuit focused upon whether the squirrel had a role in causing the damage. If yes, then there would be coverage according to Iowa insurance law; when a loss results from two causes, one of which is covered and the other is not, then there is coverage if the loss occurs from the covered cause. Due to this legal standard, the city contended that, apart from the arcing causing any damage, the squirrel caused the damage too. Because the insurance policy provided protection against mischievous actions performed by squirrels, the city contended that it was entitled to coverage, even if the excluded arcing contributed to the same damage too. Unfortunately, for the city, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected that argument, finding instead that the property damage resulted only from the arcing, which was excluded from coverage. In reaching its conclusion, the court absolved the squirrel of any wrongdoing, finding that it did not cause any of the property damage.
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Graham C. Mills, Newmeyer & DillionMr. Mills may be contacted at
graham.mills@ndlf.com
Judge Gives Cintra Bid Protest of $9B Md. P3 Project Award New Life
March 21, 2022 —
Jim Parsons - Engineering News-RecordThe Maryland Dept. of Transportation will have to reconsider a protest lodged by the losing bidder for the initial phase of its $9-billion Express Lanes project, according to a Feb. 17 state circuit court judge's ruing. The decision likely stalls the state's ambitious plan to add capacity along portions of the I-495/Beltway and I-270 west of Washington, DC, using a progressive public-partnership.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jim Parsons, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at enr@enr.com
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The Privilege Is All Mine: California Appellate Court Finds Law Firm Holds Attorney Work Product Privilege Applicable to Documents Created by Formerly Employed Attorney
June 29, 2017 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Tucker Ellis LLP v. Superior Court (A148956 – Filed 6/21/2017), the First Appellate District held that (1) the holder of the attorney work product privilege is the employer law firm rather than the former employee attorney who created the privileged documents while a firm employee, and (2) as a result, the firm did not owe a duty to obtain the former attorney’s permission before disclosing the subject documents to third parties.
In Tucker Ellis LLP, the attorney, while still employed by Tucker Ellis, exchanged a series of e-mails with a consultant retained by the firm to assist in asbestos litigation for a client. The firm also entered into an agreement with the consultant to summarize scientific studies on the causes of mesothelioma in a published review article. After the attorney departed the firm, Tucker Ellis was served with a subpoena in connection with a matter pending in Kentucky for the production of communications with the consultant regarding the article. In response, Tucker Ellis, in relevant part, produced the work product e-mails authored by the former attorney. The e-mails eventually ended up on the Internet and reached over 50 asbestos plaintiffs’ attorneys, resulting in the attorney’s termination from his new firm. After Tucker Ellis ignored the attorney’s “claw-back” letter, he filed suit against the firm for negligence, among other causes of action. The trial court granted the former attorney’s motion for summary adjudication on the issue of duty, reasoning that the firm owed the attorney a legal duty to prevent the disclosure of the work product. Tucker Ellis filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal challenging the trial court’s decision on the duty issue.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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