Seventh Circuit Remands “Waters of the United States” Case to Corps of Engineers to Determine Whether there is a “Significant Nexus”
July 10, 2018 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law Blog On June 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided the case of Orchard Hill Building Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Court of Appeals vacated the decision of the District Court granting the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Corps) motion for summary judgment dismissing the Orchard Hill Building Company’s (Orchard) complaint that the Corps’ jurisdictional determination erroneously found that the waters at issue were “jurisdictional waters” under the Clean Water Act (CWA) subject to the Corps’ jurisdiction. Acknowledging that the Corps and EPA had promulgated a new rule re-defining “waters of the United States” in 2015—which is now being challenged in the courts—the Court of Appeals noted that this case is controlled by the pre-2015 definition of “waters of the United States.” The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Corps, directing it to determine if there was a significant nexus, as required.
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Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLPMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Court Strikes Down Reasonable Construction Defect Settlement
December 20, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Court of Appeals of Washington has struck down a construction defect settlement between a building owner and the companies she hired to repair the siding, among other repairs to bring the building up to code. Yuan Zhang hired Hawk Construction LLC to do repair work. Hawk, in turn, hired Ready Construction LLC for some aspects of the project. Hawk and Ready were both insured by Capital Specialty Insurance Corporation.
There were several problems with Ready’s work. After removing old siding, they did not protect the building, nor did they remove all of the damaged layers. Ready covered, but did not fix, a mildew problem under the old siding. When new siding was reattached, the nails used were too short to adequately attach it.
After paying for an inspection of the work, Zhang had Hawk and Ready begin the repairs again, but the work was abandoned without being completed. Zhang sued Hawk for breach of contract. Hawk then sued Ready, claiming that “Ready was liable to Hawk to the extent that Hawk was liable to Zhang.” Capitol retained defense for both contractors.
Zhang settled with Hawk, in an agreement that gave her “the right to collect and/or pursue all costs and attorney fees paid by Hawk or its insurance company defending against the Zhang’s claims and pursuing claims against Ready.” Subsequently, she also settled with Ready. Both companies ceased operations.
Zhang had the settlements reviewed by a court, which concluded that the settlements were reasonable. Capital was allowed to appeal, claiming that the settlement included costs that were Zhang’s responsibility. The appeals court did not examine the question of the reasonableness of the settlement, concluding that Capitol’s interests were relevant only to “questions of bad faith, collusion, and fraud.”
In the case of Zhang, the court concluded that the relationship between Zhang and her former contractors was collusive. The court noted that “bad faith or collusion may exist when the evidence indicates a joint effort to create, in a non-adversarial atmosphere, a resolution beneficial to both parties, yet highly prejudicial to the insurer as intervener.” The court noted that both companies had minimal assets which were, in any case, exempted from the agreement. Further, the court found that the agreements failed to determine “what amount of the repairs related to preexisting water damage.” Zhang’s calculation of costs also included her expenses for architectural and engineering services, which the court points out, “where always Zhang’s costs to bear.”
The court concluded that “the overall structure of the settlements is highly probative of collusion, fraud, or bad faith.” Zhang’s agreements with Hawk and Ready allowed her to collect compensation from Hawk and then collect Ready’s compensation to Hawk for their portion of the settlement, allowing Zhang to collect the monies twice. Further, she was allowed to pursue Capitol for Hawk’s attorney expenses, even though Hawk had none. “The right to recover Hawk’s fees merely set up a windfall recovery for Zhang.” The court described the agreements among Zhang, Hawk, and Ready as “precisely the type of manipulation [the law] is intended to preclude.”
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Pulte Home Corp. v. CBR Electric, Inc.
August 24, 2020 —
Michael Velladao - Lewis BrisboisIn Pulte Home Corp. v. CBR Electric, Inc., 50 Cal.App.5th 216 (June 10, 2020), the California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of six subcontractors with respect to an equitable subrogation lawsuit filed by St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company (“St. Paul”). St. Paul filed the lawsuit after defending Pulte Home Corp. (“Pulte”) against two construction defect lawsuits. The lawsuit contended that St. Paul was entitled to seek recovery of defense costs incurred on behalf of Pulte based on equitable subrogation. St. Paul relied on the indemnity clauses in each of the subcontracts, and argued that the subcontractors had breached their contracts with Pulte. As such, each subcontractor was obligated to pay an equitable share of the defense of the construction defect lawsuits relating to their work on the homes at issue in such lawsuits. The trial court ruled against St. Paul and held that the subcontractors’ failure to pay defense costs did not “cause” the homeowners’ claims, such that there was no causal connection supporting a claim for equitable subrogation. In addition, the trial court found that “equitable subrogation was an all-or-nothing claim, meaning it required a shifting of the entire amount of defense costs to the subcontractors on a joint and several basis and did not allow for an apportionment of costs among the defendant subcontractors.”
In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeal reasoned that St. Paul stood in the shoes of Pulte and was limited to pursuing recovery from the subcontractors based on the same rights as afforded to Pulte under the subcontracts. The Court of Appeal noted that St. Paul was seeking reimbursement of defense costs from the subcontractors based on the theory that they were contractually liable for paying an equitable share of defense costs. The Court of Appeal also noted that St. Paul’s claim was not premised on the contention that the subcontractors’ failure to pay defense costs caused the homeowners’ claims. Rather, St. Paul’s claim was premised on the subcontractors’ breach of their defense duty owed to Pulte under the indemnity clauses in their subcontracts.
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Michael Velladao, Lewis BrisboisMr. Velladao may be contacted at
Michael.Velladao@lewisbrisbois.com
Homeowner Has No Grounds to Avoid Mechanics Lien
September 01, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals has rejected a motion by a homeowner in a dispute with the contractor who built an extension to his home. In McCracken v. Pirvulete, Mr. McCracken filed a mechanics lien after Mr. Pirvulete failed to complete payment. The matter went to trial with a series of exhibits that showed “the contractual relationship was strained and the parties disagreed over performance and payment.” As a result of the trial, the court awarded Mr. McCracken, the contractor, $1,922.22.
Mr. Pirvulete appealed, contending that the court had not allowed his daughter to act as a translator, that the court had failed to give him sufficient time to present his case, that the mechanics lien should have been dismissed, and several other claims, all before a formal judgment was issued. After the court formalized its judgment and rejected the appeal, Mr. Pirvulete appealed again.
The appeals court found that Mr. Pirvulete did not provide an adequate record for review. The court dismissed Mr. Pirvulete’s claims. The court notes that Mr. Pirvulete claimed that a request for a discovery period was denied, however, he has provided neither the request nor the denial. The trial court has no record of either.
Nor was there a record of a request that Mr. Pirvulete’s daughter provide translation. The court notes, “so far as we can glean from the record provided, the Register of Actions states, ‘Trial to proceed without Romanian Interpreter for Defendant; Daughter present to interpret if needed.’” Additionally, the court found that “there has been no showing that his facility with the English language is or was impaired in any way or that there was any portion of any proceeding, which he did not understand.”
Further, the appeals court found there were no grounds for a new trial, despite Mr. Pirvulete’s filings. The court concluded, “The owner has failed to provide a record adequate for review of most, if not all, of the claims of error. Some issues are not cognizable because they relate to entirely separate proceedings, and not the trial below. To the limited extent that the claims are examinable, the owner has made no showing of error.” The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court against Mr. Pirvulete.
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Broker for Homeowners Policy Has No Duty to Advise Insureds on Excess Flood Coverage
November 02, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiA broker who assisted the insureds in procuring a homeowners policy had no duty to advise the insureds to secure additional flood coverage. Ring v. Meeker Sharkey Assocs., LLC, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3458 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. Sept.26, 2017).
The insureds owned two beachfront properties that were located in a designated flood zone. They secured homeowners and flood insurance through Meeker's predecessor. Subsequently, Meeker became the insureds' homeowners insurance broker while Willis, N.A. was their flood insurance broker.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Public Projects in the Pandemic Pandemonium
September 07, 2020 —
Ashlynn E. Hutton, Michael J. Crook & Christian F. Torgrimson - Construction ExecutiveDespite the ongoing pandemic, states are opening up for business and establishing a new normal. This determination to move forward includes pushing public transportation projects full steam ahead. While this may be good news for certain industries, it may not be for commercial property owners hoping to see a slow down to public projects and avoid a taking of private property. As many grapple with new economic realities, we examine the approaches employed by states in the southeast to manage construction of public projects in this unprecedented time.
GEORGIA
The Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) is moving forward with all of its previously funded public projects, including the massive I-285 Top-End Project, designated as a “Major Mobility Project” for the Atlanta metro region. Affecting approximately 260 property owners along I-285 and Georgia Highway 400, environmental review of the project continues. GDOT anticipates a contract let date in 2022 and construction start in 2023. Like ocean liners, these projects don’t turn on a dime. Under the 2015 Transportation Funding Act, the budgeted funds cannot be shifted to other needs or projects due to economic shutdown. Once environmental review is complete, GDOT will approve the final design and move toward acquiring right-of-way from affected property owners.
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Ashlynn E. Hutton, Michael J. Crook & Christian F. Torgrimson, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Sochi Construction Unlikely to be Completed by End of Olympic Games
February 11, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAs journalists and visitors descended upon Sochi, Russia for this winter’s Olympic Games, they reported “used linen, improper toilets, poor wiring, unclean water and loose fixtures” using the Twitter hash tag @SochiProblems, according to The International Business Times. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the construction work “in and around Sochi” will be completed by February 23rd—the official end of the games.
The International Business Times article features photographs of various unfinished construction sites including an apartment building, hotels, a sports store, and other buildings. The Olympic opening ceremony took place on February 7th.
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