AIA Releases State-Specific Waiver and Release Forms
September 05, 2022 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogThe American Institute of Architects (AIA) has released a new series of state-specific waiver and release forms including forms for California. The new
California-specific forms are:
- G901CA-2022 – California Conditional Waiver and Release on Progress Payment
- G902CA-2022 – California Unconditional Waiver and Release on Progress Payment
- G903CA-2022 – California Conditional Waiver and Release on Final Payment
- G904CA-2022 – California Unconditional Waiver and Release on Final Payment
California is one of twelve states – including Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Texas, Utah and Wyoming – which regulate waiver and release forms on construction projects. California’s waiver and release statute, which is codified at Civil Code section 8120 et seq., sets forth specific language which should be used in waivers and releases. While the exact language set forth under California’s waiver and release statutes does not need to be used, the statute provides that the language must be “in substantially” the same form, and most people follow the statutory language exactly.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Federal Contractors – Double Check the Terms of Your Contract Before Performing Ordered Changes
July 08, 2019 —
Jonathan Schirmer - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCAs federal contractors may be aware, the general rule when performing a contract for the federal government is that only the contracting officer (“CO”) can bind the government. Often, the CO delegates responsibility to a contracting officer’s representative (“COR”). While in some cases a COR may be able to bind the federal government, the contract may limit that ability exclusively to the CO.
Important for our clients, it is the responsibility of the contractor to determine whether the COR can legally bind the federal government when ordering changes to the scope of work. [1] This is true even when a COR possesses apparent authority to order changes to the work, and when the project is almost exclusively overseen by COR’s. [2]
A recent case highlights the dangers of a contractor relying on the orders of a COR when performing work outside the scope of a contract. In Baistar Mechanical Inc., a contractor was awarded a maintenance and snow removal contract with the federal government. The contract expressly stated that only the CO had contracting authority regarding additional or changed work. [3] However, Baistar, the contractor, argued it was directed by the contracting officer’s representatives to perform work outside of the contract.
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Jonathan Schirmer, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Schirmer may be contacted at
jonathan.schirmer@acslawyers.com
The Condominium Warranty Against Structural Defects in the District of Columbia
September 07, 2017 —
Nicholas D. Cowie - Maryland Condo Construction Defect Law BlogThe District of Columbia Condominium Act contains a statutory warranty that protects condominium associations and their unit owner members from structural defects in newly constructed and newly converted condominiums. The warranty is backed by a condominium developer’s bond, letter of credit, or other form of security from which monies can be drawn upon if the developer fails to make warranty repairs.
This article discusses how the warranty against structural defect works and how to make claims against the developer’s security to fund warranty repairs.
THE CONDOMINIUM WARRANTY AGAINST STRUCTURAL DEFECTS
Condominium developers in Washington DC are required by statute to warrant against structural defects in the condominium common elements and each condominium unit. District of Columbia Condominium Act (“DC Condo Act”) 42-1903.16(b).
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Nicholas D. Cowie, Cowie & Mott, P.A.Mr. Cowie may be contacted at
ndc@cowiemott.com
Tokyo Tackles Flood Control as Typhoons Swamp Subways
August 20, 2014 —
Jacob Adelman – BloombergBelow the condos and boutiques of Tokyo’s upscale Minato ward -- which includes Roppongi Hills, home to Goldman Sachs Group’s Japan headquarters -- a boring machine has carved out the city’s newest defense against floods.
“There are many buildings, there’s a freeway,” said Satoshi Yamamoto, who’s directing the Tokyo government’s 24.5 billion yen ($240 million) project to build a giant subterranean reservoir -- the city’s second of three -- to handle flood waters from the Furukawa river that winds through the area. “We decided the best approach was to go underground.”
When it’s completed in 2016, the 3.3-kilometer (2-mile) reservoir will be able to handle 135,000 cubic meters of water, enough to fill 54 Olympic-sized swimming pools. Tokyo is becoming increasingly reliant on this solution as more typhoons hit the country each year, a trend that Yamamoto said may be linked to global warming. The flooding is exacerbated by the city’s sprawling concrete footprint that keeps rainwater from seeping safely into the ground.
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Jacob Adelman, BloombergMr. Adelman may be contacted at
jadelman1@bloomberg.net
Think Twice About Depreciating Repair Costs in Our State, says the Tennessee Supreme Court
July 09, 2019 —
Andres Avila - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Tennessee’s Supreme Court recently held that an insurer may not withhold repair labor costs as depreciation when the policy definition of actual cash value is found to be ambiguous. Tennessee joins other states like California and Vermont that prohibit the depreciation of repair labor costs in property policies.
In Lammert v. Auto-Owners (Mut.) Ins. Co., No. M201702546SCR23CV, 2019 WL 1592687, the Lammerts and other insureds sought property damage coverage from Auto Owners Insurance for hail damage to a home and other structures they owned in Tennessee.
Auto-Owners Insurance agreed to settle the claims on an actual cash value basis (ACV), which is a method of establishing the value of insured property that must be replaced to determine the indemnity by the insurer. There are multiple methods to calculate ACV. Auto-Owners decided to use the ACV calculation method of deducting depreciation from the cost to repair or replace the damaged property. Depreciation is the decline in value of a property since it was new because of use, age or wear. The rationale behind this method is that an insured should not make a profit by recovering the cost of, for example, a new roof for a damaged roof that was ten years old, and thus depreciation is deducted from the indemnity.
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Andres Avila, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Avila may be contacted at
ara@sdvlaw.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
COVID-19 and Mutual Responsibility Clauses
June 01, 2020 —
Joseph M. Leone - ConsensusDocsAs everyone knows, there is a tremendous amount of uncertainty in the construction industry due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Schedules, productivity, safety processes, and seemingly everything else are being affected. In these difficult times, most contractors are making every effort to work together to solve the problems caused by COVID-19. But what happens when differences arise between project owners, contractors, and subcontractors as to the effect of COVID-19 on a project? One party may want to continue pushing the schedule, others may want to slow down, or, more likely, not be able to keep up with the original schedule because of some reason related to COVID-19. As between a prime contractor and a subcontractor, a mutual responsibility clause can provide some clarity or, unfortunately, depending on how the subcontract is written, confusion.
Almost all subcontracts have a clause which flows down the prime contractor’s obligations on a project to the subcontractor as applicable to the subcontractor’s work. Known as “flow-down” clauses, this clause works in one direction; obligations of the prime contractor “flow-down” to the Subcontractor. A mutual responsibility clause, in essence, works in both directions. The subcontractor is required to perform its obligations consistent with the prime contractor’s obligations to the owner and the subcontractor is granted the same rights against the prime contractor which the prime contractor has against the owner. Obligations flow down and rights flow up. The rights and obligations flowing through the prime contractor include, the obligation to perform the work in accordance with the plans and specifications, the obligation to meet the schedule constraints in the prime agreement, and the right to extensions of time and change orders to the extent the prime contractor obtains the same.
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Joseph M. Leone, Drewry Simmons Vornehm, LLP Mr. Leone may be contacted at
jleone@dsvlaw.com
Not to Miss at This Year’s Archtober Festival
October 15, 2014 —
Carrie Hojnicki – BloombergNew York architecture fanatics everywhere can rejoice: Archtober has arrived. In its fourth annual iteration, the monthlong festival throws a spotlight on the importance of architecture and design in the five boroughs, calling special attention to the city’s rich built history and exciting future. In addition to a lineup of lectures, openings, and workshops, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) New York Chapter–sponsored initiative highlights a “Building of the Day,” with on-site tours led by the architects themselves.
Here are five events not to miss this Archtober.
1. AIA’s New York chapter puts its own spin on the architecture tour: a boat ride. Guides from the AIA will share their wisdom as the cruise circles the tip of Manhattan, passing architectural marvels aplenty. October 3, 10 am and 1:30 pm, Classic Harbor Line
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Carrie Hojnicki, Bloomberg
